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The inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an important source of finance for South Africa. 
The South African government continuously attempts to attract more FDI to improve economic 
growth. Several studies have examined the determinants and effects of FDI at a macroeconomic 
level in South Africa, but very little research has analysed the effects of FDI at a microeconomic 
level, where the focus is on firm performance. Foreign ownership sourced from FDI can have both 
direct and spillover (indirect) effects on firm performance. The absence of evidence regarding the 
effect of foreign ownership on firm performance raises questions about the impact of FDI at the 
firm-level in South Africa. Hence, this study seeks to determine the direct and horizontal spillover 
effects of foreign ownership on the financial performance of firms listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE).  
This study uses panel data for non-financial firms listed on the JSE, covering the seven-year period 
from 2012 to 2018. The system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach is employed 
to estimate the relationship as it accounts for endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity, thus ensuring unbiased results. Firm performance is measured with Return on 
Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. The results for the direct effects vary 
across performance measures, with a non-linear effect of foreign ownership identified only when 
ROE is used. The findings show that foreign ownership has a positive effect on ROE at levels of 
foreign ownership below 40.1% but a negative effect at higher levels of foreign ownership. No 
evidence of horizontal spillovers are found for any performance measures. The implications of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
The rise in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) have 
revamped the world economic system. A substantial amount of attention has been directed towards 
FDI because developing countries consider these inflows as a vital source of finance to facilitate 
their country’s economic growth. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (2018), the largest source of external finance for these developing 
countries is still FDI, comprising 39% of total incoming finance. As of 2018, FDI inflows to 
developing economies amounted to $671 billion (UNCTAD, 2018).  
For South Africa, a crucial structural limitation faced by the economy is low domestic savings that 
are inadequate to achieve the levels of productive investment needed to elevate economic growth. 
Increased economic growth is needed to reduce poverty, increase employment and vastly improve 
living standards, amongst other factors. Due to the gap between domestic savings and the need for 
investment, the South African economy needs foreign capital to meet its objectives of job creation 
and inclusive growth (National Treasury, 2017).  
Figure 1-1: Level of FDI in South Africa from 2010-2018 
 



























Figure 1 depicts the increase in FDI from 2010 to 2013, thereafter, a notable decline is witnessed 
towards the end of Jacob Zuma’s presidency. Following the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as 
president in 2018, attracting more FDI became a central focus of the South African government, 
as the president stated that his goal was to bring R1.4 trillion in investment to South Africa by 
2023 (Villers, 2019). Since then, numerous attempts to attract more international investors have 
been undertaken. Figure 1 shows that the South African government has been successful with these 
efforts, as FDI into South Africa grew from $2 billion in 2017 to $5.2 billion in 2018 - an increase 
of 320%.  
In recent years, the importance of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) has grown significantly and 
outpaced the growth of trade (Ebersberger and Loof, 2005). Dunning and Lundan (2008: 3) defined 
an MNC as a corporation that “engages in FDI and owns or, in some way, controls value-added 
holdings in more than one country”. By the end of 2015, foreign investors owned 38% of shares 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) (see figure A-1 in appendix A). Foreign ownership 
includes both strategic investors (FDI) and portfolio investors (mainly foreign institutional funds). 
Strategic investors have the ability to enforce a significant amount of influence over the firm's 
management in the host economy (National Treasury, 2017). FDI was the largest source of foreign 
ownership in JSE-listed companies, amounting to R1 970 billion, which was equivalent to 49% of 
GDP (National Treasury, 2017). The current policy on FDI in South Africa does not place any 
restrictions on foreign ownership in South African firms (National Treasury, 2011).  
1.2 Research Problem 
Given the importance of FDI as a source of capital, several studies have been undertaken on FDI 
to better understand what attracts FDI to a country and the effects on the country, in order to tailor 
FDI-promotion policies. These studies on the determinants and effects of FDI are typically 
conducted at a macroeconomic level. For example, a considerable amount of research has been 
dedicated to the impact of FDI on economic growth and poverty including in South Africa (for 
example, Kayiya, 2012; Makwembere, 2014; Wakyereza, 2017 among others). Very little 
research, however, has analysed the effects of FDI at a microeconomic level where the focus is on 
foreign ownership and firm performance in South Africa.  
The existing theories that link foreign ownership and firm performance provide contending 




on firm performance. With regards to the direct effects of foreign ownership, a positive effect is 
proposed through decreased agency costs and resource transfer as foreign ownership provides 
assistance to domestic firms through the introduction of new technology, better managerial 
practices, production processes and monitoring (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Douma, George and 
Kabir, 2006; Swart, 2013). However, a negative effect may arise through an increase in agency 
costs (Hong and Loan, 2017) and the liability of foreignness (Barbosa and Louri, 2005), among 
other sources.  
In addition, FDI may have indirect, also known as “spillover” effects, on the performance of other 
domestic firms (Carkovic and Levine, 2002; Girma, Gong, Görg and Lancheros, 2015). These 
spillovers can occur horizontally (intra-industry) or vertically (inter-industry). Horizontal 
spillovers are externalities from foreign firms to domestic firms within the same industry (Javorcik, 
2004), whereas vertical spillovers (backward and forward) emerge when domestic firms and 
MNCs connect across different stages of production (Li and Luo, 2019). FDI is argued to have 
positive horizontal spillovers on the performance of other domestic firms through labour mobility, 
imitation, increase in competition and export spillovers (Görg and Greenaway, 2004), but may 
also have negative effects via local workers migrating to MNCs and the crowding out of domestic 
firms due to decreased market power (Wang and Blomström, 1992). The effects of vertical 
spillovers may be positive via backward and forward linkages but negative effects could also arise 
from the crowding out of domestic suppliers (Sasidharan, 2006; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008).  
Previous studies in individual countries do not provide substantial clarity as to which of the 
theoretical arguments concerning the direct effect of foreign ownership on firm performance are 
most accurate. Some studies have observed a positive linear relationship (Douma et al., 2006); 
others a negative linear relationship (Kim and Lyn, 1990); a non-linear U-shaped relationship 
(Phung and Hoang, 2012); an inverse U-shaped relationship (Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010); and even 
no relationship (Swart, 2013) between foreign ownership and firm performance. Consequently, 
the results on the direct effects of foreign ownership appears to be country specific. Therefore, it 
is not possible to simply translate the findings of other studies to South Africa. 
Further complexity is added to the study of the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance 
in that it is not clear whether the financial performance of firms also influences the amount of 




foreign ownership, as foreign investors often prefer investing in firms that are more productive. 
This potential reverse relationship raises the issue of endogeneity (Stančík, 2007). Along with 
endogeneity, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) highlight the possibility of heterogeneity that 
often appears because the value of firms is usually affected by unobservable characteristics of the 
contracting environment. Certain studies acknowledge the issues of endogeneity and 
heterogeneity, but many do not. Roberts and Whited (2013: 6) state that “endogeneity leads to 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible”. The 
reliability of existing studies that failed to account for endogeneity and heterogeneity are therefore 
questionable. 
The unpublished studies of Swart (2013) and Dube (2018) are the only known papers that have 
examined the relationship between foreign ownership and the financial performance of firms listed 
on the JSE. Swart (2013) reported no significant relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
performance, whereas Dube (2018) discovered a positive linear relationship. Nevertheless, both 
papers contain limitations. Firstly, the sample used by Swart (2013) comprised only of large firms 
and included financial firms, which most studies on this topic exclude due to their differing asset 
structures (Yilmaz and Buyuku, 2016). Secondly, Dube (2018) accounted only for the top one, 
two, three, five and 10 foreign shareholders in his analysis, thus, diminishing the accuracy of the 
effect of foreign ownership. Lastly, neither of these studies accounted for the issue of endogeneity. 
These shortcomings call into question the reliability of the results obtained.  
Previous evidence on FDI spillovers contains a combination of both vertical and horizontal 
spillover effects (such as Nicolini and Resmini, 2010; Xu and Sheng, 2012; Choo, 2012); only 
vertical spillovers (such as Kinda, 2012; Fatima, 2014); and only horizontal spillovers (such as 
Khalifah and Adam, 2009; Erdogan, 2011). There is a lack of clarity on the effects of FDI 
spillovers due to mixed findings. Mixed findings have been documented for horizontal spillovers 
as certain studies observed positive effects (such as Karpaty and Lundberg, 2004; Padibandla and 
Sanyal, 2005; Thangavelu and Pattnayak, 2006), whereas others observed negative effects (such 
as Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Mühlen, 2013). The same holds true for vertical spillovers; 
therefore, there is a lack of clarity on the effects of FDI spillovers. Moreover, while there is 
abundant literature on the spillover effects of FDI on local enterprises in different countries, little 
is known in the South African context (exceptions are Mebratie and Bedi, 2011; Magwiro, Josue 




The existing studies on the direct and indirect effects of FDI have been, for the most part, pursued 
separately. On the one hand, several authors (such as Griffith, 1999; Harris and Robinson, 2002; 
Gunduz and Tatoglu, 2003) estimated the direct effects for MNCs that receive FDI and compared 
their performance to domestic firms, without considering indirect effects (i.e., spillover effects). 
On the other hand, other authors (such as Padibandla and Sanyal, 2005; Nicolini and Resmini, 
2010; Xu and Sheng, 2012) investigated FDI spillover effects, while mainly neglecting the direct 
effects of FDI.  
The absence of definitive evidence on the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance raises 
questions about the impact of FDI at the firm-level. While South Africa continuously attempts to 
attract FDI to improve economic growth, it is unclear as to whether these foreign investors improve 
the performance of firms listed on the JSE or whether a positive effect can only arise if they own 
less than (or more than) a threshold proportion of the firm. Such knowledge is critical for tailoring 
FDI-specific policies. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no study, to date, that has 
examined the relationship between foreign ownership and the performance of firms listed on the 
JSE, while taking into consideration the possibility of a non-linear relationship, indirect effects 
from horizontal spillovers, potential endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity across the firms 
in the sample. Thus, to address this research gap, this study intends to fully consider all factors in 
assessing the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance in South Africa, 
thereby ensuring robust and reliable results. 
1.3 Research Questions and Research Objectives 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
The primary research question, which is thus the focus of this study, is as follows: 
• What are the direct and indirect horizontal effects of foreign ownership on the performance 
of firms listed on the JSE? 
The primary research question will be answered through the following secondary research 
questions: 
• Does endogeneity exist between foreign ownership and firm performance? 





• If the direct relationship is non-linear, what is the optimal level of foreign ownership? 
• Are there any horizontal spillover effects from foreign firms to domestic firms? 
1.3.2 Research Objectives 
To address the secondary research questions, the following objectives are specified:  
• To explore if endogeneity exists between foreign ownership and firm performance.  
• To establish if the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance is either 
linear or non-linear (with the non-linear relationship being either U- or inverse U-shaped). 
• If the direct relationship is non-linear, to determine the optimal level of foreign ownership. 
• To ascertain if there are any horizontal spillover effects from foreign to domestic firms. 
1.4 Justification of the Study in a South African Environment  
South Africa is a compelling case to analyse the impact of foreign ownership on firm performance 
due to the South African government’s prioritisation in attracting FDI and that FDI is the largest 
source of foreign ownership in South African companies (in comparison to portfolio investment). 
This study provides valuable insight to investors, firm owners and managers, on the one side, as 
they seek to identify an ownership structure that maximises shareholder value and firm 
performance. In addition, it will also aid the government and other policymakers in achieving their 
objectives of job creation and inclusive economic growth with the capital attained through FDI. 
1.5 The Scope and Method of this Study 
1.5.1 The Scope of Study 
This study focuses only on the effect of FDI, with respect of foreign ownership, at a firm-level 
rather than a macroeconomic level, as a substantial amount of research has already been conducted 
on the impact of FDI on the South African economy. With respect to FDI spillovers, this study 
reviews literature on horizontal and vertical spillovers, but only horizontal spillovers are estimated 
due to the discrepancies surrounding the estimation of vertical spillovers.  The study covers the 
seven-year period from 2012 to 2018. The sample excludes firms from the financials industry as 




Delisted firms are included to eliminate any effects of survivorship bias1.  Annual data for all listed 
and delisted companies of financial performance indicators and firm-specific characteristics were 
obtained from Bloomberg, foreign ownership percentages, while the foreign ownership data was 
extracted from the shareholder’s section of IRESS, due to its unavailability on Bloomberg.  
1.5.2 Research Methodology  
The first step of the empirical analysis involves a series of tests used to assess the potential issue 
of endogeneity. These tests include: (i) the test of reverse causality; (ii) the test of strict exogeneity; 
and (iii) the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test, that is adopted as a robustness check. The second 
step of the empirical analysis uses linear models and a quadratic model estimated using System 
Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM) to satisfy the remaining three objectives. In order 
to ensure robustness, the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test, Hansen test and difference-in-Hansen 
test are specified within all system GMM estimations. The test of non-linearity between foreign 
ownership and firm performance is conducted using a quadratic test and Sasabuchi-Lind-Mehlum 
(SLM) test. The SLM test determines whether the non-linear relationship is U-shaped or inverse 
U-shaped and estimates the optimal level of foreign ownership in JSE-listed firms. The final 
component of the empirical analysis extends the robustness tests by assessing the strength of 
instruments in the system GMM.   
1.6 Structure of the Study 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical foundations on the direct and spillover effects of foreign 
ownership on firm performance. This chapter also includes a comprehensive review of empirical 
studies on the topic, which is subdivided according to financial performance, firm productivity and 
spillovers. Chapter 3 explains the data selection, variables utilised in the study and the sample 
period. A detailed description of the approaches used, is also provided, in conjunction with an 
outline of the estimation techniques adopted for each model. In Chapter 4 the results from each of 
the models are presented, together with an analysis of the findings. Chapter 5 provides answers to 
the research questions and attempts to draw inferences from the findings. The final segment of this 
 
1 Survivorship bias occurs when the sample being tested consists of only companies which were strong enough to 
survive the sample period of analysis and excludes the companies which did not survive. This phenomenon distorts 




chapter details the potential weaknesses of this study, recommendations for future research on the 






CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review, comprising of the theoretical framework and review of empirical evidence, 
centres on two closely related themes: the direct and indirect effects of foreign ownership. In order 
to form the theoretical framework of this study, it is necessary to adopt a multi-theoretic approach 
by integrating components of financial and economic theories, as restricting the analysis to only 
financial theories proves too limiting in fully understanding the relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance. The empirical evidence consists of prior research on this subject 
and is reviewed through three avenues: financial performance, productivity and FDI spillovers.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 The Direct Effects of Foreign Ownership on Firm Performance  
The theories presented in this section aim to provide a more holistic understanding of the direct 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. 
2.2.1.1 Agency Theory 
According to Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012: 209), one of the most significant traits of 
contemporary business is “the separation of ownership and control”, where shareholders have little 
or no direct control over the operations of the company (Marks, 1999; Moez, 2018). This 
separation arises since the ownership of large companies is typically widely dispersed among 
domestic and foreign institutional, corporate, and retail investors meaning that the owners need to 
appoint managers to run the business on their behalf. Managers are thus tasked with the 
responsibility of maximising shareholder wealth. This separation of ownership and control gives 
rise to the agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
Agency theory, developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, refers to the principal-agent 
relationship when one person/entity (the principal) hires another (the agent) to act on their behalf. 
While the principal-agent relationship can be seen in many different environments, it is most 
common in the case of shareholders (the principal) hiring managers (the agent) to run the firm and 
act in their best interest.  
As a consequence of differing interests and information asymmetry (managers have more 




shareholders (i.e., they do not maximise shareholder value) instead acting in their self-interests 
(He and Sommer, 2010). This is referred to as the agency problem. In order to reduce this problem, 
the objectives of managers need to be aligned with those of shareholders. Several mechanisms can 
be used to achieve this, for example, monitoring, incentives such as share ownership and threats 
of a takeover (Rediker and Seth, 1995).  
The Board of Directors (BoD) has a legal duty to represent shareholders’ interests, which includes 
hiring and firing the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), setting their compensation and monitoring 
their performance (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). In addition to making decisions 
concerning the CEO, the BoD may also participate in the setting of strategies and the selection of 
projects. These duties make the BoD an important element for ensuring that managers’ and 
shareholders’ decisions are aligned (Davies, 2000). The monitoring role of the board usually 
increases once outside members are included as they have incentives to execute duties rather than 
to conspire with management to expropriate residual claimants as they are driven to obtain 
reputations as experts in decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Monitoring can also be 
conducted in the form of auditing (Hall, 1998; Panda and Leepsa, 2017), with owners requiring 
the books of the company to be audited regularly. This may assist in decreasing the rate of 
embezzlement in the company (Petrascu and Tieanu, 2014). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) claimed that shareholders with significant levels of ownership have 
strong incentives to monitor managers; thereby reducing agency costs. However, large 
shareholders can also negatively impact firm value as they can cultivate their private interests 
which contradict with the interests of minority shareholders or those of employees and managers. 
This is supported by Viet (2013: 299), who states that “ownership by shareholders correlates with 
gains from monitoring or with losses from expropriations when their ownership exceeds a certain 
large level”.  
In the absence of active monitoring of a firm’s management by its shareholders, the payment of 
dividends may provide indirect control benefits (Khan, 2006). The distribution of cash dividends 
depletes the free cashflows of a company, thus forcing managers to seek external finance. 
According to Easterbrook (1984), external finance is more effective than internal finance with 
regard to monitoring and disciplining management. By paying dividends, companies also undergo 




agency problems in order to secure future funds. Hence, the payment of dividends can be viewed 
as a mechanism that reduces agency costs and information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985).  
Another way to reduce the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is with the aid 
of performance-based incentives such as share option schemes (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 
Mawanza, 2014). The fundamental idea is that a manager has, as part of their remuneration, the 
option to buy a prespecified number of shares of the firm, at a fixed price. The manager thus 
benefits directly from an increase in the share price and, as such, will act and make decisions that 
are expected to increase the firm’s share price (Hall, 1998). Moreover, a significant level of 
managerial ownership will likely result in the manager committing to value-added activities and 
refraining from exploiting corporate resources as their main objective is the maximisation of 
shareholder value, due to their own interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
According to Cohen and Uliana (1990), an active takeover market also aims to align the interests 
of managers and shareholders. If managerial actions lower the future earnings of shareholders, the 
price of the share often declines as well. In many cases, this can make the firm a target for takeover 
(Hall, 1998). If the management of such a firm is replaced, shareholders may benefit. The threat 
of takeovers can, therefore, act as an outside control mechanism, which guarantees that the actions 
of managers maximise the wealth of shareholders.   
However, these mechanisms have cost consequences, with an associated effect on the wealth of 
shareholders and should thus only be incurred if the advantages to be gained are greater than the 
associated cost (Hall, 1998). There are three main types of agency costs: (i) monitoring costs that 
are induced when principals attempt to monitor the activities of agents, which was discussed 
above; (ii) bonding costs of restrictive covenants; and (iii) residual losses accumulated from the 
difference in manager behaviour from the ideal (Coriat and Weinstein, 2012; Zhou, 2014). 
Bonding expenditures are a result of the agents assuring the principals that they will not take 
specific actions (Laiho, 2011; Hong and Loan, 2017). Furthermore, an agent is obligated to 
contractual obligations that limit the agents’ activity. These contractual obligations will also ensure 
the required performance of agents (Zhou, 2014). Despite monitoring and bonding, it is improbable 
that the interests of managers and shareholders fully align (McColgan, 2001). Therefore, there are 




residual loss. In addition to losses induced, firms incur unnecessary management expenditure and 
residual losses from unrealized investment opportunities due to their management being risk-
averse (Kaaro, 2014). These missed opportunities could have increased shareholder wealth.  
Agency Theory and Foreign Ownership 
Due to the distance between the MNC and the home country of the foreign shareholder, as well as 
the language barrier and reduced access to information, it is often argued that foreign ownership 
contributes to greater agency costs than domestic ownership (Swart, 2013; Hong and Loan, 2017). 
According to Boubakri, Guedhami and Saffar (2016), foreign ownership is expected to be lower 
in more distant firms since longer distances between the MNC’s headquarters and the foreign 
shareholder potentially amplifies negative incentives and increases the degree of information 
asymmetry as remotely located companies tend to be neglected by foreign owners due to travel, 
transportation costs and the difference in time-zones (Malloy, 2005). The lack of available 
information for foreign shareholders offers managers less incentive to fulfil the interests of external 
shareholders and more power to seek private benefits (Luo and Chung, 2013). Foreign 
shareholders are often aware of this and thus implement greater monitoring and transparency of 
management actions (Guedhami, Pittman and Saffar, 2009), further increasing agency costs.  
Differences in languages pose significant problems as numerous non-English-speaking companies 
are expected to adopt English as their corporate language, compelling them to conduct daily 
operations in their second language, which may warrant miscommunications (Feely and Harzing, 
2008). Some firms introduce language training facilities; however, teaching employees to work 
effectively in a foreign language may be difficult. As such, companies intending to pursue this 
route need to do so to sustain the program over many years, which in turn will lead to more agency 
costs. 
The effect of foreign ownership on firm performance in the agency theory, however, may be more 
complicated, depending upon the type of ownership by the foreigner. Douma et al. (2006) and 
Swart (2013) suggested that foreign shareholders should be separated into two categories, namely 
foreign financial institutions and foreign industrial corporations, as the governing dynamics of 
these shareholders are significantly different. Foreign financial institutional shareholders are 
mainly interested in the short-term returns that a company can provide (Wilkins, 1999).  As such, 




with management and, in many instances, do not participate in the transfer of any management or 
technological skills (Douma et al., 2006).  
Moreover, foreign financial institutional shareholders hold extremely fragmented stakes as this 
form of ownership is usually legally constrained. According to Douma et al. (2006: 643), these 
shareholders represent the “dispersed-outside category of shareholders as viewed from an agency 
perspective”. Although equipped with monitoring capabilities, dispersed-outside shareholders 
only exhibit moderate influence on firm performance and the agency problem, as their capacity to 
actively monitor is restricted by their weak incentives to monitor and discipline management 
(Hackethal and Zdantchouk, 2006). Leech and Leahy (1991) argue that if foreign investors are 
dispersed, they will have only a moderate influence on the performance of the firm since the 
investor usually owns less than 5%. 
Foreign corporate shareholders, in contrast, are potentially more likely to participate in a long-
term commitment with MNCs, and thus fill a more operative role to assure the profitability and 
productivity. Douma et al. (2006: 643) characterised these foreign corporate shareholders as 
“concentrated-outside and strategic-foreign from the agency and resource-based theories, 
respectively”, which is discussed below. Agency theory states that due to foreign corporate 
ownership stakes being larger and less disintegrated compared to those of foreign financial 
institutional shareholders, foreign corporate investors may exhibit a favourable influence on firm 
performance as they can mitigate the possibility of the majority owners taking control at the 
expense of the minority shareholders, while simultaneously maximising the benefits of monitoring, 
incentive alignment, and risk-bearing (Allen and Phillips, 2000; Douma et al., 2006). Contrarily, 
increased ownership and control can lead to an entrenchment effect where large foreign 
shareholders worsen financial performance because they pursue their own interests at the expense 
of other stakeholders (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Phung 2015). 
It is thus clear that the agency theory does not provide a definitive theoretical argument as to 
whether foreign ownership positively or negatively affects firm performance. On the one hand, a 
positive effect may materialise through monitoring and incentives, which will decrease agency 
costs, but, on the other hand, an adverse effect may also be experienced through an increase in 
agency costs, caused by distance, the difference in languages and information symmetry. 




performance, while concentrated foreign investors that own more than 5% will induce a positive 
impact on firm performance. Nonetheless, Oliver (1997) claimed that the agency theory represents 
an incomplete outlook of the world. It is therefore suggested that agency theory should be 
integrated with the resource-based and institutional theories in order to attain a clearer 
understanding of the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. As such, these theories are 
examined in the following two sub-sections. 
2.2.1.2 The Resource-based Theory 
Firms have a competitive advantage when they are in possession of tangible and intangible 
resources. In order to maintain their competitive advantage, the company resources need to be 
scarce, valuable, inimitable and irreplaceable (Barney, 1991). Thus, the performance of firms 
under the resource-based theory is determined by the resources of the firm.  
The impact of foreign ownership on firm performance according to the resource-based theory, like 
that of the agency theory, depends on the type of ownership. That is, the performance of firms will 
differ substantially when owners are either foreign financial institutions or foreign industrial 
corporations (Douma et al., 2006). As indicated in the previous section, foreign financial 
institutional shareholders are equipped with efficient monitoring abilities, but their financial focus 
and interest in liquidity make them reluctant to commit to a long-term relationship with the 
company and to participate in the restructuring procedure, in case of inadequate performance 
(Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty, 2017). These shareholders favour exit strategies instead of a 
role to monitor management (Coffee, 1991).  
If foreign institutional shareholders are disappointed with the performance of a firm’s share price, 
they hold the easy option of selling their ownership stake rather than investing their time and effort 
to establish a corporate restructuring process (Douma et al., 2006). As mentioned in the agency 
theory, they do not participate in the transfer of any management or technological skills. Since 
foreign institutional shareholders are reluctant to enter in a long-term relationship with the 
company or take part in the restructuring process, they are expected to have only a moderate effect 
on firm performance (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).  
Contrarily, foreign corporate shareholders who have strategic interests, as a result of their 
ownership stakes, are driven by non-financial objectives, such as the attainment of control rights 




2003). Strategic-foreign shareholders utilise their stakes of ownership as a way to harvest their 
strategic interests, which include acquiring entry into new markets, location-specific resources and 
inexpensive production amenities (Douma et al., 2006). Their foreign affiliation also brings local 
companies in connection with a high-calibre of technical, managerial and financial resources 
(Chibber and Majumdar, 1999). These shareholders increase profitability through an increase in 
sales and cost reduction due to additional and/or superior resources such as technology from 
MNCs, combined with new market access made possible by the affiliated local firms (Anderson 
and Liao, 2019). Among these groups of shareholders, there exists significant heterogeneity in 
resources and organisational capabilities, and as such, this impacts on the performance of the firm 
(Douma et al., 2006).  
In summary, the resource-based theory stipulates that resources that induce competitive advantage 
within firms will positively influence a firm’s performance and that such resources are most likely 
to be provided by strategic-foreign shareholders, suggesting a positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performance.  
2.2.1.3 Institutional Theory  
Although the agency and resource-based theories provide significant insight in understanding the 
impact of different types of ownership on firm performance, they experience a limitation in that 
they fail to analyse the social context within which the company’s operations are integrated 
(Douma et al., 2006). Nevertheless, this is captured by the institutional theory. The institutional 
theory concentrates on the legitimacy required by MNCs in order to operate in a foreign country. 
The theory emphasises the influence of factors such as socio-cultural norms, beliefs, values, and 
regulatory and judicial systems on organisational structure and behaviour (Oliver, 1997 and 
Douma et al., 2006). Such factors may constrain the achievement of superior performance by the 
foreign firm (Alquist, Berman, Mukherjee and Tesar, 2019). The principal rationale of this theory 
is that organisations must comply with these institutional factors to increase their legitimacy 
(Karakaş and Yıldız, 2012).  
Maintaining legitimacy may prove to be difficult because MNCs try to conform to both internal 
and external legitimacy expectations and suffer from the liability of foreignness (Crilly, 2011; 
Campbell, Eden, and Miller, 2012). Internal legitimacy deals with the approval of a subsidiary by 




and embodied by the home country environment of the parent firm. External legitimacy is granted 
by the institutional environment in which the subsidiary is located and emanates from it following 
practices institutionalised in that environment (Murage, 2013). Zaahir (1995) defined the concept 
of the liability of foreignness as the cost incurred from engaging in business abroad because of the 
competitive advantages that local firms possess. In particular, local firms have superior access to 
market-relevant information, are more fixed in the national environment and do not face foreign 
exchange risks (Hymer, 1976). Therefore, the performance of foreign firms may be hindered as 
they must compensate for the liability of foreignness (Barbosa and Louri, 2005).  
There are four major sources of the liability of foreignness. First is the spatial difference between 
the MNC and its operations. Second, firm-specific costs based on the unfamiliarity of MNCs with 
the local environment, including governance structures, procedures, business practices and the 
legal and regulatory frameworks that facilitate and enable business transactions. This may affect 
their legitimacy, performance and the costs of doing business overseas (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 
1997; Cai, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Calhoun, 2002). Third, economic nationalism, where 
national governments undertake protective measures to reduce imports and investments from other 
countries or by limiting immigration, may prevent MNCs from having access to required resources 
and talent from their home countries (Bell, Filatotchev and Rasheed, 2012). Lastly, government 
policies and restrictions; for example, the restrictions imposed on MNCs from the United States 
(US) on high-technology sales to certain countries, or laws like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act2 
(Zaheer, 1995). Some governments also have the power to place restrictions and performance 
requirements for FDI in all sectors (Singh, 2003). 
It is thus evident that major institutional issues that foreign-owned firms face, such as difficulties 
in maintaining legitimacy and liability of foreignness, may negatively impact firms, thereby 
indicating a negative relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance.   
 
2 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. ("FCPA"), was enacted to 
make it unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make payments to foreign government officials to assist 




2.2.2 The Indirect Effects of Foreign Ownership on the Productivity of Domestic Firms   
This section reviews the theories relating to the spillover effects that arise when the presence of 
foreign firms causes productivity increases in local firms, taking the interactions between firms 
into consideration. 
2.2.2.1 Horizontal Spillovers 
Horizontal (intra-industry) spillovers arise when the entrance of foreign subsidiaries increases the 
productivity levels of other domestic companies within the same industry (Batool, Sadia and 
Ahmad, 2009; Yanran, 2015; Li and Luo, 2019). Nevertheless, negative spillovers, which decrease 
productivity levels, may also occur (Mühlen, 2013). There are four main channels through which 
horizontal spillovers may occur: (i) labour mobility; (ii) imitation; (iii) competition; and (iv) 
exports (Görg and Greenaway, 2004).  
Foreign affiliates are usually more involved than local firms in training and educating their workers 
(Djankov and Hoekman, 2000), with this training occurring across most levels of employees from 
manufacturing workers to technologically advanced professionals and top-level managers 
(Tantratananuwat, 2015). The movement of the MNC-trained workers can conceivably increase 
productivity via two mechanisms. Firstly, the MNC-trained labourers can take with them the 
learning of new technology or management systems and therefore become direct agents of the 
transmission of innovative technology (Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde, 2001; Görg and Greenaway, 
2004). Secondly, workers from local firms may enhance their productivity by merely associating 
themselves with MNC-trained workers. However, it has been widely argued that the most 
significant mechanism is the relocation of MNC-trained labour within the domestic sector - either 
by alternating positions of employment or establishing new companies (Fosfuri et al., 2001; Doan, 
Mare and Iyer, 2015). On the contrary, highly skilled domestic labourers may be lured to MNCs 
as they tend to offer higher wages. As a result, local firms may experience a loss in human capital, 
thus resulting in productivity losses (Glass and Saggi, 2002). 
The sophisticated technologies and new products unveiled by the MNC in the local market 
pressure the domestic firms to innovate. Innovation usually takes the form of imitation, whereby 
the local companies imitate the final goods or the production methods of the MNC (Wang and 
Blomström, 1992; Doan et al., 2015). Domestic firms may approach workers who were integral in 




production technique of the MNC. This procedure is referred to as reverse engineering (Yanran, 
2015). Besides imitating goods and procedures, the local enterprises may also imitate the 
management systems via reverse engineering (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Yanran, 2015). 
However, the success of the strategy of reverse engineering is dependent upon the complexity of 
the product and process; the more complicated they are, the harder it is to imitate them. 
Notwithstanding this, any advancement of domestic technology acquired from imitation is a 
benefit for local firms (Doan et al., 2015). 
The increase in competition as a result of foreign companies entering the domestic market may 
drive domestic firms to enhance their productivity, reduce costs and allocate resources more 
efficiently within the economy (Blomström, 1986; Doan et al., 2015; Tantratananuwat, 2015). 
However, the existence of MNCs might be prominent enough to create a position of market power 
in the domestic economy, reducing the scale of some local companies that are already in service 
to the host country market. Eventually, certain domestic companies may even be forced to leave 
the market as they cannot compete at all (Wang and Blomström, 1992; Glass and Saggi, 2002), 
thus effectively decreasing local market competition (Davies, 2003). The net effect of the 
competition relies on the ability of domestic companies to contend with MNCs and the efficacy of 
foreign firms to strengthen their market share (Kosava, 2010; Tantratananuwat, 2015).  
Görg and Greenway (2004: 174) state that “a further indirect source of productivity gain might be 
through exports”. Spillovers through exports occur when MNCs disperse their knowledge of 
international markets to local companies, thus helping them to grow into more lucrative exporters 
(Kneller and Pisu, 2007). There are three main channels that facilitate export spillovers. First, if 
MNCs possess superior access to information on foreign markets, this can “spill over” through 
their export activities (Görg and Greenway, 2004). Export-related information spillovers result in 
the decrease of export marketing costs and the increase in the export-to-sales ratios of local 
companies in the same industry (Chen, Sheng and Findlay, 2013). Second, there are imitation 
effects whereby local firms can learn the MNCs efficient production or management procedures, 
which, in turn, allow them to compete more successfully in export markets (Mühlen, 2013). Third, 
competition between local companies and MNCs in both home and foreign markets can induce 




Foreign companies have strong incentives to prevent knowledge spillovers to the local firms who 
are their competitors. This can be accomplished by restricting local employees’ access to 
information; managing core parts/materials information as trade secrets; and exporting production 
equipment by sealing off know-how in the equipment (Matsubara, 2014). MNCs can also 
counteract the mobility of labour by paying higher wages or implementing restraints of trade 
(Batool, Sadia and Ahmad, 2009). The prevention of technology spillovers can occur through 
formal protection of intellectual property or operating in countries where local companies have 
restricted imitative abilities (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005).  Thus, the effect of horizontal 
spillovers may be restricted by the actions of the MNCs (Li and Luo, 2019). 
2.2.2.2 Vertical Spillovers 
The spillover effects of foreign ownership on the performance of local firms described above arise 
for companies in the same industry. However, spillovers may also occur as a result of inter-industry 
linkages when there is an interaction between the MNC and their local suppliers or customers 
(Batool et al., 2009; Doan et al. 2015). These are known as vertical spillovers and may occur 
through backward/upstream linkages or forward/downstream linkages (Pack and Saggi, 2001). 
Backward linkages occur when there is an association between the MNC and domestic suppliers, 
while forward linkages materialise from relationships between the MNC and their domestic 
customers (Blomström and Kokko, 1998; Talavera, 2001).  
Foreign affiliates sign formal contractual agreements with domestic suppliers for the supply of 
intermediate inputs. In order to decrease the price and elevate the quality of inputs for their 
production process, the MNC may transfer new technologies or techniques to the suppliers (Görg 
and Greenaway, 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008; Li and Luo, 2019). MNCs are known to 
contribute technical assistance to facilitate their local suppliers in absorbing and understanding the 
freshly transmitted knowledge (such as through training management) (Doan et al., 2015). In 
addition, MNCs offer domestic suppliers an opportunity to increase their economies of scale by 
extending and assuring a market for intermediate inputs (Lim and Fong, 1982). Overall, domestic 
suppliers benefit from the backward linkages of foreign ownership in the form of an enhancement 
of the quality of raw materials, increased output and jobs, more efficient production, technological 




MNCs adhere to strict quality requirements concerning the inputs supplied by domestic firms 
(Javorick and Spatareanu, 2005). If MNCs are not satisfied with the quality of inputs from local 
suppliers, they will be uninterested in building vertical relationships (Reganati and Sica, 2007). 
This may result in the crowding out of domestic suppliers, as MNCs may acquire their inputs from 
foreign suppliers; thereby forcing domestic suppliers to exit the market (Görg and Greenaway, 
2004; Sasidharan, 2006). As a consequence, a negative vertical spillover can arise in such 
scenarios.  
MNCs acting as suppliers of intermediate inputs to domestic firms may also result in forward 
linkage spillover effects (Sari, Khalifah and Suyanto, 2016). MNCs take an interest in their 
customer’s revenues and efficiency since that, in turn, translates to higher demand for their 
supplies. Therefore, the MNC has an incentive to convey knowledge on production procedures, 
techniques and global market access to the upstream domestic company (Doan et al., 2015). 
Foreign suppliers provide their local customers with the necessary technical support and training 
when they buy these intermediate inputs. As a result, local firms may increase their productivity 
through the use of high-quality inputs from foreign suppliers (Liang, 2017). 
2.2.2.3 Absorptive Capacity 
For spillover benefits from foreign ownership to be realised, sufficient absorptive capacity is 
required in the host country (Nguyen, Duysters, Patterson and Sander, 2009). Absorptive capacity 
refers to a local firm’s ability to identify, assimilate and exploit the benefits spilled over by FDI 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Khordagui and Saleh, 2016). Three main factors increase the 
absorptive capacity of firms: (i) greater initial technological knowledge; (ii) greater human 
resource capacity from the labour force; and (iii) a more advanced financial system of the country.   
As discussed in sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2, the gains from FDI can be transmitted to domestic 
companies through horizontal or vertical channels. Regardless of the channel, Nguyen et al. (2009: 
8) asserts that “domestic companies are required to have initial technological level to assimilate or 
image the advanced technology from FDI”. That is, companies require prior related knowledge in 
order to absorb and utilise new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Typically, absorptive 
capacity has been measured by the technology gap between the domestic and foreign firms (Doan 
et al., 2015). Kokko (1996) claims that domestic firms can only reap the benefits of spillovers if 




Khordagui and Saleh (2016: 144) notes that “the greater the gap, the lower the ability of the host 
country to absorb the incoming technology since it lacks the human capital, networks and general 
infrastructure to make use of such technologies”.  
The second major element is the labour force, which is defined by human capital and education 
(Blomström and Kokko, 2003). This factor is deemed crucial as labour is the channel for 
transferring and receiving the FDI benefits through training, learning by doing and accumulating 
experience (Nguyen et al., 2009). Better educated and skilled labour gives rise to better know-how 
absorbed, and better performance achieved. Chen (1990) points out that countries with more 
investment in human capital have the ability to reap greater benefits from foreign ownership. 
Therefore, to realize the benefits of FDI, the host country requires good quality human capital as 
only humans have the capacity to learn, assimilate and generate new information.  
Finally, the development of the financial system impacts the absorptive capacity of a country 
(Mabena, 2013). Financial systems are a vital tool used to carry out FDI activities, such as the 
disbursement of investment capital; the transfer of money from the home country of the MNC to 
the recipient country; payments for building materials, raw materials and labour costs; collection 
of money after selling and the transfer of income out of the country, and the other businesses 
(Nguyen et al., 2009).  All such activities require a developed financial system. For example, if 
the investment capital is not disbursed, the project process might be delayed, stagnant or even shut 
down and the host country will receive nothing from FDI. Hence, the development of financial 
systems is a crucial component required to accelerate absorptive capacities of recipient country’s 









2.3 Empirical Evidence   
This section examines previous studies on the direct and indirect relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance through three avenues: financial performance, productivity and 
FDI spillovers.  
2.3.1 Financial Performance 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
financial performance with mixed findings obtained. The results of these studies are analysed 
based on the findings of the form of the relationship (linear, non-linear and none).  
2.3.1.1 Linear Relationship 
Gunduz and Tatoglu (2003) compared the impact of various ownership structures on the financial 
performance of Turkish enterprises, including foreign versus domestic companies, using several 
stock and accounting performance measures. The dataset compromised of all private sector firms 
listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), excluding financial companies, with 34 foreign and 
168 local companies, as of the end of 1999. The results showed that foreign-owned firms exhibited 
superior performance, but only in terms of Return on Assets (ROA) and no other performance 
indicators.  
Aydin, Sayim and Yalama (2007) also sought to distinguish if the performance of foreign firms 
were superior to that of domestic firms in Turkey. To do this, they applied t-tests to determine if 
there were significant differences in the operating profit margin, ROA and Return on Equity (ROE) 
between foreign firms and domestic firms listed on the ISE. The dataset included 42 firms with 
foreign ownership and 259 domestic firms. Consistent with the findings of Gunduz and Tatoglu 
(2003), this study found that firms with foreign ownership performed more favourably based on 
ROA than domestic firms. These findings were attributed to enhanced monitoring and control 
capabilities and the transfer of new technology from foreign firms, resulting in lower operating 
expenses.  This view is consistent with that of the agency theory and resourced-based theory 
outlined in sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2, respectively.   
Douma et al. (2006) explored the differential impact of foreign institutional and foreign corporate 
ownership on firm performance in India. The data sample of this study comprised of 1005 




Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), Douma et al. (2006) assumed that the ownership structure was 
exogenous. The results showed that that the performance of foreign firms were superior to that of 
domestic firms, with firm performance measured by ROA and Tobin's Q. This superior 
performance was ascribed to foreign shareholders playing a significant monitoring role, which led 
to a reduction in agency costs. These results are consistent with those of the agency theory and a 
study by Boardman, Shapiro and Vining (1997), who also credited foreign ownership for the 
reduction of agency costs in Canadian companies.   
A more recent paper on the impact of foreign ownership on the performance of Indian firms was 
conducted by Shrivastav and Kalsie (2017). The empirical analysis was conducted on 145 non-
financial firms listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) from 2008 to 2012. The study utilised 
Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE as performance indicators. As explained in section 2.2.1.1, the different 
forms of foreign ownership may exhibit different effects on the firm. Shrivastav and Kalsie (2017) 
incorporated this into their study by not only examining total foreign ownership but also 
disaggregating this measure into foreign corporate and foreign institutional ownership. Multiple 
regression analysis was performed using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Random 
Effects Model (REM). Under the pooled OLS model, foreign ownership (as a holistic measure) 
displayed a positive effect on all measures of firm performance. However, regarding the REM, the 
effect was insignificant. When total foreign ownership was disaggregated, foreign corporate 
ownership exhibited a positive influence on firm performance, whereas foreign institutional 
ownership had an ambiguous effect on firm performance as results varied when different firm 
performance indicators were used.  
Huang and Shiu (2009) studied the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance in Taiwan. In 
contrast to Douma et al. (2006), they treated foreign ownership as an endogenous variable and 
used Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation to account for endogeneity. Despite the 
difference in assumptions, Huang and Shiu (2009) obtained similar results to Douma et al. (2006) 
as firms with high levels of foreign ownership performed better than firms with low levels. Huang 
and Shiu (2009) credited the superior performance to the ability of foreign investors to select more 
profitable investments as they have the resources that allow them to execute fundamental research. 
The authors further argued that foreign investors also make contributions to technology, finance 




Although most research on the foreign ownership-performance nexus focuses on large companies, 
Halkos and Tzeremes (2011) analysed 353 foreign-owned Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) in the Greek manufacturing industry and concluded that foreign ownership had a positive 
effect on the performance of SMEs. 
A Nigerian study by Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) adopted a multivariate regression analysis to 
determine the relationship between ownership structure and enterprise performance. This study 
used a data sample consisting of 31 financial firms from 2006 until 2010. The empirical results 
revealed that foreign ownership had a favourable influence on firm performance. The authors 
stated that foreign ownership improved managerial efficiency, technical skills and the state of 
technology.  
Marashdeh (2014) investigated the effect of corporate governance on the performance of 115 
Jordanian firms during the period 2000 to 2010. Accounting-based measures such as ROA and 
ROE were used to measure firm performance and the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and REM 
were used to estimate the empirical relationship. The results revealed that foreign ownership had 
a positive relationship with firm performance, but only when measured with ROE. These findings 
confirmed that foreign investors have the capacity and incentive to intervene (i.e., monitor and 
control) in corporate governance to improve the existing monitoring strategies of domestic 
investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003). This is supported by Lee, Rhee and Yoon (2018), who holds 
the view that a greater incentive for monitoring among foreign shareholders results in superior 
corporate performance. This evidence is also in agreement with the concepts of the agency theory 
presented in section 2.2.1.1. 
Ting, Kweh, Lean and Ng (2016) explored the impact of ownership structure on firm performance 
in Malaysia from 2002 until 2011, using 201 non-financial firms. This study employed Tobin’s Q 
and ROA as performance indicators and constituted year and sector dummies to account for year 
and sector effects. Results from the pooled OLS regressions revealed that foreign ownership 
positively affected firm performance. Ting et al. (2011) attributed the positive impact to superior 
managerial efficiency, technical skills, and technology that foreign investors brought into the 
working environment.  
A South African study by Dube (2018) investigated the impact of foreign ownership on financial 




financial JSE-listed firms from 2004 to 2014. The Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and the GMM were 
used for estimation purposes. Dube (2018) found positive effects of foreign ownership on 
corporate performance. As per previous studies, these findings imply that foreign investors take 
on effective monitoring roles and transfer skills and advanced technology to their investee 
companies, thus improving firm performance in terms of ROA and ROE. However, the 
concentration of foreign ownership was only based on the percentage of the top one, two, three, 
five and 10 foreign shareholders. Dube (2018: 410) notes that “an analysis of the total number of 
shareholders for each firm would likely give a more accurate picture of ownership and its effects 
on corporate performance”. Hence, the results of the study may be unreliable.  
In Indonesia, Nofal (2020) found that foreign ownership enhanced the firm performance of 66 
non-financial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, from 2014 to 2018. Nofal (2020) states 
that this outcome is consistent with the view of foreign ownership in Indonesia, where high and 
stable foreign ownership is beneficial to companies due to active monitoring, facilitation of 
technology usage, international market development and professional management. The findings 
of this study do not support the view of the entrenchment effect discussed in section 2.2.1.1 as the 
author argued that long-term and large-scale investments made by foreign investors do not seem 
to cause entrenchment, but rather results in monitoring benefits that reduce agency costs.  
Not all studies, however, have found that firms with foreign ownership perform better than those 
without foreign ownership. For example, Kim and Lyn (1990) discovered that foreign firms 
operating in the US were not as profitable as domestic US firms. The authors argued that although 
foreign firms spend substantial time engaging in Research and Development (R&D), they do not 
give sufficient attention to advertising, resulting in lower performance. Furthermore, they 
contained higher debt levels combined with higher liquidity than domestic firms. Similarly, 
Munday, Peel and Taylor (2003) found that in terms of profit margin and ROE, foreign subsidiaries 
in the construction sector in the United Kingdom (UK) were less profitable than domestic firms.  
The inferior performance of MNCs in the US and UK compared to the other countries cited may 
be attributable to their developed status. Traditionally, FDI flows from developed to developing 
countries, bringing with its superior technology and practices (Chari, Chen and Dominguez, 2011). 
Chang, Mellahi and Wilkinson (2009: 2) states that “the ways in which MNCs from emerging 




ways in which MNCs from developed countries manage their foreign subsidiaries”. MNCs from 
emerging economies are faced with the double hurdle of liability of foreignness and liability of 
country of origin (Hymer, 1976). Although the liability of foreignness is inevitable for MNCs in 
both developed and emerging economies; MNCs from emerging economies are more susceptible 
to the liability of country of origin and specific disadvantages because of perceived weakness and 
lack of global dominance of the home country’s economy (Chang et al., 2009). Furthermore, FDI 
from developing countries may not provide any competitive advantage to MNCs, as it is unlikely 
that they contribute any scarce resources that developed countries do not already possess.  
2.3.1.2 Non-Linear Relationship  
Another common trend in studies of foreign ownership and firm performance is that of a non-
linear relationship (Vo and Vo, 2016); that is, the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance 
varies as the level of foreign ownership varies.  
An Indian study by Chibber and Majumdar (1999) analysed 1001 private sector firms listed on the 
BSE before and after 1991. They discovered that foreign ownership only began to positively 
influence firm performance after 1991, once foreigners were allowed to obtain a majority 
shareholding of 51%. Prior to 1991, foreigners were only permitted ownership of a maximum of 
40% in their subsidiaries. The study concluded that firms with a majority foreign shareholding 
achieved better performance compared to domestic and minority-owned foreign firms. Chibber 
and Majumdar (1999) believed that the reason for the enhanced performance of foreign firms was 
due to foreign investors having greater strategic control and transferring superior technical, 
managerial, and financial resources to foreign firms. However, firms will only reap the benefits of 
foreign investors if their majority shareholding is foreign. These results do not support the findings 
of Douma et al. (2006) and Shrivastav and Kalsie (2017) presented in section 2.3.1.1, where both 
studies observed linear relationships between foreign ownership and firm performance in India. 
However, Douma et al. (2006) and Shrivastav and Kalsie (2017) did not test for the possibility of 
a non-linear relationship between these variables, which may account for the conflicting results.   
Akimova and Schwodiauer (2004) examined the impact of ownership structure on corporate 
governance and performance of privatised companies in Ukraine. The data sample consisted of 
202 medium and large companies from 1998 to 2000. The results depicted a non-linear relationship 




value of 39%. This suggested that foreign shareholding below 39% improved firm performance, 
however, once foreign ownership exceeded the threshold value, firm performance was impaired. 
Akimova and Schwodiauer (2004) stated that the initial positive effect emerged from foreign 
investors providing new technology, but the latter negative effect of foreign ownership was due to 
the institutional environment in Ukraine being averse to foreign majority ownership.  
In Vietnam, Phung and Hoang (2012) studied the relationship between firm performance and 
foreign and state ownership. All firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchanges from 
2007-2012 were included in the study sample. The author used the FEM to estimate the 
relationship as it controls for unobserved heterogeneity between the variables. Tobin’s Q and ROA 
were employed as performance indicators. The study found that, for both performance measures, 
state ownership and firm performance shared an inverse U-shaped relationship, whereas the 
foreign ownership and firm performance shared a U-shaped relationship. Thus, only once foreign 
ownership becomes concentrated, do the benefits materialise, which the authors attribute to greater 
monitoring, as discussed in section 2.2.1.1. As such, Phung and Hoang (2012) recommend that for 
Vietnamese firms to enhance their corporate governance quality; they must increase foreign 
ownership to a notable level. While the authors do not discuss this possibility, drawing from the 
resource-based theory presented in section 2.2.1.2, these results may also suggest that the benefits 
of foreign ownership through technological transfer, capital investment and other resources, only 
manifest when firms have control, as reflected in a greater stake of foreign ownership.  
Viet (2013) conducted a similar study in Vietnam, also adopting ROA and Tobin’s Q as 
performance measures. His sample consisted of 407 listed non-financial firms from 2006 to 2010. 
This study employed the 2SLS method to account for endogeneity. Unlike Phung and Hoang 
(2012), Viet (2103) found a significant inverse U-shaped relationship between foreign ownership 
and firm performance. The author claimed that the inverse U-shape relationship was connected to 
the entrenchment effect that foreign investors developed when they held a substantial level of 
shareholding, as explained in section 2.2.1.1. There was also evidence suggesting that foreign 
investors preferred to invest in companies with sound financial performance (hence the 
endogeneity problem), large size, low level of debt, in the pharmaceutical industry, and listed on 




Similar to Viet (2013), Phung (2015) observed an inverse U-shaped relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance in Vietnam, from 2007 to 2012. This study also attributed the U-
shape to an entrenchment effect of foreign investors. This study compensated for potential 
endogeneity by employing the system GMM approach. The results revealed an inflection point of 
43% of foreign ownership, maintaining that during the initial increase of foreign ownership, 
foreign investors are incentivized to monitor the managers and force them to align their objectives 
with the shareholder’s objectives; however when it surpasses 43%, foreign investors display an 
entrenchment effect. The inverse U-shaped relationship found by Viet (2013) and Phung (2015) is 
consistent with section 2.2.1.1 on the benefits from monitoring and the losses from expropriations 
by shareholders when their ownership reaches a certain large level. However, these findings 
conflict with those of Phung and Hoang (2012). This may be due to the fact that Phung and Hoang 
(2012) did not account for endogeneity in their analysis.  
An inverse U-shape relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance was also 
reported in Turkey by Gurbuz and Aybars (2010). This paper utilised 205 firms listed on the ISE 
from 2005 to 2007 and excluded all non-financial firms from the study sample. Firm performance 
was measured using ROA and the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets (EBITTA). 
Causality tests proved that foreign ownership should be regarded as an exogenous variable when 
estimating the relationship between firm performance and foreign ownership. The results revealed 
that although foreign ownership initially shared a positive relationship with financial performance, 
the relationship became negative once the foreign shareholders owned more than 50% of the 
ownership structure. This may be the consequence of Turkey’s distinctive methods in carrying out 
business operations in which they prefer to sustain local relationships and allow local ownership 
to have a fundamental role. These findings differ from the preceding Turkish studies by Gunduz 
and Tatoglu (2003) and Aydin et al. (2007) that found positive linear relationships. This may be 







2.3.1.3 No Relationship 
Barbosa and Louri (2005) studied the difference between the performance of domestic firms and 
MNCs in Portugal using a sample comprising of 523 manufacturing firms in 1992. A quantile 
regression technique was used to account for departures from the normality of firms’ profitability. 
The results showed no significant difference in the performance of the domestic firms and MNCs. 
The inability of MNCs in Portugal to persistently outperform their domestic rivals, despite their 
technological advantages, may be attributable to the fact that they must provide compensation for 
their liability of foreignness, as mentioned in section 2.2.1.3.  
Mihai (2012) also found no significant relationship between firm performance and foreign 
ownership across 63 Romanian companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange in 2010. This 
study argued that the positive effects of foreign ownership were not witnessed, as this study was 
performed during a year of recession. Furthermore, most firms in the sample belonged to the 
manufacturing sector, which was severely affected by the crisis, meaning that the decline in 
demand due to weaker industrial production directly affected the performance indicators, 
regardless of the presence of foreign ownership.   
A South African study by Swart (2013) analysed the relationship between foreign ownership and 
the performance of JSE-listed firms from 2004 to 2010. This study used a data pairing analysis 
between foreign- and domestic-owned firms, with ROA, ROE and Economic Value Added (EVA) 
employed as measures of performance. The study sample included only the largest public 
companies to ensure that firm size did not influence the results. Conflicting with the results of 
Dube (2018), Swart (2013) found that foreign ownership was not significantly related to ROA and 
ROE. However, Swart (2013) observed some evidence of foreign ownership enhancing firm value, 
as foreign-owned firms had a 4.6% higher EVA return compared to their domestic-owned 
counterparts, but it was argued that this might be the result of an accounting irregularity instead of 
true value-added. This is supported by Anderson, Bey and Weaver (2004), who stated that larger 
firms seem to perform increasingly better when EVA is used as a performance indicator because 
EVA is biased with respect to firm size. The difference in the findings of Swart (2013) and Dube 





Khan and Nouman (2017) observed an insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performance for 177 non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from 
2004 to 2013. The authors employed several panel regression methods such as pooled OLS, REM 
and FEM to ensure the robustness of their results. Financial performance was measured using 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. These findings, however, contrast with those of a previous Pakistani study 
by Javid and Iqbal (2008) as they observed superior firm performance due to foreign ownership. 
The difference in results may be related to the assumption of endogeneity, as Javid and Iqbal 
(2008) accounted for endogeneity with the use of the system GMM, whereas Khan and Nouman 
(2017) ignored the issue of endogeneity.  
In conclusion, it is therefore evident that most of the research based on the relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performance has been conducted in developing countries, with mixed 
results having been obtained. The two studies that were conducted in developed countries (the US 
and UK) both found that the performance of domestic firms was superior to that of foreign-owned 
firms. This implies that foreign ownership may not have any financial benefits for firms in 
developed markets.  
2.3.2 Firm Productivity 
According to Greenaway, Guariglia and Yu (2014), when the share of foreign ownership in firms 
increases, foreign owners tend to be more productive, thus increasing the total profit of firms. 
Contrarily, since the increase in foreign ownership translates to a decrease in the total profits that 
will be dispersed to domestic owners, their incentives to contribute to production decreases, 
leading to a lower level of total productivity, which in turn reduces total profit. The overall effect 
depends on the level of foreign ownership. Hence, the impact of foreign ownership on firm 
productivity can be interpreted as another avenue for firm performance as productivity and 
profitability are closely related and should produce similar trends (Foster, Haltiwanger and 
Syverson, 2008). Firm productivity is analysed in the succeeding literature where the principal 
focus is on whether the relationship between foreign ownership and firm productivity is either 
positive or negative. Therefore, unlike the preceding empirical evidence, less emphasis is given to 
the shape of the relationship (i.e., linear versus non-linear). In addition, in contrast to the literature 





Globerman, Ries and Vertinsky (1994) tested for differences in productivity and wages between 
Canadian-owned, US-owned, Japanese-owned, and European-owned firms in Canada. This study 
used industry dummy variables to capture the influence of the industry. The results showed that 
labour productivity was substantially higher for foreign-owned firms, but that this difference 
disappeared once size and capital intensity were controlled for. Furthermore, it was found that 
foreign-owned companies tended to pay higher wages to production workers. These findings 
suggested that FDI improved productivity and income levels in Canada. 
Griffith (1999) used data collected from the Annual Census of Production to determine whether 
foreign-owned firms in the UK car industry were more productive than domestic-owned firms over 
the period 1980 to 1992. The production functions were estimated using panel data analysis, with 
the results demonstrating that German and US subsidiaries had a significant Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) advantage over domestic UK firms.  
In another study of the UK, Harris and Robinson (2002) aimed to determine whether foreign-
owned plants from the US, European Union (EU) and South East (SE) Asia exhibited superior 
productivity compared to domestic plants for all manufacturing firms, from 1974 until 1995. The 
system GMM approach was used to estimate the models and. Similar to the findings of Griffith 
(1999), in general, US-owned firms outperformed the UK-owned firms. There was little evidence 
of a significant productivity differential between UK-owned plants and EU-owned plants. For SE 
Asian-owned firms, the results were mixed as they performed better in some industries but worse 
in others.  
Fons-Rosen, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, Villegas-Sanchez and Volosovych (2015) used a unique 
firm-level panel data set from advanced European countries (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, 
France, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden) over the period 1999 until 2008, to investigate the 
effect of foreign ownership on firm-level productivity. Fons-Rosen et al. (2015) confirmed that 
foreign ownership was endogenous as it was a function of current and expected future productivity 
and firm-level variables. This implied that foreign investors endogenously selected high 
productivity firms. Hence, this study utilised the instrumental variables (IV) approach to control 
for endogeneity. Results revealed that firms that received FDI displayed small increases in TFP; 




Driffield, Sun and Temouri (2018) used Hansen's (2000) threshold estimation technique to 
examine the relationship between foreign ownership and productivity across four countries (UK, 
Germany, Italy and Poland) from period 2001 to 2010. With the use of a split sample, Hansen's 
(2000) threshold estimation method enabled the authors to investigate the possibility of a non-
linear relationship between firm productivity and foreign ownership by endogenously identifying 
and estimating the value of foreign ownership at which the impact of foreign ownership either 
switched in signs or magnitude. In Germany, foreign firms were found to have a higher 
productivity than local firms. This coincides with a previous study by Temouri, Driffield and 
Higón (2008) who also discovered that foreign firms were more productive than all local firms in 
Germany.  As a matter of fact, Driffield et al. (2018) found that German MNCs had the highest 
level of TFP, followed by the UK, Italy and Poland across the entire distribution for the 
manufacturing sector. With regard to the services sector, Italian MNCs were the second most 
productive after German MNCs, followed by the UK and Polish MNCs. Hansen's (2000) threshold 
method yielded an increasing but non-linear relationship between foreign ownership and 
productivity. 
Turning to evidence from developing countries, Takii (2004) conducted a study to investigate 
whether foreign affiliates used more advanced technology or skills compared to domestic 
companies in the Indonesian manufacturing sector in 1995. The results suggested that foreign 
companies were more productive than domestic companies and, in addition, companies with 100% 
of foreign ownership were more productive than companies with less foreign ownership. This 
finding differs from a previous Indonesian study by Blomström and Sjoholm (1999), who claimed 
that the productivity of foreign-owned plants did not depend on the level of foreign ownership.  
Using the GMM estimation technique to account for endogeneity, Li, Lu and Ng (2009) compared 
the productivity of foreign firms and domestic firms in China. The empirical analysis used data 
from the Survey of Chinese Enterprises. The results found that a 10% increase in foreign ownership 
led to an approximately 10% increase in labour productivity. However, the identity of the foreign 
ownership mattered, as only foreign ownership from foreign firms had a positive impact on 
productivity but not ownership from foreign banks, institutional investors or individuals. Li et al. 
(2009) suggested that the productivity improvement from foreign ownership might have arisen 
from the transfer of technology, managerial skills and products and the bridging with overseas 




Greenaway et al. (2014) used both accounting (such as return on sales (ROS) and ROA) and 
productivity measures (such as labour productivity and TFP) in their study of the relationship 
between foreign ownership and firm performance in China. Their sample comprised of 21 582 
unlisted Chinese firms over the period 2000 to 2005. Given possible endogeneity of the regressors, 
this study used the first difference GMM approach to estimate all specifications and found that an 
inverse U-shape characterised the foreign ownership-performance relationship among Chinese 
firms. Specifically, the turning points were found to be 52.31%, 64.24%, 55.65%, and 46.79% of 
foreign ownership for ROA, ROS, labour productivity and TFP, respectively. This indicates that a 
substantial level of domestic ownership is still essential to guarantee optimal firm performance. 
A positive effect of foreign ownership on productivity is confirmed by most studies. Unlike the 
firm financial performance in developed countries, foreign ownership increased firm productivity 
in developed countries (such as Canada, UK and Germany).  
2.3.3 FDI Spillovers  
Whilst the preceding sections reviewed studies only on the direct effects of foreign ownership, this 
section extends the empirical evidence to the indirect effects of foreign ownership, specifically in 
terms of FDI spillovers.  
Padibandla and Sanyal (2005) used panel data of firms in India in the post-reform period from 
1989 to 1999 to examine the productivity effects at the firm-level from FDI. Data was sourced 
from the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The 
results revealed strong evidence of horizontal spillovers as domestic firms benefited from the 
presence of foreign-owned firms in their industries. In addition, the benefits were found to be 
greater for larger firms and those that did more business domestically. This could be attributed to 
larger firms having better absorptive capabilities compared to smaller firms and domestically 
orientated firms benefiting by imitating the practices of MNCs, as stated in section 2.2.2.3. 
Thangavelu and Pattnayak (2006) also examined spillovers from FDI in the Indian market through 
both backward and horizontal linkages but focused exclusively on the pharmaceutical industry. 
The data sample consisted of nearly 200 companies from 1989 to 2000. To account for 
endogeneity, this study adopted a semi-parametric estimation method proposed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Consistent with the results of Padibandla and Sanyal 




of negative spillovers from the backward linkages were also detected, suggesting potential 
technology and efficiency gaps between domestic companies and MNCs in the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry.  
A more recent study in India by Mondal and Pant (2018) used a panel data sample comprising of 
manufacturing firms from 1994 to 2010 to explore productivity spillovers through horizontal and 
vertical linkages. Interestingly, the results revealed that only local companies with initial 
technological knowledge, a narrow technology gap with the foreign firms, and high 
complementary capabilities, achieved productivity gains from FDI spillover channels. This 
discovery may, to some extent, explain the reasons for some of the findings of Padibandla and 
Sanyal (2005) and Thangavelu and Pattnayak (2006). 
From the perspective of a developed country, Karpaty and Lundberg (2004) studied whether the 
productivity of local manufacturing companies in Sweden were higher in the presence of foreign 
companies over the period 1990 to 2000. The data was extracted from Statistics Sweden and 
included all manufacturing firms. Using the FEM approach, their findings showed strong evidence 
of positive horizontal spillover effects from FDI as the presence of foreign ownership in the same 
industry and region increased the TFP of local companies. Karpaty and Lundberg (2004) also 
found that the magnitude of the spillover effects was contingent on both the absorptive capacity of 
the local firm and the nationality of the foreign firm. US-owned companies had a more substantial 
positive impact on productivity in local companies compared to foreign ownership from the rest 
of the world. The authors attributed this to a larger stock of firm-specific knowledge that could be 
dispersed to domestic companies.  
Zhang et al. (2010) adopted a slightly different approach to the seminal research on spillover 
effects by investigating the impact of the diversity of FDI country origins on the productivity of 
local companies in China. The authors suggest that the diversity of FDI country origins may 
increase FDI spillovers by enhancing the range of technology and managerial methods introduced 
by foreign companies, to which local companies are subjected and which they could adopt. The 
study used panel data on Chinese manufacturing firms obtained from the Annual Industrial Survey 
Database of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics over the period 1998 to 2003. The results 
revealed that the diversity of FDI country roots within an industry had a favourable effect on the 




study further stated that the positive effects of the spillovers were greater when local companies 
were larger and when the technology gap between FDI and the local firms were intermediate.  
Xu and Sheng (2012) also studied the effect of FDI spillovers on Chinese companies in the 
country’s manufacturing industry between 2000-2003. Using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
method, the study accounted for endogeneity, simultaneity bias and clustering errors. Xu and 
Sheng’s (2012) findings showed a positive productivity gain in local companies due to vertical 
spillovers through forward linkages. There was also evidence of positive horizontal spillovers; 
however, after controlling for the firm’s market share, negative effects of horizontal spillovers 
emerged. Thus, the initial result of a positive horizontal spillover effect was a function of market 
power.  
In a more recent Chinese study, Lu, Tao and Zhu (2017) focussed only on horizontal spillovers, 
with data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) for the period of 1998-2007. After 
accounting for endogeneity, the findings revealed that FDI had a negative and significant effect on 
the productivity of domestic firms in the same industry; thereby signalling negative horizontal 
spillovers.  
Nicolini and Resmini (2010) utilised an unbalanced panel of firm-level data from Bulgaria, Poland 
and Romania between the period 1998 to 2003 to explore the effect of foreign ownership on the 
productivity of local companies. The authors used a panel FEM to account for unobservable 
heterogeneity at the firm, industry and regional levels as well as over time. The results showed 
evidence of both technological horizontal and vertical spillovers but that the advantages of 
spillovers depended on the size of the local company. In Bulgaria, foreign firms benefited medium-
sized firms operating in complementary low-tech manufacturing sectors regardless of their level 
of absorptive capacity. There was no evidence of spillovers in Poland. Finally, both horizontal and 
vertical spillovers were present in Romania, although only small firms benefited from both kinds 
of spillovers, while large firms reaped horizontal spillovers, but only from low-tech foreign firms.  
Jude (2012) estimated the direction and magnitude of FDI technological spillovers using a plant-
level dataset of Romanian enterprises from 1999 to 2007. Although the results confirmed the 
previous findings of Nicolini and Resmini (2010), of both vertical and horizontal spillovers in 
Romania, Jude (2012) discovered that vertical spillovers were more prominent than horizontal 




did not alter the results. Among all the horizontal spillover channels mentioned in section 2.2.2.1, 
labour mobility was found to be the only significant one in this study.  
In a study of horizontal spillovers from foreign ownership in Turkey, Erdogan (2011) analysed 
215 firms that were among the top 500 industrial enterprises in Turkey over the period 2004 to 
2008. The findings suggested that domestic firms benefited from productivity spillovers from 
foreign-owned firms, but that absorptive capacity did not matter for horizontal spillovers.  Fatima 
(2014) also examined FDI spillovers in Turkey but extended the study of Erdogan (2011) by also 
considering vertical spillovers. Firm-level data for manufacturing firms for the period 2003 to 2010 
was used, as this period coincided with substantial inflows of FDI into both the manufacturing and 
service sectors in Turkey. In contrast to Erdogan’s (2011) findings, Fatima (2014) found no 
significant effects of horizontal spillovers from foreign firms on the productivity of domestic 
Turkish firms. The difference in results may be explained by the different time periods examined 
and variations in the firms in the sample. With respect to vertical spillovers, Fatima (2014) found 
evidence of a positive and significant effect on local productivity levels. Fatima (2014) suggested 
that Turkish policymakers should focus their attention on the strengthening of supplier-buyer 
relationships between local firms and MNCs to maximise the benefits from FDI. This study also 
acknowledged the heterogeneity of local (foreign) firms and their differential capacity to absorb 
(exude) the FDI-induced externalities. 
In a study of five developing countries (Brazil, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa and Vietnam), 
Kinda (2012) adopted a one-step stochastic frontier model to explore the importance of vertical 
spillovers from 2000 to 2005. The author used an alternative approach to estimate vertical 
spillovers by measuring the share of a firm’s sales to MNCs within the country to capture backward 
linkages. The results of the study pointed to the existence of vertical spillovers from foreign to 
domestic companies, through backward linkages. Smaller domestic firms that did business with 
MNCs, were observed to be more productive.  
Mühlen (2013) employed comparable firm-level panel data from 10 Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) 
to estimate the spillover effects from FDI on firm productivity levels. The impact was evaluated 




results revealed a small negative horizontal spillover effect from the foreign presence within 
sectors across Latin American countries, caused by wholly-owned foreign firms.  
FDI spillovers in the Malaysian manufacturing sector studied by Khalifah and Adam (2009), Choo 
(2012) and Dogan, Wong and Yap (2017) demonstrated mixed results. Khalifah and Adam (2009) 
undertook the study during the period 2000 to 2004 and focused exclusively on horizontal 
spillovers. Using pooled-OLS and the FEM to account for the heterogeneity of the firms, Khalifah 
and Adam (2009) found evidence of positive horizontal productivity spillovers in industries when 
MNCs competed with local companies. Choo (2012) explored horizontal and backward vertical 
spillovers from foreign ownership in Malaysia. The data sample consisted of 940 firms, covering 
12 industries for the period 2004 to 2007. Consistent with the results of Khalifah and Adam (2009), 
Choo (2012) found evidence of positive horizontal spillover effects, and in addition, significant 
backward vertical spillovers at sub-sectoral levels. Dogan et al. (2017) used firm-level data from 
the Census of Manufacturing for the years 2000 to 2005 and the Annual Survey of Manufacturing 
Industries for the years 2001 to 2004. This study used the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to 
compute TFP and included lagged spillover variables to address the potential endogeneity problem 
that could arise because foreign firms might choose to enter more productive industries. In contrast 
to the two previous studies, Dogan et al. (2017) observed weak evidence of horizontal spillovers 
and the vertical spillovers were found to be negative. The variations in methodologies, underlying 
assumptions, and the firms included in the samples can possibly account for the different results 
observed in the studies.  
Li and Luo (2019) examined the effects of spillovers from FDI on firm-level productivity growth 
in the West Midlands of England for 2198 firms operating in 75 industries over the period 2004 to 
2011. FEM panel data IV regression was adopted to accommodate reverse causality. In terms of 
vertical spillovers, the empirical results suggested strong forward spillovers from foreign affiliates 
to their local consumers in downstream sectors. However, there was weak positive spillover effects 
through backward and horizontal linkages.  
Orlic, Hashi and Hisarciklilar (2018) explored the relationship between FDI spillovers and the 
productivity of manufacturing firms in five European transition countries (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia). This study relied on firm-level data extracted from the 




the presence of foreign firms in upstream services, particularly in the knowledge-intensive 
services, and in the downstream manufacturing sector. The imitation effect was observed to 
negatively affect the productivity of domestic companies. At the same time, labour mobility and 
increased competition appeared to be the primary channels of horizontal knowledge diffusion, 
consistent with the theory discussed in section 2.1.2.1. The study concluded that the direction and 
intensity of both vertical and horizontal spillovers depended on the absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms.   
For the most part, the evidence on spillovers is mixed. This can be attributed to different estimation 
techniques used in studies and the different levels of absorptive capacities in countries.  
2.3.4 Firm Productivity and FDI Spillovers  
As presented above, the literature on the performance effects of foreign ownership can be broadly 
classified into those that evaluate the direct impact of foreign ownership on the recipient firms and 
those that evaluate FDI spillovers from those firms to competitors, suppliers and customers. This 
section examines empirical evidence that is based on a combination of both, i.e., direct and indirect 
effects of foreign ownership on productivity.  
With the use of a panel containing more than 4000 Venezuelan firms between 1976 and 1989, 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) identified two effects of FDI on firms: (i) increases in foreign 
ownership were correlated with increases in productivity for recipient firms with less than 50 
employees, implying that these firms gain from the productivity advantages of foreign investors; 
and (ii) that increases in foreign ownership impairs the productivity of domestic firms in the same 
industry; thereby suggesting a negative horizontal spillover effect. The net effect of foreign 
ownership was relatively small and the gains from FDI appeared to be mainly achieved through 
joint ventures. 
Konings (2000) examined the influence of FDI on the productivity performance of firms in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, using the FEM. This study also considered the possibility of 
spillovers, and endogeneity of ownership among other factors. There was no evidence of an impact 
of foreign ownership on the productivity of firms in Bulgaria and Romania. However, in Poland, 
foreign-owned firms were found to be more productive than local firms. This may be due to the 
time lag required by firms to restructure and affect performance productivity as Poland is more 




spillovers were observed from foreign firms to domestic firms in Bulgaria and Romania whereas 
no spillovers were detected in Poland. Konings (2000) attributes this finding to a larger 
technological gap in less advanced countries like Bulgaria and Romania.  
Schoors and Tol (2002) analysed the effects of foreign ownership on labour productivity of 
Hungarian firms. Data for Hungarian firms was collected from the Amadeus database of Bureau 
van Dijk. This study utilised an unbalanced panel of 1084 firms in 1997 and 1998. In order to 
control for a potential selectivity bias, a treatment effects model was estimated for the foreign 
ownership dummy variable and firm-specific effects were used as right-hand side variables in the 
treatment equation. Foreign ownership was found to have a positive impact on labour productivity; 
therefore, the performance of foreign businesses was superior to that of local businesses. 
Furthermore, horizontal spillovers were apparent as the presence of foreign ownership increased 
the labour productivity of local firms in the same sector. The absorptive capacity of the local firms 
that was measured by the technology gap discussed in section 2.2.2.3, did not affect the magnitude 
of spillovers.  
Yudaeva, Kozlov, Melentieva and Ponomareva (2003) compared the productivity of Russian firms 
that had foreign ownership with the productivity of wholly domestic-owned firms from 1993 to 
1997. This study also considered spillover effects from foreign ownership. The results showed that 
foreign-owned firms were more productive than local Russian-owned firms, but the productivity 
of the former was negatively affected by the lagging development of reforms in the regions where 
they operated. They also discovered evidence of positive horizontal spillovers and negative vertical 
spillovers.  
Kee (2005) investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and firm productivity in 
Bangladesh’s garment sector during the period 2004 to 2005. This study was based on data 
collected from the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association Members’ 
Directory. To address the endogeneity bias, firm productivity was measured by a three step non-
linear estimation methodology developed by Olley and Pakes (1996). The findings showed that 
foreign-owned firms were, on average, 20% more productive than domestic firms in the same sub-
industry and location. Furthermore, there was significant evidence that domestic firms benefited 
from productivity spillovers from the foreign-owned firm; for every 10% increase in the 




Olabisi (2011) analysed the causal relationship between foreign ownership and the productivity 
performance of Chinese manufacturing companies from 2003 until 2007. An unbalanced panel 
data set of 413 firms. The results show that foreign-owned firms had higher average productivities 
but, after controlling for endogenous selection into foreign ownership and unobserved 
confounding factors, the foreign-owned firms appeared to lag their Chinese-owned counterparts. 
These results suggest that local firms appear to be catching up with their foreign-owned 
counterparts in terms of productivity. The process of “catching up” may be motivated in part by 
observable characteristics of the firms, referred to as imitation in section 2.2.2.1. 
As noted in chapter 1, studies investigating the effect of foreign firms operating in Africa on local 
firms are limited. To the authors knowledge, Mebratie and Bedi (2011) and Magwiro et al. (2016) 
are the only existing studies that studied the effect of FDI on domestic firms in the South African 
context. Mebratie and Bedi (2011) investigated the impact of FDI on the labour productivity of 
foreign- and domestic-owned manufacturing firms using a two period (2003 and 2007) panel data 
model. With the implementation of stratified sampling, firms were selected from a list of all 
registered companies in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban. Based on results 
produced by OLS, foreign-owned firms displayed superior productivity to their local counterparts. 
However, panel data-based estimates supported the notion that FDI is attracted to more productive 
companies, and after controlling for firm fixed-effects, there was no longer any foreign-owned 
productivity effect. This highlights the possibility of endogeneity in the South African 
environment. Consistent with the lack of a foreign ownership productivity effect, no evidence of 
spillover effects were observed.  
This view is supported by Magwiro et al. (2014), who sought to determine whether there were any 
productivity differences between MNCs and local manufacturing firms while also assessing the 
possibility of horizontal and vertical spillover effects. Drawing on cross-sectional data from the 
World Bank enterprise survey in 2007, Magwiro et al. (2014) also found that MNCs were not 
significantly more productive than local manufacturing firms, nor were there any significant 
horizontal or vertical spillover effects. The absence of spillovers contradict the findings of the 
Zambian studies by Waldkirch and Ofosu (2010) and Bwalya (2006), who found negative spillover 





A review of the literature on the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance 
shows that this relationship depends on many factors operating within a firm. The empirical 
evidence on the foreign ownership-financial performance relationship generates mixed findings 
with some studies claiming that performance is dependent on the level of foreign ownership. This 
differs from the relationship between foreign ownership and firm productivity, where in most 
cases, foreign ownership is positively linked to firm productivity. This difference is unexpected 
given that productivity usually translates into better financial performance. However, these 
differences may be attributable to the fact that the studies that focused on financial performance 
are typically of listed companies, whereas those that focused on productivity usually involve 
private companies that may be smaller.  With respect to FDI spillovers, the evidence is also mixed, 
which could be a consequence of different absorptive capacity in countries and the use of different 
methodologies in studies (including potential endogeneity). The empirical evidence has also given 
insight into various methodologies employed to carry out the different studies, which has guided 
















CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the data and methodology that were utilised to fully answer the research 
questions presented in chapter 1. Firstly, the dataset that was formulated for the empirical analysis 
is described. Thereafter, the variables and empirical models used to measure the direct effects of 
foreign ownership are presented, followed by the additional variables and model/s required for the 
estimation of the horizontal spillover effects of foreign ownership. Finally, the methods that were 
used to estimate the models are discussed.   
3.2 Data 
The data sample used in this study consists of non-financial firms listed and previously delisted on 
the JSE during the period 2012-2018. The list of firms contained within the sample is presented in 
table B-1 in the appendix. Annual firm-level data was obtained from financial statements through 
the Bloomberg database. Similar to previous South African studies (such as Swart, 2013; Dube, 
2018), the percentage of foreign ownership was obtained from IRESS. All data was obtained in 
local currency, and market capitalisation was measured at 31 December for all firms in each year. 
The final data set comprised of an unbalanced panel of 1320 annual observations in respect of 247 
firms, spanning the seven-year period from 2012 to 2018 inclusive. This data set accounts for 
mergers, acquisitions and unbundling’s. The structure of the unbalanced panel is presented in table 
B-2 in the appendix.  
Consistent with many previous studies on this subject (such as Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010; Ting et 
al., 2016; Shrivastav and Kalsie, 2017; Dube, 2018), financial firms are excluded from this study 
because their financial statements, asset structures and regulatory requirements differ substantially 
from firms in other industries; therefore, analysing financial firms with non-financial firms may 
produce biased results. Delisted firms were included, as failing to account for them when 
performing historical research may result in a survivorship bias (Kouwenberg, Salomons and 
Thontirawong, 2014).  
The industry classification of firms was based on the Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
that is used by the JSE. Firms in the data set belong to eight industries, namely, Basic Materials; 
Consumer Goods; Consumer Services; Health Care; Industrials; Oil and Gas; Technology; and 




period; therefore, eight categories were used. Industrial classifications are considered relatively 
broad and may combine firms whose operations appear to differ, although they are grouped in the 
same industry. Sectoral classifications, which are a level lower of industrial classifications, may 
prevent this issue (Dube, 2018). However, from the eight industries, there exist 33 sectors, thus 
making the use of dummy variables extremely cumbersome. Hence, following previous studies 
(such as Fosu, 2013; Nguyen, Locke and Reddy, 2015; Akbar et al., 2016; Dube, 2018), the ICB 
industry classification was deemed as most suitable for this study. The industry that each company 
belongs to and the distribution of firms among these industries are documented in table B-1 and 
table B-3 of the appendix, respectively.  
3.3 Testing the Direct Effect of Foreign Ownership on Firm Performance 
The empirical models presented in this section were utilised to test the first research objective (i.e., 
to establish if the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance is either linear or 
non-linear). The empirical evidence presented in section 2.3 suggests that the direct effects of 
foreign ownership on firm performance can be estimated through financial and productivity 
measures. However, the estimation of productivity at the firm-level is problematic in South Africa 
due to the unavailability of the required data. Bhorat and Lundall (2004) and Behar (2010) claim 
that the scarcity of South African firm-level studies has been primarily driven by a lack of data. 
As such, most studies examining productivity in South Africa are undertaken at an aggregate- or 
sectoral-level (such as Fedderke, 2000; Tsebe and Biniza, 2015). 
To the author’s knowledge, the only study that attempted to estimate productivity at the firm-level 
in South Africa is that of Kreuser and Newman (2018), who estimated TFP for the South African 
manufacturing sector. Their primary data source was South African Corporate Income Tax (CIT), 
and South African Revenue Services (SARS). Still, this study experienced difficulties in accessing 
certain firm-level data and thus substituted the missing data with industry-level data; thereby 
creating drawbacks and limitations to their study.  
Productivity can also be reflected through financial measures that are employed to measure firm 
performance. Miller (1987) examined the relationship between profitability and productivity and 
found that the increases in operating income can be attributed to productivity and price changes. 
Tatje and Lovell (1999) confirmed that productivity gains have the potential to contribute to an 




TFP, using the framework of the neoclassical theory of production, and introduced the concept of 
“duality” among TFP measures. They showed that several decompositions of profit variations are, 
in fact, “dual” to each other and therefore, largely measure the same concept.  
Bosch-Badia (2010) discovered a “functional relationship” between ROA and the leading 
productivity indicators at firm-level, namely TFP and labour productivity. Both productivity 
indicators, together with a price change in outputs and inputs, were the drivers that determine the 
value of ROA. This relationship can be deemed as an extension of the DuPont method that 
expresses ROA as the product of operating margin per asset turnover.  
Taking all the above factors into consideration, firm productivity was not directly estimated in this 
study. Instead, financial and market measures were utilised to determine the effect of foreign 
ownership on financial firm performance.  
3.3.1 The Variables  
3.3.1.1 The Dependent Variables  
As was evident from the review in section 2.3, accounting-based measures such as ROA and ROE 
are most commonly used to measure financial performance in the prior research focused on the 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance (such as Aydin et al., 2007; Gurbaz 
and Aybars, 2010; Swart, 2013; Marashdeh, 2014). Ongore (2011) confirms the widespread usage 
of these two ratios. As such, ROA and ROE were selected for this purpose in this study. ROA was 
calculated as the ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets, while ROE was calculated as the ratio of net 
income to the average common stockholder’s equity.  
In conjunction with these accounting-based measures, market-based measures of performance 
have also been employed in studies of ownership and performance, with Tobin’s Q used 
extensively (such as Douma et al., 2006; Ting et al., 2016; Shrivastav and Kalsie, 2017; Dube, 
2018). Tobin’s Q uses a forward-looking approach to measure corporate performance by reflecting 
what management will achieve in the future whereas ROA and ROE use a backward-looking 
approach to reflect what management has already achieved (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Hu 
and Izumida, 2008). Chinaemerem and Anthony (2012) claim that the use of market-based 
performance measures, such as Tobin’s Q, along with accounting-based performance measures, 




Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) also points out that only using one measure of performance 
contributes to the inconsistencies in identifying a clear relationship between firm performance and 
the variables of interest. Likewise, Tian and Zeitun (2007) stated that investors might favour either 
accounting- or market-based measures of performance and thus, only considering one category 
hinders the reliability of the results obtained. As such, in conjunction with ROA and ROE, Tobin’s 
Q was employed to measure firm performance in this study. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market 
value to the replacement value of assets (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Hu and Izumida, 2008; Hong 
and Loan, 2017). Due to the lack of data on the replacement costs of assets, many studies use the 
book value of assets instead of the replacement value of assets, which is followed in this study 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Shrivastav and Kalsie, 2017; Hong and Loan, 2017). 
3.3.1.2 The Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variable in this section, foreign ownership, was measured as the percentage of 
shares owned by foreigners in the firm (Miguel, Pindado and Torre, 2004; Douma et al., 2006; 
Hong and Loan, 2017).  Based on theory and previous evidence, the a priori expectation of the 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance was unclear.  
3.3.1.3 The Control Variables 
Following the analysis of previous empirical work, several firm-specific variables were included 
in the empirical models as control variables. The inclusion of firm-specific variables removes the 
potential influence that other factors may have on financial performance to more accurately 
identify the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance (Chinaemerem and 
Anthony, 2012). The control variables that were used are listed and described in table 3-1 below.  
Table 3-1: Explanation of Control Variables 
           Variable Explanation 
Firm Size The natural log of net assets. 
Firm Age 
The natural log of the number of years since the establishment 
of the firm to the observation date. 
Leverage Ratio The ratio of long- and short-term debt to total assets. 
Dividend Payout 
Ratio 








1. Firm size (LNSIZE) - Firm size controls for any systematic effect of a firm’s size with regards 
to the relationship between assets and a firm’s performance since the performance of large firms 
compared to small firms may differ (Lee, 2010). Larger firms frequently outperform smaller firms 
due to their operational efficiency and competitive power (Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010). 
Nonetheless, De Miguel, Pindado and Torre (2004) argued that larger firms often experience 
information asymmetry, leading to an impairment in firm performance. Consequently, the 
expectation of the relationship between firm performance and size was ambiguous.  
2. Age of a firm (LNAGE) - Firm performance may also be affected by the firm’s age. According 
to Thornhill and Amit (2003), older firms are exposed to experience-based economies and can 
steer clear of the liabilities of newness. Hence, a positive relationship was expected between firm 
performance and the age of firm.  
3. Leverage ratio (LEV) - The leverage ratio was included as firms require loans to invest and 
expand over and above the money supplied by shareholders and thus, this should influence 
performance (Yilmaz and Buyuklu, 2016). Companies also find debt attractive as they are always 
cheaper than funds raised on external equity markets (Shuetrim, Lowe and Morling, 1993). 
Furthermore, Lins (2003) claimed that the leverage ratio should be controlled due to the chance of 
creditors minimising managerial agency costs and, in the process, impacting ownership 
concentration. Although financial and economic theory suggests a positive relationship between 
leverage and profitability (Kale, 2014), the increase in debt raises the costs associated with its 
fulfilment, which could result in a potential decline in the profitability of firms (Gurbuz and 
Aybars, 2010). Consequently, the expected relationship between firm performance and the 
leverage ratio was unclear.   
4. Dividend Payout (DIVPAY) - When the distribution of a firm’s earnings occurs in the form of 
the payment of dividends, investors’ expectations of firms generating more profit in the future is 
amplified (Gurbaz and Aybars, 2010). Thus, the relationship between the dividend payout ratio 
and firm performance was expected to be positive.  
5. Asset Turnover ratio (ASTO) - The managerial efficiency of a firm may be measured by the 
way management utilises the firm’s assets to yield positive returns (Kim and Lyn, 1990; 




variable in the model. A positive relationship was expected between the asset turnover ratio and 
firm performance. 
3.3.1.4 Dummy Variables 
Along with the firm-specific control variables, a group of industry and year dummies were also 
included to control for differences in industry and time effects (Sasidharan, 2006). Industry dummy 
variables control for industry-specific characteristics and shocks (Hu and Izumida, 2008). The 
industry dummies are presented below in table 3-2. 
Table 3-2: Industry Dummy Variables 
Variable Explanation 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝟏 
A dummy variable equal to unity if a firm is in the Basic Materials 
industry and otherwise equal to zero. 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝟐 
A dummy variable equal to unity if a firm is in the Consumer Goods 
industry and otherwise equal to zero. 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝟑 
A dummy variable equal to unity if a firm is in the Consumer Services 
industry and otherwise equal to zero. 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝟒 
A dummy variable equal to unity if a firm is in the Health Care 
industry and otherwise equal to zero. 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝟓 
A dummy variable equal to unity if a firm is in the Industrials industry 
and otherwise equal to zero. 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝟔 
A dummy variable equal to unity if a firm is in the Oil and Gas 
industry and otherwise equal to zero. 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝟕 
A dummy variable equal to unity if a firm is in the Technology 
industry and otherwise equal to zero. 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝟖 
A dummy variable equal to unity if a firm is in the 
Telecommunications industry and otherwise equal to zero. 
Numerous studies that focus on the ownership-performance nexus and/or FDI spillover effects 
include year dummies in their estimation models to account for contemporaneous correlations in 
the errors across firms (such as Arellano and Bond, 1991; Wintoki et al., 2012; Schultz, Tan and 
Walsh, 2010; Sato and Söderbom, 2017; Shrivastav and Kalsie, 2017). For this reason, year 
dummy variables are incorporated into the models of this study. The time classification was based 








Table 3-3: Year Dummy Variables 
Variable Explanation 
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟐 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the year is 2012 and otherwise 
equal to zero. 
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟑 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the year is 2013 and otherwise 
equal to zero. 
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟒 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the year is 2014 and otherwise 
equal to zero. 
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟓 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the year is 2015 and otherwise 
equal to zero. 
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟔 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the year is 2016 and otherwise 
equal to zero. 
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟕 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the year is 2017 and otherwise 
equal to zero. 
𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟖 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the year is 2018 and otherwise 
equal to zero. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Model 
3.3.2.1 The Base Model  
As a starting point for the analysis, equation (1) was estimated to determine whether foreign 
ownership impacts firm performance. The relationship was estimated for each of the performance 
measures and serves as a baseline against which the results from the non-linear models were 
compared (Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010; Viet, 2013). This model is presented as follows:  
𝒀𝒊𝒕  =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜼𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                                                            (1)         
where i = 1…N and t = 1…7; 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is either ROA, ROE or Tobin's Q; 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of 
foreign ownership; 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is the set of control variables (firm size, firm age, leverage ratio, dividend 
payout ratio and asset turnover ratio); 𝑑𝑖𝑡 are the industry and time dummies and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 constitutes 
the random error term.  
3.3.2.2 A Non-Linear Relationship 
As noted by Gurbuz and Aybars (2010), it is necessary to consider the possibility that foreign 
ownership of different quantities may have different effects on firm performance; hence, only 
testing for a linear relationship, as described above, is inadequate as it may fail to deliver an 
accurate assessment of the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. This is evident from 




performance, as presented in section 2.3.1.2. For this reason, to fully answer the research 
objectives, this study conducted tests for non-linearity (U-shaped and inverse U-shaped). If a non-
linear relationship was found, the optimal level of foreign ownership was then determined, as it is 
the turning point where the positive effect of foreign ownership turns negative (inverse U-shaped) 
or vice versa (U-shaped).  
Traditionally, non-linear relationships have been measured by a standard regression model that 
consists of a quadratic term (Lind and Mehlum, 2010) as follows:   
𝒀𝒊𝒕  =   𝒂𝟎 +  𝜷𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕  +  𝝀(𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕)
𝟐 +  𝜼𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕  + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                                  (2)                  
A significant coefficient on the quadratic term (𝜆), with an extremum point within the data range, 
indicates a non-linear relationship. In addition, the sign conveys the direction of curvature, with a 
negative value reflecting that the relationship is characterised by an initial rise, followed by a 
decline, inferring an inverse-U shape (Hans, Pieters and He, 2016). If 𝜆 is positive, the curve 
declines initially before increasing and is thus U-shaped (Simonsohn, 2018). 
It has been argued, however, that this approach alone is inadequate for the testing of a non-linear 
relationship (Lind and Mehlum, 2010; Megersa, 2014; Megersa and Cassimon, 2015). Lind and 
Mehlum (2010) notes that the inclusion of a quadratic term does not guarantee the existence of a 
non-linear relationship because if the actual relationship is convex but still linear over relevant 
data values, this method inaccurately yields an extreme point and hence a U-shape. Thus, in order 
to ensure of the presence of a non-linear relationship, Lind and Mehlum (2010) developed and 
modified Sasabuchi’s (1980) likelihood ratio test, which is now referred to as the Sasabuchi-Lind-
Mehlum (SLM, as defined in chapter 1) test. Given the estimates of a regression model, the SLM 
method allows for tests of non-linearity at a certain level of significance. This approach also 
enables the U-shape (or inverse U-shape) to be examined to determine the extreme point of the 
relationship (Megersa, 2014).  
Although this method has not been adopted in prior research of the foreign ownership-performance 
nexus, it was previously employed by Asali, Cristobal-Campoamorb and Shaked (2016) to uncover 
the optimal level of FDI required in MNCs for human capital formation and has also been widely 
used in a variety of other studies (such as Rafindadi and Yusof, 2013; Megersa, 2014; Megersa 
and Cassimon, 2015; Begum, Sohag, Abdullah and Jaafar, 2015; Dary and James, 2019). Thus, 




with the quadratic equation shown in equation (2). The SLM test was favoured over Hansen’s 
(2000) endogenous threshold approach that was used by Driffield et al. (2018) to find the optimal 
level of foreign ownership in firms, as the approach of Hansen (2000) requires the splitting of 
sample which may induce inaccurate results since they are sensitive to the manner in which the 
data is split, that is, different splits generate different outcomes (Gupta, 2013). 
To implement the SLM test, it was assumed that the relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performance was either U-shaped, inverse U-shaped, or linear; thus, if it was non-linear, it 
has at most one extreme point (Lind and Mehlum, 2010). The choice of the interval was the 
observed data range [min(FO), max(FO)], with a minimum holding of foreign ownership set at 
10% for min(FO). The 10% border was applied as it is in accordance with the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) definition of foreign ownership where foreign-owned firms are defined as 
an enterprise in which foreign shareholding is at least 10% of the total shareholding and FDI is 
defined as purchase of at least 10% of equity in a firm (Patterson, Montanjees, Motala and Cardillo, 
2004). This definition of foreign ownership has been applied in several other studies (such as 
Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010; Mondal and Pant, 2010; Orlic et al. 2018). 
As previously mentioned, a U-shaped curve is characterised by a negative slope at low values and 
a positive slope at high values (Lind and Mehlum, 2010; Simonsohn, 2018). This is captured by 
the following condition:  
𝛃 + 𝝀(𝑭𝑶𝒎𝒊𝒏) ˂ 𝟎 ˂ 𝜷 + 𝝀(𝑭𝑶𝒎𝒂𝒙)                                                                                      (3) 
If there is a violation of either of these inequalities, the curve is not U-shaped but inverse U-shaped 
or linear (Lind and Mehlum, 2010). In order to test if these inequalities were satisfied by the 
sample, the following composite null (inverse U-shaped relationship) and alternative hypotheses 
(U-shaped relationship) were tested:  
𝑯𝟎: 𝜷 + 𝟐𝝀(𝑭𝑶𝒎𝒊𝒏)  ≥  𝟎  and/ or 𝜷 + 𝟐𝝀(𝑭𝑶𝒎𝒂𝒙) ≤  𝟎                                                 (4) 
𝑯𝟏: 𝜷 + 𝟐𝝀 (𝑭𝑶𝒎𝒊𝒏) ˂ 𝟎 and 𝜷 + 𝟐𝝀(𝑭𝑶𝒎𝒂𝒙)  > 𝟎                                                           (5) 
Due to the linearity of equation (2) with respect to β and 𝜆, the test of equation (4) vs. equation (5) 
was simply a test of linear restrictions on β and 𝜆. The output from the test includes the Fieller 
confidence interval, whose boundaries produce the cut-off points for the acceptance or rejection 




3.4 Testing the Indirect Effect of Foreign Ownership on Firm Performance (Horizontal Spillovers) 
In this section, the empirical model that was employed to test the final research objective is 
described. The review of the literature in sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 presented two categories of 
spillovers, i.e., horizontal spillovers and vertical spillovers. Several studies considered both 
horizontal and vertical spillovers (such as Nicolini and Resmini, 2010; Erdogan, 2011; Xu and 
Sheng, 2012; Jude, 2012). However, some studies have shown that vertical spillover effects 
actually measure intentional productivity transfers rather than unintentional externalities or 
spillovers (such as Pack and Saggi, 2001; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005; Lin and Saggi, 2005; 
Smeets, 2008; Blalock and Gertler, 2008). The analysis of vertical spillovers also requires complex 
estimations as they are computed at the sector level (Havranek and Irsova, 2010) and further 
bifurcated into downstream (backward: from FDI to local suppliers) and upstream (forward: from 
FDI to local buyers). 
Taking the above arguments into consideration and following the work of Aitken and Harrison 
(1999), Mühlen (2013) and Lu et al. (2017), this study chose to concentrate specifically on 
horizontal (intra-industry) spillovers, attempting to establish a link between the share of foreign 
ownership in an industry and the financial performance of domestic firms within the same industry. 
Hence, this study does not perform any estimations of vertical spillovers and focuses only on 
horizontal spillovers in the subsequent sections.  
3.4.1 Variables 
3.4.1.1 The Dependent Variables 
Since horizontal spillovers are expected to affect the productivity of a domestic firm, it is common 
for studies to estimate the presence of spillovers with TFP as the dependent variable. However, 
this was not possible for this study due to data limitations. Moreover, as explained in section 3.3, 
financial performance and productivity are considered to be closely related. Therefore, the 
dependent variables used to estimate the presence of horizontal spillovers were the financial 





3.4.1.2 The Explanatory Variables 
The first explanatory variable was the percentage of foreign ownership of firms, as defined in 
section 3.3.1.2. The second explanatory variable was the horizontal spillover measure that captured 
the effect that foreign-owned firms had on the performance of domestic firms, in the same industry. 
Based on the work of Sinani and Meyer (2004), Mondal and Pant (2010) and Lu et al. (2017), a 
proxy for the horizontal spillover variable was formulated as the ratio of the total share of foreign 
firm sales to the total sales of the industry, for a particular period. This is presented as follows:  
𝑯𝑺𝒋𝒕 =
∑ (𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒋𝒕 ×𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒋𝒕)  𝒊
∑ 𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊 𝒊𝒋𝒕
× 𝟏𝟎𝟎                                                      (6) 
where 𝐻𝑆𝑗𝑡 measures the extent of horizontal spillovers in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡; 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents 
the foreign ownership percentage of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡 and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 measures sales of 
firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡.  As stated in section 3.3.2.2, a firm is considered as foreign-owned if 
it contains at least 10% of foreign shareholding; therefore, the foreign ownership percentage of 
firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 is equal to 10% or more (𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≥ 10% in equation (6)).  
Mondal and Pant (2010) referred to this proxy as a measure of competition spillover as it results 
from the presence of foreign ownership and its effect on production in the domestic market. This 
is supported by Glass and Saggi (2002), who stated that competition between local firms and 
MNCs is motivation for local firms to increase their productivity levels, as explained in section 
2.2.2.1. For example, Sinani and Meyer (2004) found that greater competition between foreign 
and domestic firms had a positive impact on the growth of sales of local firms in Estonia. Although 
there are other channels through which spillovers can be proxied (such as imitation, skill, 
employment, etc.), this specific measure was adopted as sales accounts for output (Reyes, 2017), 
which is linked to productivity.   
If the benefits of foreign ownership are “spilled over” to domestic firms, then the coefficient on 
𝐻𝑆𝑗𝑡 should be significantly positive as per the theory reviewed in section 2.2.2.1. However, based 
on previous empirical evidence, the effect was unclear and thus there was no a priori expectation 




3.4.1.3 Control Variables 
All firm-specific control variables and dummy variables used to test the direct effects of foreign 
ownership, as outlined in section 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.1.4, were also implemented in this model. 
3.4.2 Empirical Model  
Following the benchmark model used by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Lu et al. (2017) to 
investigate the spillover effects of foreign ownership on firm performance, the empirical model 
used in this study was as follows:   
𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐 𝑯𝑺𝒋𝒕  + 𝜼𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                  (7) 
where I = 1…N and t = 1…7; 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡  and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are defined as per the previous usage. 
3.5 Estimation Technique 
When determining the most appropriate method to estimate the empirical models using panel data, 
it is crucial to consider the issue of potential endogeneity (Schultz et al., 2010). This issue is 
discussed further in the sub-section below. All regressions were performed on STATA.  
3.5.1 Testing for Endogeneity 
The most common and pervasive issue confronting studies that focus on performance-ownership 
relationships is that of endogeneity. Roberts and Whited (2013: 6) broadly define endogeneity as 
“a correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term in a regression”. This concept 
leads to a violation of the basic OLS assumption that all explanatory variables are strictly 
orthogonal to the error terms (Brooks, 2014). The presence of at least one source of endogeneity 
will lead to biased estimates and invalid results (Schultz et al., 2010).  
There are three sources of endogeneity that can arise in the relationship between foreign ownership 
and firm performance: (i) dynamic endogeneity; (ii) simultaneity; and (iii) unobserved 
heterogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). Dynamic endogeneity occurs when the firm’s past 
performance determines the current level of foreign ownership and/or the control characteristics 
of the firm. Simultaneity occurs when there is a reverse relationship between variables. For 
example, a higher percentage of foreign ownership leads to better firm performance, or 
alternatively, better firm performance leads to a higher percentage of foreign ownership. 




that may affect a firm’s level of foreign ownership, control characteristics and/or performance, but 
may be unobservable to the researcher and therefore difficult to quantify (Schultz et al., 2010).  
Panel data estimation techniques such as the FEM may ameliorate the bias stemming from 
unobserved heterogeneity and produce consistent parameter estimates (Petersen, 2009). However, 
this is done at the expense of violating an exogeneity assumption; one that researchers frequently 
fail to notice. That is, the model assumes that current observations of the explanatory variables are 
entirely independent of past values of the dependent variable (Schultz et al., 2010) and that the 
explanatory and dependent variables do not simultaneously affect each other (Rasmussen, 2013); 
an assumption that Wintoki et al. (2012) argues is unrealistic.  
Dynamic endogeneity is highly probable as previous unsatisfactory firm performance can 
potentially decrease the number of foreign shareholders willing to invest in the firm, which can, in 
turn, affect the firm’s current level of foreign ownership, some control characteristics and 
performance. This is supported by Bishop, Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2002: 21) who stated that 
“foreign investors are attracted to the companies characterised by previous positive results in terms 
of performance”. With regard to simultaneity, if firms aim to attract a specific level of foreign 
ownership in any period that is based on achieving a particular level of performance in that period, 
then, while performance may be influenced by foreign ownership, the reverse is also true- the level 
of foreign ownership is determined by the performance target. Under this circumstance, foreign 
ownership and firm performance are simultaneously determined; thereby indicating a reverse 
relationship (Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010; Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart and Lalive, 2014). Given 
the strict exogeneity assumption and the subsequent inability to account for dynamic endogeneity 
and simultaneity, the FEM is regarded as inefficient to control for all sources of endogeneity 
(Schultz et al., 2010). 
The dynamic GMM approach developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) can overcome the 
estimation problems imposed by unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic 
endogeneity and produce consistent parameter estimates (Roodman, 2009; Phung, 2015). 
However, in the case that the assumption of strict exogeneity is valid (i.e., there is no dynamic 
endogeneity or simultaneity), then the FEM specifications will produce parameter estimates that 




selecting the most appropriate estimation technique for this study, a series of tests for endogeneity 
between the firm performance and foreign ownership relationship were conducted (Schultz et al., 
2010; Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2014). These tests are outlined in the subsequent sections. 
Following the work of Wintoki et al. (2012) and Akbar et al. (2016), firm age and the industry and 
time dummy variables are treated as exogenous. 
3.5.1.1 Test of Dynamic Completeness  
Before testing for dynamic endogeneity, it is imperative to identify the number of performance 
lags required to incorporate all information from the past. Glen, Lee and Singh (2001) and 
Gschwandtner (2005) suggested that two lags are adequate for capturing the influence of past 
performance on current data. To determine the suitability of this assertion, Wintoki et al. (2012) 
estimated two OLS regressions for each performance indicator. In the first regression, the 
performance indicator was regressed against the control variables and four lags of past 
performance; Wintoki et al. (2012) discovered that only the first and second lags were significant. 
The second regression was estimated with the control variables and only the third and fourth lags 
of past performance, which were observed to be significant. Together, these results showed that, 
although the earlier lags contain relevant information, that information is absorbed by the more 
recent lags. Thus, their results confirmed the suggestions of Glen et al. (2001) and Gschwandtner 
(2005).  
For the purposes of this study, the testing approach of Wintoki et al. (2012) was followed to assess 
the suitability of the assertion that two lags of past performance (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q) were 
sufficient to attain dynamic completeness. The models for the first and second OLS regressions 
were estimated as follows: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + ∑ 𝒌𝒑𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝒑
𝒑=𝟒
𝒑=𝟏 + 𝜼𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                                                  (8) 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + ∑ 𝒌𝒑𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝒑
𝒑=𝟒
𝒑=𝟑 + 𝜼𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                                                    (9) 
where i = 1…N and t = 1…7; 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are defined as per the previous usage. The first 
regression in equation (8) runs from the first lag to the fourth lag, while the second regression in 




3.5.1.2 Test of Reverse Causality  
The first endogeneity test was conducted as per the procedure of Wintoki et al. (2012) and Akbar 
et al. (2016) with the purpose of establishing whether past performance had an impact on current 
variables. This test involved estimating the following OLS regression for each of the variables:  
        𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + ∑ 𝜼𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                         (10)        
where i = 1…N and t = 1…7; 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is either the percentage of foreign ownership, 
horizontal spillovers, firm size, leverage ratio, dividend payout ratio or asset turnover ratio. 𝑑𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are defined as per the previous usage.  𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is the performance (with respect to ROE, ROA 
or Tobin’s Q) of firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡 − 1; 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 are the control values of firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡 − 1. If 
past performance was significant for any current variable (i.e., the current percentage of foreign 
ownership, horizontal spillovers or any control variables) in equation (10), there exists reverse 
causality in which performance determines these variables and not vice versa. 
3.5.1.3 Test of Strict Exogeneity 
Still in accordance with Wintoki et al. (2012) and Akbar et al. (2016), a second test of endogeneity 
was performed to ensure the robustness of the results drawn from the reverse causality test above. 
The strict test of exogeneity, outlined by Wooldridge (2010), differs from the first test of 
endogeneity as the estimation involves future values (leads) instead of past values (lags). This was 
conducted by using a FEM to examine whether future realisations of the explanatory and control 
variables were associated with current performance (Grieser and Hadlock, 2019). The FEM was 
estimated as follows: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐 𝑯𝑺𝒋𝒕 + Ω𝑾𝒊,𝒕+𝟏  + 𝜼𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                   (11) 
where i = 1…N and t = 1…7; 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 is a subset of future values of foreign ownership, horizontal 
spillovers and the control variables. 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are defined as per the previous 
usage.   
The null hypothesis of strict exogeneity assumes that the future realisations of foreign ownership, 
horizontal spillovers and the control variables are not linked to current firm performance. If the 
future values were found to be significant in equation (11), the null hypothesis was rejected, 




i.e., future realisations of foreign ownership, horizontal spillovers and the control variables adjust 
in response to firm performance.  
3.5.1.4 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Test 
When testing for endogeneity, El-Faitouri (2014) and Akbar et al. (2016) discovered a difference 
in results between the test of reverse causality and the strict test of exogeneity. Therefore, the 
DWH test was adopted in this study as an additional robustness check for endogeneity in the case 
of such discrepancies. The DWH test (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) was used to test 
for endogeneity in the studies of Schultz et al. (2010), Saidi and Al-Shammari (2014) and 
Rathnayake, Kassi, Louembe, Sun and Ning (2019).   
This test aims to ascertain whether the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, foreign ownership, horizontal spillovers or the control variables are 
endogeneous. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, all variables are considered exogenous.   
3.5.2 Panel Estimation with an Exogenous Explanatory Variable   
As highlighted above, if endogeneity was not detected in any of the above tests, then panel data 
equation methods should be employed. The first approach to estimating panel data simply entails 
pooling the time-series and cross-sectional observations and estimating a single equation using 
OLS. However, the cross-sectional units in the panel data set, often firms or countries (the former 
being the case in this study), are typically heterogeneous (Nwakuya and Ijomah, 2017). In the 
presence of this unobservable heterogeneity, using OLS to estimate the empirical models yields 
biased results (Moulton, 1986). The FEM3 is thus typically used (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; 
Chinaemerem and Anthony, 2012; Yilmaz and Buyuklu, 2016).  
The FEM controls for all time-invariant differences between the cross-sectional units, therefore, 
this model is not biased due to the omission of time-invariant characteristics (Nwakuya and 
Ijomah, 2017). The FEM infers that these time-invariant traits are distinctive to the individual and 
must not display any correlation with other individual traits. There is variation among every entity, 
thus the entity’s error term and the constant should not be correlated with the others. If there is a 
 
3 The Random Effects Model (REM) was not used as it allows for correlation between the error term and explanatory 
variables which is why endogeneity occurs so regularly (Bell and Jones, 2015). The discovery of endogeneity has 





correlation between the error terms, the FEM is not appropriate (Torres-Reyna, 2007; Nwakuya 
and Ijomah, 2017).  
To understand how the FEM operates, the error term (𝑒𝑖𝑡) from either equation (1), (2) or (7) are 
decomposed into a time-invariant effect (𝜇𝑖) and the remainder (𝑣𝑖𝑡) that varies over time and 
entities (Brooks, 2014). The decomposition is displayed below: 
𝒆𝒊𝒕 =  𝝁𝒊 + 𝒗𝒊𝒕                                                                                                     (12) 
where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 encapsulates all the variables that affect 𝑌𝑖𝑡 cross-sectionally but do not change over 
time (Brooks, 2014).  
3.5.3 Panel Estimation with an Endogenous Explanatory Variable   
If endogeneity was observed in any of the tests, panel data techniques (such as OLS or FEM) result 
in biased estimates of the coefficient (Akbar et al., 2016). The IV estimation approach used by 
Fons-Rosen et al. (2015) could alleviate the endogeneity problem. However, it is difficult to 
identify variables that fulfil the requirements of a valid IV (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Guo, Kand, 
Cai and Small 2018), including no correlation with the error term and no correlation with the 
endogenous variable (Baser, 2009).  
To avoid an endogeneity problem, numerous studies (such as Abbas and Christensen, 2010; 
Roodman, 2009; Wintoki et al., 2012; Phung, 2015; Akbar et al., 2016) utilised a more robust 
estimation methodology known as the dynamic GMM. As mentioned in section 3.5.1, GMM can 
control for all endogeneity sources and “produce unbiased and consistent estimates by employing 
valid internal instruments during estimation” (Schultz et al., 2010: 146). These internal instruments 
take the form of selected lags of the regressors (Roodman, 2009). The intricacies of this model are 
explained further below.  
3.5.3.1 Dynamic Model 
Equation (13) assumes that two lags of the dependent variable are appropriate to capture the 
influence of past performance on current performance, nevertheless, as explained in section 
3.5.1.1, this was determined empirically.  The dynamic empirical model was thus specified as 
follows:  




where 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is the performance (with respect to ROE, ROA or Tobin’s Q) of firm i in period t − 1; 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 is the performance (with respect to ROE, ROA or Tobin’s Q) of firm i in period t − 2; 𝑌𝑖𝑡, , 
𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 are defined as per the previous usage. 
3.5.3.2 First Difference GMM  
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed the first difference GMM specification for dynamic panel 
datasets that produces consistent parameter estimates in the presence of endogeneity. In this 
approach, the model is defined as a system of equations and uses lagged values of endogenous and 
exogenous variables as IV (Wintoki et al., 2012). The dynamic model of equation (13) was 
specified in the first differenced form as follows: 
△ 𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝝀𝟏 △ 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝀𝟐 △ 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜷𝟏 △ 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜼 △ 𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 +△ 𝒗𝒊𝒕        (14) 
where: i = 1…N and  t = 1…7; △ 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝑌𝑖𝑡 −  𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1; △ 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2; △ 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 =
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−3. By taking the first differences, the time-invariant effect (𝜇𝑖) presented in equation 
(12) is eliminated (Phung, 2015). The instruments are drawn from the set of lagged dependent or 
explanatory variables i.e. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑘; 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−𝑘; 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−𝑘4 where k > 2. Hence, historical values of firm 
performance, the percentage of foreign ownership, and other firm-specific variables that are older 
than two years were used as instruments. 
The model, however, presents drawbacks in that if the original model is conceptually in levels, 
differencing can potentially decrease the power of the tests by reducing the variation in the 
explanatory variables (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000) and variables in levels may be weak 
instruments for first differenced equations (Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
3.5.3.3 System GMM 
To mitigate the shortcomings of the first difference GMM, Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed an augmented version, which included the levels equations in 
the estimation procedure (Wintoki et al., 2012). This model is called the system GMM and uses 
lagged levels as instruments for differenced equations and lagged differences as instruments for 
levels equations (Baltagi, 2008). Wintoki et al. (2012: 27) notes that “the system GMM estimator 
makes an additional exogeneity assumption that any correlation between our endogenous variables 
 





and the unobserved (fixed) effect is constant over time”. This assumption enables the inclusion of 
the levels equations with the GMM estimates. According to similar research (such as Roodman, 
2009; Phung, 2015), the system GMM approach is favoured over the first difference GMM.   
Under the system GMM, a level equation was added to the differenced equation to form a system 
of equations as follows5: 
△ 𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝝀𝟏 △ 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝀𝟐 △ 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜷𝟏 △ 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜼 △ 𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕+𝒗𝒊𝒕  
     𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝝀𝟏𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝀𝟐𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜷𝟏𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜼𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒗𝒊𝒕                       (15)     
where i = 1…N and t = 1…7.   
More instruments are introduced in the system GMM from the levels equation, which may, 
therefore, increase efficiency (Roodman, 2009). The potential instruments that can be used for the 
differenced and levels equations were6: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑘; 𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−𝑘; 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 and △ 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑘; △ 𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−𝑘; △ 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−𝑘, 
where k >  2. 
Roodman (2009: 97) asserts that “a crucial assumption for the validity of GMM is that the 
instruments are exogenous”. The biggest concern in this regard is whether sufficient lags have 
been included to control for the dynamic aspects of the foreign ownership-performance nexus. In 
the case that enough lags are included, Wintoki et al. (2012: 15) states that “any historical value 
of firm performance beyond those lags is a potentially valid instrument since it will be exogenous 
to current performance shocks”. In order to verify the validity of the GMM model, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) suggested a series of tests to examine whether the instruments are exogenous. These 
tests are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test, Hansen test and the Difference-in-Hansen test, 




5 When dealing with the second research question, △ 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 and 𝐻𝑆𝑗𝑡  are included in the first differenced and levels 
equations, respectively.  
6 zi,t−k  and △ zi,t−k do not include instruments for firm age and industry and time dummies as these variables are 




3.5.3.4 Arellano-Bond Autocorrelation Test 
The Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test is used to check for first- (AR (1)) and second-order (AR 
(2)) serial correlation in the residuals of the first difference equation (Roodman, 2009). If the 
assumption of exogeneity among instruments is valid, the residuals in the first differences (AR 
(1)) should be correlated, but there should be no second-order serial correlation (AR (2)) (Akbar 
et al., 2016). This is depicted in the hypotheses below. 
1. Test for AR (1): 
    𝑯𝟎: 𝑬(△ 𝒗𝒊𝒕/△ 𝒗𝒊,𝒕−𝒌) = 𝟎                                                                                                                   (16) 
    𝑯𝟏: 𝑬(△ 𝒗𝒊𝒕/△ 𝒗𝒊,𝒕−𝒌) ≠ 𝟎                                                                                                      (17) 
2. Test for AR (2): 
    𝑯𝟎: 𝑬(△ 𝒗𝒊𝒕/△ 𝒗𝒊,𝒕−𝒌) = 𝟎                                                                                                      (18)    
    𝑯𝟏: 𝑬(△ 𝒗𝒊𝒕/△ 𝒗𝒊,𝒕−𝒌) ≠ 𝟎                                                                                                      (19) 
If the assumption of exogeneity was valid, then the results should return a rejection of the null 
hypothesis for the first-order serial correlation in the first differenced errors, and an acceptance for 
the second-order serial correlation in the first differenced errors (Phung, 2015). If the null 
hypothesis was rejected for AR (2), the instruments were not strictly exogenous, therefore, the 
model would require the addition of further lags (Roodman, 2009).  
3.5.3.5 Hansen Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 
In addition to the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test, the Hansen or Sargan test for joint 
overidentifying restrictions (testing the joint validity of the instruments) is standard after the GMM 
estimation. However, the Sargan test statistic may be inconsistent for robust GMM (Roodman, 
2009; Pitt, 2011). Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002) also argue that the J-statistic of Hansen 
(1982) is more commonly employed to test overidentifying restrictions. Hence, only the Hansen 
test of overidentifying restrictions was implemented in this study. This is in accordance with 
previous research on GMM (such as Wintoki et al. 2012; Nguyen et al., 2015; Akbar et al., 2016; 
Duru, Iyengar and Zampelli, 2016). This test yields a J-statistic that follows a chi-squared (χ²) 
distribution under the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the instruments and the 




The hypothesis test is presented below:  
𝑯𝟎7: 𝑬(𝒗𝒊,𝒕/𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝒌; 𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕−𝒌; 𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝒌, △ 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝒌; △ 𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕−𝒌; △ 𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝒌) = 𝟎                          (20) 
           𝑯𝟏 ∶ 𝑬(𝒗𝒊,𝒕/𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝒌; 𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕−𝒌; 𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝒌, △ 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝒌; △ 𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕−𝒌; △ 𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝒌) ≠ 𝟎                           (21)                                        
If the null hypothesis of the Hansen test was not rejected, then it can be concluded that there was 
no correlation between the instruments and the error term. If the null hypothesis was rejected, then 
it suggested that the instruments were not exogenous. However, Roodman (2009: 98) states that 
the Hansen test “should not be relied upon too faithfully, because it is prone to weakness”.  This 
is due to the fact that the test becomes weaker as more moment conditions are included. 
Furthermore, Arellano and Bond (1991) claimed that the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test had 
more power than the Hansen or Sargan tests to detect lagged instruments being made invalid 
through autocorrelation.  
3.5.3.6 Difference-in-Hansen Test of Exogeneity  
Closely related to the Hansen test for the validity of the full instrument set is the difference-in-
Hansen test that is used to test the validity of subsets of the instruments, which was also 
implemented in this study. This was conducted by testing the additional exogeneity assumption 
made by the system GMM that any correlation between endogenous variables and the unobserved 
(fixed) effect is constant over time, as outlined in section 3.5.3.3. This test also yields a J-statistic 
that distributes a chi-squared (χ²) under the null hypothesis that the subset of instruments used in 
the levels equations are exogenous (Wintoki et al., 2012; Akbar et al., 2016). The hypothesis test 
was as follows:  
𝑯8
𝟎
: △ 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝒌, △ 𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕−𝒌 𝒂𝒏𝒅  △ 𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝒌  are exogenous  (22) 
𝑯𝟏 : △ 𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝒌, △ 𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕−𝒌 𝒂𝒏𝒅  △ 𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝒌 are not exogenous (23) 
If the null hypothesis was rejected, the subset of instruments used for the levels equation are 
endogenous and, therefore, invalid. The rejection of the null hypothesis violates the additional 
assumption of the system GMM.  
 
7 When dealing with the final research question, 𝐻𝑆𝑗,𝑡−𝑘 and △ 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 are also included in this test. 




3.5.3.7 Strength of Instruments    
A secondary specification test of the system GMM can be conducted by examining the goodness-
of-fit of the first-stage regressions (Schultz et al., 2010). Several authors (such as Staiger and 
Stock, 1997; Stock and Yogo, 2005) argue that GMM estimates may potentially be biased if the 
endogenous variables are only weakly correlated with the instruments. No single criterion exists 
to evaluate the joint strength or weakness of the instrument set of the system GMM. Nonetheless, 
Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005) outlined a procedure using a standard 2SLS 
regression. This approach has been used in several studies, such as Wintoki et al. (2012) and 
Schultz et al. (2010) and was thus adopted to evaluate the strength of the instruments used in the 
system GMM in this study.  
For this analysis, a first stage regression of endogenous variables on the instruments was estimated 
and thereafter an examination of the F-statistics was performed. The null hypothesis of each of the 
tests is that the set of instruments are weak. To examine the strength of the instruments, equation 
(15) was separated into its constituent levels and difference equations. Thereafter this study 
independently estimated the strength of: (1) lag differences as instruments in the level equations; 
and (2) lagged levels as instruments in the differenced equations (Wintoki et al. 2012).  
The model for the equation in levels was as follows: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑯𝑺𝒋𝒕 + 𝜼𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒗𝒊𝒕                                                          (24) 
Instruments:  △ 𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−2;△ 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2; △ 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−2 
The model for the equation in differences was as follows: 
△ 𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 △ 𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 △ 𝑯𝑺𝒋𝒕 + 𝜼 △ 𝒛𝒊𝒕 + 𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒗𝒊𝒕                                    (25)                                                           
Instruments: 𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−3; 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡−3; 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−3 
For the variables in levels, the F-statistics were obtained by regressing each variable on all the 
lagged differences used as instruments (△ 𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−2;△ 𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡−2; △ 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−2). Similarly, for the variables 
in differences, the F-statistics were obtained by regressing each variable on all the lagged levels 




If the F-statistic was significant, the null hypothesis of weak instruments was rejected. However, 
if the F-statistic was insignificant, the null hypothesis of weak instruments could not be rejected; 
thereby suggesting that the results of the GMM estimates are driven by weak instruments. 
3.5.4 Summary of Estimation Procedure  
As discussed, it was proposed to select an estimation technique based on the results of the series 
of endogeneity tests. Hence, the first step of the estimation was to ascertain whether endogeneity 
existed in the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. On the one hand, if 
endogeneity was not present, the FEM was selected. On the other hand, if the issue of endogeneity 
was detected, the system GMM was adopted. The chosen technique was then used to estimate 
equations (1), (2) and (7), with the SLM test performed alongside the estimation of equation (2).  
3.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the dataset and methodology used in this study was discussed in detail, including 
the justifications for the techniques chosen. The data sample consisted of an unbalanced panel over 
seven years, for 247 firms which translated into 1320 annual observations. The empirical models 
for the linear and non-linear relationship between firm financial performance and foreign 
ownership were outlined, as well as the development and incorporation of horizontal spillover 
effects. The series of endogeneity tests were used to determine if exogeneity assumptions were 
violated in the foreign ownership-performance nexus. The estimation model selected was 
dependent on the results of the endogeneity test. The next chapter focuses on analysing and 





CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results from the models and procedures described in the preceding 
chapter. Firstly, the descriptive statistics are reported, after which the results for the endogeneity 
tests are discussed. Subsequently, the results of the system GMM model, that was used to estimate 
the linear and non-linear relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance, are 
examined in conjunction with the output of the SLM test. Thereafter, the results from the second 
system GMM, used to determine the effects of horizontal spillovers, are analysed. Lastly, the 
results of the robustness tests are explained.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides a review of the summary statistics and the correlation matrix for firm 
performance, foreign ownership and the control variables of the JSE-listed firms in the sample.  
4.2.1 Summary Statistics and Correlation Analysis for all Variables 
Table 4-1: Summary Statistics of all Variables from 2012-2018 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 0.029 0.142 -0.845 0.748 
ROE 0.085 0.242 -0.987 0.972 
TQ 6.850 9.502 0.055 57.749 
FO 0.179 0.193 0 0.979 
HS 0.212 0.373 0 1.963 
LNSIZE 20.874 2.044 11.113  26.155 
LNAGE 3.394 0.870 1 6.077 
LEV 0.190 0.213 0 2.884 
DIVPAY 0.276 0.314 0 1.776 
ASTO 1.240 0.863 0 6.802 
Notes: Std. Dev. is the standard deviation, Min is minimum, and Max is maximum. ROA represents the firm’s returns on assets, 
ROE represents the firm’s return on equity, TQ represents Tobin’s Q, FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, 
HS is the percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the firm to the observation date, LEV is the leverage ratio of 
the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for the firm. See chapter 3 for complete 
definitions of all variables.  
 
As displayed in table 4-1, the average ROA and ROE over the period 2012 to 2018 are 2.9% and 
8.5%, respectively. Both performance indicators are characterised by the large deviations around 
their respective means. The mean value of Tobin’s Q is 6.85, which demonstrates a relatively high 




the market value of a JSE-listed firm, on average, is more valuable than its replacement cost 
(Phung, 2015). The control variables, except for firm age, have a relatively low dispersion around 
their respective means, as indicated by their low standard deviation. The average net assets of the 
firms in the sample is R1 162 687 532 in net assets9. The average firm age of 3010 years reflects 
that most companies listed on the JSE have been in operation for a long period of time. The mean 
value of the leverage ratio shows that the companies use only 19% of debt to finance their assets. 
This low usage of debt indicates that these companies are less risky (Salin and Yadav, 2012).  
The mean value of the dividend payout ratio suggests that, on average, 27.6% of earnings are 
distributed to shareholders. Vries, Erasmus, Hamman and Wesson (2012) estimated the average 
dividend payout ratio of JSE-listed firms, from 2000 to 2009, to be 28.33%. This implies that 
the average dividend payout ratio has decreased over time (from 28.33% to 27.6%), however, 
unlike this study, Vries et al. (2012) included financial firms in their study sample which may 
account for the differences observed. The average asset turnover ratio of 1.24 indicates that for 
every rand of assets, firms generate R1.240 in revenue, suggesting that firms efficiently utilise 
their plant and equipment (Fairfield and Yohn, 2001).  
Foreign ownership constitutes 17.9% of the total shareholding on average. This differs 
substantially from Dube (2018), who found that the average foreign shareholding on the JSE was 
6.36% from 2004 to 2014. This may be attributable to the fact that Dube (2018) only included the 
top one, two, three, five and 10 foreign shareholders of firms, consequently excluding foreign 
shareholders that did not fall into that category, thus resulting in a lower average. The average 
value of horizontal spillovers is 21.2%, with significant variation across the sample (from 0 to 
196%). 
 
9 Average firm size of R1 162 687 532 = 𝑒20.874 















Notes: This table shows the correlation coefficients between performance measures, foreign ownership characteristics and control variables for the period of 2012 to 2018. ROA 
represents the firm’s returns on assets, ROE represents the firm’s return on equity, TQ represents Tobin’s Q, FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, HS is the 
percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment 
of the firm to the observation date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for the firm. See chapter 
3 for complete definitions of all variables. 
 ROA ROE TQ FO HS LNSIZE LNAGE LEV DIVPAY ASTO 
ROA 1.000          
ROE 0.728 1.000         
TQ 0.240 0.211 1.000        
FO 0.176 0.176 0.092 1.000       
HS 0.171 0.161 0.073 0.333 1.000      
LNSIZE 0.385 0.088 -0.004 0.299 0.305 1.000     
LNAGE 0.1322 0.1223 -0.035 0.242 0.169 0.276 1.000    
LEV -0.215 0.019 -0.111 -0.097 -0.036 -0.416 -0.076 1.000   
DIVPAY 0.430 0.446 0.1204 0.211 0.208 0.307 0.225 -0.139 1.000  




As is clear from the results presented in table 4-2, the correlations of each pairwise variable are 
low, except for ROA and ROE, which is consistent with the findings of Mao (2015) in China and 
Okundamiya and Okundamiya (2017) in Nigeria. ROA and ROE exhibit weak positive correlation 
with Tobin’s Q, demonstrating that market-based measures and accounting-based measures 
capture different aspects of firm performance. As mentioned in chapter 3, on the one hand, 
accounting-based measures evaluate a firm’s profitability (Masa’deh, Tayeh, Al-Jarrah and 
Tarhini, 2015) from a backward-looking perspective and reflect what the firm has accomplished. 
On the other hand, market-based measures are indicators of investment opportunities from a 
forward-looking perspective and reflect what a firm will accomplish (Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001; Hu and Izumida, 2008).  
All firm performance measures are positively correlated with foreign ownership, but foreign 
ownership has a stronger relationship with the accounting-based measures than with Tobin’s Q. It 
is also evident that foreign ownership shares a relationship of the same magnitude with both ROA 
and ROE of 0.176. Foreign ownership and horizontal spillovers share a positive correlation, which 
is expected since spillovers are a result of FDI (Tong and Hu, 2003).  
Firm size is positively associated with ROA and ROE but negatively associated with Tobin’s Q. 
The positive correlation with the accounting-based measures coincides with Chhibber and 
Majumdar (1999), who expressed that larger firms benefit from economies of scale, market power 
and better access to external finance, which may enhance their profitability. The negative 
correlation with Tobin’s Q is supported by Offenberg (2010), who argued that firms become 
relatively less valuable as they grow larger. This is due to the inability of shareholders to minimise 
agency costs in larger companies.  
The negative correlation between foreign ownership and the leverage ratio suggests that foreign 
investors are deterred from investing in firms that contain large levels of debt. This is in line with 
Ostadi and Ashja (2014), who observed that existing debt had a significant adverse effect on the 
inflow of FDI. The leverage ratio shares negative correlations with all variables except for ROE. 
The difference in correlations between leverage and ROE, and leverage and ROA are similar to 
the findings of Krishna and Kumar (2018) in India and the previously mentioned Nigerian study 
by Okundamiya and Okundamiya (2017). Both studies found a positive correlation between 




(2018) argued that debt is considered as the cheapest source of finance and, therefore, resulted in 
an increase in the return to the equity shareholders in India. Okundamiya and Okundamiya (2017) 
stated that the relative efficiency of asset usage by Nigerian firms was negatively affected by their 
capital structure where debt was heavily employed, resulting in a diminishing ROA. The negative 
effect of debt on efficient usage of assets further suggests that debt decreases the asset turnover 
ratio, which corresponds with the findings in table 4-2.  
According to Uluyol, Lebe and Akbas (2014), at an ideal level of financial leverage, a company’s 
ROE would increase. Therefore, the positive correlation between ROE and the leverage ratio may 
indicate that firms listed on the JSE achieve an optimal level of leverage. The negative correlation 
between Tobin’s Q and the leverage ratio postulates that firms with more debt are less valuable in 
the market (Mao, 2015). The negative correlation that the leverage ratio shares with ROA and 
Tobin’s Q coincides with the pecking order theory that assumes a negative relation between 
leverage and firm performance since profitable firms are in less need of debt (Samour and Hassan, 
2016).  
In accordance with Phung and Hoang (2012), the correlation between firm age and Tobin's Q is 
negative, inferring that the market value of firms decreases with their age. On the contrary, firm 
age produces a positive correlation with ROA and ROE. The asset turnover ratio is positively 
correlated with all performance measures. This positive correlation illustrates that firms on the JSE 
make efficient usage of their assets, thereby exhibiting a positive influence on firm performance 
(Baik, Chae, Choi and Farber, 2013).  
The dividend payout ratio is positively correlated with all performance measures and is particularly 
strong with the accounting-based measures. This is consistent with the findings of Murekefu and 
Ouma (2012) in Kenya. Furthermore, the positive correlation between dividend payout ratio and 
firm performance supports the agency theory view of dividends, as discussed in section 2.2.1.1. 
As previously outlined, paying dividends to shareholders reduces free cash flows. This forces firms 
to raise funds externally for new investments, which, in turn, increases the level of external 
monitoring (Jiraporn, Kim and Kim, 2011). There is thus improved corporate governance, which 
positively affects a firm’s performance (Murekefu and Ouma, 2012).  
Similar to the correlation between firm performance and the dividend payout ratio, Chai (2010) 




identified in Korea, could also be justified by the agency theory view of dividends, i.e., dividends 
can substitute for direct monitoring of firms by large external shareholders (Rozeff, 1982; 
Easterbrook, 1984; Khan, 2006).  
In summary, ROE is the only performance measure that is positively correlated to all variables, 
whereas ROA is negatively correlated to leverage but positively correlated to all the other 
variables. Tobin's Q shares a positive correlation with all variables except for the leverage ratio, 
firm size and firm age. The leverage ratio is the only variable negatively correlated to foreign 
ownership.  
4.2.2 Summary Statistics of Foreign Ownership 
Table 4-3: Summary Statistics of Foreign Ownership from 2012-2018 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2012 0.140 0.171 0.000 0.859 
2013 0.150 0.174 0.000 0.772 
2014 0.166 0.187 0.000 0.784 
2015 0.180 0.186 0.000 0.812 
2016 0.206 0.211 0.000 0.867 
2017 0.214 0.211 0.000 0.979 
2018 0.217 0.206 0.000 0.778 
Notes: This table displays the summary statistics of the variation of foreign ownership for the period 2012-2018. Std. Dev. is the 
standard deviation, Min is minimum, and Max is maximum. 
Table 4-3 shows that the percentage of foreign ownership in JSE-listed companies followed an 
upward trend, increasing from 14% in 2012 to 21.7% in 2018. Peyper (2017) asserted that South 
Africa remains the largest hub of FDI on the continent despite its political uncertainty. During this 
period, the South African government has made numerous attempts to attract more foreign capital 
to achieve the goals of job creation and inclusive growth (National Treasury, 2017; Cronje, 2018; 
Villers, 2019), with the evidence suggesting that these efforts have yielded some success. As stated 
in chapter 1, the current policy on FDI in South Africa does not place any restriction on the level 
of foreign ownership in South African firms, which assists the continual increase in foreign 
shareholding. Aside from the efforts of the government, South African companies have also 
worked hard to attract offshore investors, contributing to the growth in foreign ownership. As of 
2015, the lion’s share of the top 40’s profit is earned outside of the country’s borders (Hogg, 2015). 
The international operations of these companies have gained the attention of offshore investors, 




Table 4-4: Summary Statistics of Foreign Ownership across Industries from 2012-2018 






                                                   
         
   
Notes: This table displays the summary statistics of the variation of foreign ownership across different industries for the period 
2012-2018. Std. Dev. is the standard deviation, Min is minimum, and Max is maximum.  
The results from table 4-4 reveal that, on average, the consumer services industry has the highest 
level of foreign shareholding during the seven-year period. The South African retail scene is 
dominated by a small number of major retail companies, which make them appealing for foreign 
investments and takeovers. An example of this is the high-profile acquisition of Massmart by the 
American MNC retail company Walmart that acquired a 51% share of the target company in 2011 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2016; Omarjee, 2017). Foreign shareholders have significant stakes in 
almost half of the JSE top 40 companies, such as Mr. Price, Shoprite, and Woolworths (Hogg, 
2015), that are from the consumer services industry. Between the period 2013 to 2019, the 
international holdings of Clicks and Lewis also expanded (Wasserman, 2019). Other major 
companies within the consumer services industry that contain significant levels of foreign 
ownership are Famous Brands, Spar, The Foschini Group and Truworths.   
The telecommunications and basic materials industries follow the consumer services industry 
closely in terms of foreign shareholding, with 20.7% and 20.6%, respectively. Based on evidence 
from Pau (2013) and Atiyas, Levy and Walton (2017), it is deduced that South Africa’s four 
licensed mobile operators (i.e., Vodacom, MTN, Cell C11 and Telkom) are widely held by foreign 
shareholders. Vodacom’s largest shareholder is Vodafone Group plc, which is based in the UK 
(National Treasury, 2017). Prior to 2018, Saudi Oger, an international telecommunications 
holdings firm in Saudi Arabia, was the majority shareholder of Cell C. In 2015, Vodacom and 
MTN were among the JSE top 40 companies with a controlling share of foreign ownership (Hogg, 
2015). Although foreign investors recently sold notable stakes in Vodacom and MTN, they were 
net buyers of Telkom (Wasserman, 2019). Naspers, a multinational internet group and a large-cap 
 
11 Blue Label Telecoms, which owns Cell C, has a substantial level of foreign shareholding.  
Industry Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Basic Materials 0.206    0.236    0.000     0.867 
Consumer Goods 0.155 0.146 0.000     0.496 
Consumer Services 0.244 0.210 0.000 0.979 
Health Care 0.176 0.185 0.000 0.766 
Industrials 0.137 0.150 0.000 0.625 
Oil and Gas 0.132 0.121 0.004 0.402 
Technology 0.117 0.137 0.000 0.585 




stock, is predominantly owned by foreigners as well and known to employ most of their staff from 
outside South Africa (Chandler, 2016).  
The basic materials industry contains the third highest percentage of foreign ownership, as South 
Africa is well endowed with natural resources (Asiedu, 2006), such as coal, diamonds, and gold. 
Mining companies such as Anglo Gold, Anglo American and Anglo Platinum are in the group of 
JSE top 40 companies where foreign shareholders have the controlling share (Hogg, 2015). In 
addition, Gold Fields, Harmony and Anglo Gold are among the top five foreign-owned stocks in 
South Africa (Wasserman, 2019).  
The average foreign shareholding of the consumer services, telecommunications and basic 
materials industry differ from the findings of Dube (2018), who observed that from 2004 to 2014, 
foreign shareholding was highest in the basic material industry, followed by the consumer services 
industry and thereafter the telecommunications industry. This implies that, during the seven-year 
period, the preferences of foreign investors changed from the basic material industry to the 
consumer services and telecommunications industries, respectively. This shift in preferences may 
be a consequence of the Marikana Massacre in 2012, which caused a steady decline in the 
production and value of the South African mining industry (Hill and Maroun, 2015).  
Interestingly, figure 4-1 displays an upward trend of foreign ownership in the basic materials 
industry since 2016. Although the consumer services and telecommunications industries have a 
higher average foreign shareholding than the basic materials industry during the seven-year period, 
figure 4-1 reveals that in 2018, the basic materials industry received the largest share of foreign 
capital. This suggests that, as of 2018, the preference of foreign investors has reverted to the basic 
materials industry, as per Dube (2018). This is further supported by Wasserman (2019), who stated 
that 62% of mining shares on the JSE are currently in foreign hands. Furthermore, offshore 
investors increased their mining holdings over 2018, particularly in platinum and gold companies, 
except for Harmony.  
As presented in table 4-4, the health care, consumer goods, industrials, and oil and gas industries 
contained moderate levels of foreign ownership, with a small variation between the industries. 
Figure 4-1 shows that foreign ownership began to increase in the consumer goods industry since 
2015. Hogg (2015) labelled Tiger Brands as one of the JSE top 40 companies that had a substantial 




industry, are Clover Industries, Illovo Sugar, RCL Foods and Bidvest. The JSE-listed firms in the 
health care industry, such as Netcare, Life Healthcare, Mediclinic and Aspen, are leading 
healthcare brands with significant levels of foreign capital. The percentage of foreign ownership 
across the health care industry fluctuates during the seven-year period.  
The lowest level of average foreign shareholding is in the technology industry, as illustrated in 
table 4-4. This may be a result of South Africa not being as technologically advanced as the 
countries of foreign investors. This is supported by Dube (2018), who also observed the lowest 
portion of foreign ownership present in the technology industry. However, figure 4-1 indicates 
that, as of 2016, the technology industry has attracted more foreign investors than the industrials 
and oil and gas industries. This may suggest that South African firms are becoming more 
innovative. The oil and gas industry also experienced a large drop in 2017, met by a slight increase 
in 2018.  
Overall, figure 4-1 suggests that although the preferences of foreign investors may have alternated, 
the three major industries responsible for the inflow of foreign capital are still the basic materials, 
consumer services and telecommunications industries. It is also recognized that as of 2016, the 
least attractive industry for foreign investors diverted from the technology industry to the oil and 
gas industry.  




4.2.3 Summary statistics for Performance Measures  





Notes: This table displays the mean values for ROA, ROE and TQ for the period 2012-2018. ROA represents the firm’s returns on 
assets. ROE represents the firm’s return on equity. TQ represents Tobin’s Q.   
It is clear from table 4-5 that all performance measures fluctuated during the seven-year period. 
Firms achieved their highest ROA and Tobin’s Q in 2012 and their highest ROE in 2015 while 
experiencing their lowest ROE and Tobin’s Q in 2018 and lowest ROA in 2014. Tobin’s Q 
fluctuated less compared to the accounting-based measures. The average ROA is substantially 
lower than the ROE in every year, indicating that companies have more assets than shareholder 
equity. The fluctuation in the performance averages, combined with the uniform increase of 
foreign ownership from 2012-2108 (in table 4-3), indicates that if a relationship were to exist 
between foreign ownership and firm performance, it might be non-linear. The estimates of ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q are also attributed to firm-specific characteristics.  










Notes: This table shows the mean values of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q across different industries from 2012-2018. 
ROA represents the firm’s returns on assets. ROE represents the firm’s return on equity. TQ represents Tobin’s Q.  
Table 4-6 shows that the consumer services industry achieves the highest averages of ROA and 
ROE, and the telecommunications industry earns the second highest ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
These top performing industries also hold the highest levels of foreign ownership, respectively.  
On the one hand, the high returns may be a potential reason as to why foreign shareholders invest 
Year ROA ROE TQ 
2012 0.038 0.086 7.442 
2013 0.024 0.072 7.248 
2014 0.019 0.092 7.056 
2015 0.032 0.106 7.300 
2016 0.035 0.088 6.557 
2017 0.029 0.090 6.290 
2018 0.028 0.061 5.614 
Industry ROA ROE TQ 
Basic Materials -0.014 0.009 3.907 
Consumer Goods 0.057 0.121 6.971 
Consumer Services 0.086 0.207 9.624 
Health Care 0.024 0.056 8.970 
Industrials 0.029 0.068 5.736 
Oil and Gas -0.065 -0.057 4.857 
Technology 0.009 0.116 11.732 




frequently in the consumer services and telecommunications industries. On the other hand, the 
high returns could be a result of the large share of foreign investors, who transfer new technology 
and introduce better managerial and innovative production processes, as discussed in section 
2.2.1.2.  
Firms in the basic materials industry performed poorly in terms of all performance measures. This 
poor performance may be due to the Marikana Massacre in 2012 that was mentioned in the 
previous section. Furthermore, the costs associated with extracting minerals from deeper in the 
mines continue to rise as well as increased electricity and labour costs. Despite the dismal 
performance of the basic materials industry, foreign investors seem to still find it attractive as it 
holds the third largest portion of average foreign shareholding from 2012-2018. The oil and gas 
industry experienced negative returns for ROA and ROE. This can be attributable to the fact that 
the gas sector spent more than it earned for three consecutive quarters, thereby resulting in 
significant losses (Stats SA, 2017).  The health care and industrials industries share satisfactory 
performance averages for all measures. These industries also have a moderate level of foreign 
ownership.  
The performance of the technology industry varies substantially depending on the performance 
indicator, with the highest Tobin's Q, a moderate ROE and a weak ROA. According to Bharadwaj, 
Bharadwaj and Konsynski (1999), information technology contributes to a firm's future 












4.3 Regression Results for the Endogeneity Tests 
As stipulated in section 3.5.1, dynamic completeness tests, reverse causality tests and the test of 
strict exogeneity were used to examine whether foreign ownership, horizontal spillovers and the 
control variables were related to the past or future performance of firms. The results of these tests 
determined the estimation technique (FEM or GMM) that was most suitable for this study.  
4.3.1 Regression Results for Test of Dynamic Completeness  
As mentioned in sections 3.5.1.1 and 3.5.3.1, although two lags of performance are deemed 
sufficient to capture the persistence of profitability over time, this study still follows the testing 
procedure of Wintoki et al. (2012) to verify this assertion. The results thereof are presented in table 
4-7. In columns 1, 3 and 5, four lags of the performance measure are included, whereas in columns 
2, 4 and 6, the two recent lags are dropped and only the third and fourth lags are included. 
Table 4-7: OLS Regression Results for the Test of Dynamic Completeness 
 ROA ROA ROE ROE TQ TQ 
Performancet−1 0.389  0.613  0.437  
 (3.53)***  (7.82)***  (4.61)**  
Performancet−2 0.023  0.026  0.270  
 (0.39)  (0.39)  (3.51)**  
Performancet−3 0.239 0.310 -0.009 0.175 0.018 0.376 
 (2.99)*** (3.86)*** (0.10) (2.06)** (0.14) (3.62)*** 
Performancet−4 0.019 0.143 0.039 0.160 0.011 0.133 
 (0.31) (1.90)* (0.68) (2.62)*** (0.14) (1.53) 
LNSIZE -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.013 -0.114 -0.097 
 (0.69) (0.30) (1.83)* (2.32)** (1.23) (0.85) 
LNAGE -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.221 0.092 
 (0.09) (0.37) (0.09) (0.03) (0.97) (0.21) 
LEV -0.019 -0.027 0.029 -0.008 -1.673 -3.042 
 (0.78) (0.99) (0.80) (0.15) (1.41) (1.80) 
DIVPAY 0.084 0.109 0.170 0.258 1.386 1.783 
 (4.53)*** (5.60)*** (4.80)*** (5.93)*** (1.97) (1.64)* 
ASTO 0.010 0.011 0.017 0.020 0.555 0.293 
 
 
(2.13)** (1.87)* (1.98)* (1.53) (1.24) (0.38) 
R2 0.52 0.41 0.54 0.34 0.64 0.42 
Notes: All t-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, firm clustered standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively for the t-test. Year and Industry dummies are included in all specifications. ROA represents the firm’s 
returns on assets, ROE represents the firm’s return on equity, TQ represents Tobin’s Q, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the firm to the observation 
date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for 




As can be seen from table 4-7, when all four lags are included, the first and third lags are significant 
for ROA, the first lag is significant for ROE and the first and second lags are significant for Tobin’s 
Q. Thus, the results vary depending on the performance measure, but it is evident that the first lag 
is needed for all three measures. The only lag significant beyond the second past measure of 
performance is for ROA. After the first and second lags are dropped, the third and fourth lags 
become statistically significant for ROA and ROE, while the third lag is still significant for Tobin’s 
Q. The fact that more of these later lags become significant when the past lags are dropped attests 
to the fact that they include relevant information but that the more recent lags mostly subsume this 
information. These findings are broadly consistent with those of Wintoki et al. (2012), in that the 
later lags emerge as more significant when the past lags are dropped.  
As such, in light of these results, this study follows the assumption of Glen et al. (2001) and 


















4.3.2 Regression Results for Reverse Causality  
This section presents the results from OLS regressions of the percentage of foreign ownership, 
horizontal spillovers and control variables on the performance and control variables from one year 
prior. Tables 4-8, 4-9 and 4-10 display results for ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, respectively.   
Table 4-8: OLS Regression Results for the Relationship between Foreign Ownership, Firm-
specific Variables and Past ROA 
 FO HS LNSIZE LEV DIVPAY ASTO 
ROAt−1 0.052 0.032 1.322 -0.004 0.246 -0.243 
 (1.22) (0.46) (1.73)* (0.08) (4.47)*** (2.07)** 
LNSIZEt−1 0.013 0.036 0.933 -0.007 0.007 0.001 
 (5.27)*** (7.29)*** (14.48)*** (0.99) (2.80)*** (0.17) 
LNAGEt−1 0.034 0.042 0.104 -0.000 0.017 -0.016 
 (4.61)*** (3.51)*** (1.68)* (0.01) (2.28)** (1.42) 
LEVt−1 0.037 0.194 0.103 0.868 0.007 -0.071 
 (1.43) (4.92)*** (0.38) (14.73)*** (0.24) (1.28) 
DIVPAYt−1 0.058 0.035 0.188 0.018 0.521 0.072 
 (2.64)*** (0.96) (1.44) (1.19) (10.13)*** (1.51) 
ASTOt−1 -0.001 0.058 0.013 -0.001 0.026 0.868 
 (0.03) (3.39)*** (0.29) (0.31) (3.16)*** (15.99)*** 
       
R2 0.18 0.21 0.81 0.69 0.48 0.85 
Notes: All t-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively for the t-test. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. Year and Industry dummies are included in 
all specifications. ROA represents the firm’s returns on assets,  FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, HS is 
the percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the firm to the observation date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, 
DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for the firm. (t-1) is a subset of past values of 













Table 4-9: OLS Regression Results for Relationship between Foreign Ownership, Firm-specific 
Variables and Past ROE 
 
 










               
Notes: All t-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively for the t-test. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. Year and Industry dummies are included in 
all specifications. ROE represents the firm’s return on equity, FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, HS is 
the percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the firm to the observation date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, 
DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for the firm. (t-1) is a subset of past values of 













 FO HS LNSIZE LEV DIVPAY ASTO 
ROEt−1 0.089 0.128 0.786 0.013 0.150 -0.198 
 (3.65)*** (3.36)*** (2.53)** (0.30) (4.10)*** (4.02)*** 
LNSIZEt−1 0.014 0.036 0.947 -0.007 0.009 -0.002 
 (5.86)*** (7.78)*** (15.00)*** (0.94) (4.16)*** (0.46) 
LNAGEt−1 0.033 0.041 0.092 -0.000 0.014 -0.013 
 (4.48)*** (3.44)*** (1.55) (0.02) (1.96)** (1.15) 
LEVt−1 0.028 0.182 -0.005 0.867 -0.013 -0.047 
 (1.09) (4.63)*** (0.02) (14.41)*** (0.43) (0.82) 
DIVPAYt−1 0.041 0.005 0.130 0.014 0.509 0.097 
 (1.83) (0.13) (0.89) (1.52) (9.56)*** (2.09)** 
ASTOt−1 -0.003 0.053 -0.006 -0.002 0.022 0.874 
 (0.53) (3.07)*** (0.13) (0.51) (2.80)*** (16.02)*** 
       




Table 4-10: OLS Regression Results for Relationship between Foreign Ownership, Firm-specific 









       
Notes: All t-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively for the t-test. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. Year and Industry dummies are included in 
all specifications. TQ represents the firm’s Tobin’s Q. FO represents the fraction of the percentage of foreign ownership in firms. 
HS is the percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets. LNAGE is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the firm to the observation date. LEV is the leverage ratio of 
firms. DIVPAY Is the dividend payout ratio. ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio. (t+1) is a subset of past values of TQ and 
control variables. See chapter 3 for complete definitions of all variables 
From the three tables above, it can be gathered that past performance, when measured by ROE and 
Tobin’s Q, is a significant determinant of the current level of foreign ownership and horizontal 
spillovers. In accordance with Akbar et al. (2016), this finding raises two critical issues: (i) there 
is reverse causality in which past values of ROE and Tobin’s Q determines the level of foreign 
ownership and horizontal spillovers, but not vice versa and; (ii) foreign ownership and horizontal 
spillovers could be determined simultaneously with ROE and Tobin’s Q, due to the omitted 
variables bias.   
Similar to El-Faitouri (2014), tables 4-8, 4-9 and 4-10 also indicate that the control variables are 
potentially dynamically endogenous. On the one hand, when past performance is measured by 
ROA and ROE, the indicators are significant for all the control variables, except for the leverage 
ratio. On the other hand, when Tobin’s Q measures past performance, it is only significant when 
the leverage ratio is the dependent variable. That being said, although the leverage ratio does not 
display a significant relation with the past performance of ROA and ROE, it still retains a certain 
amount of dynamic endogeneity with firm performance because it is significantly related to the 
past performance of Tobin’s Q (Akbar et al., 2016). Correspondingly, the control variables that 
 FO HS LNSIZE LEV DIVPAY ASTO 
TQt−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (3.96)*** (1.67)* (0.65) (1.72)* (1.07) (0.72) 
LNSIZEt−1 0.014 0.037 0.949 -0.007 0.010 -0.002 
 (5.70)*** (7.51)*** (15.01)*** (4.98)*** (4.12)*** (0.68) 
LNAGEt−1 0.034 0.043 0.099 -0.000 0.016 -0.015 
 (4.72)*** (3.58)*** (1.65)* (0.07) (2.15)** (1.39) 
LEVt−1 0.049 0.204 0.068 0.863 0.003 -0.071 
 (1.87)* (5.00)*** (0.26) (40.64)*** (0.10) (1.35) 
DIVPAYt−1 0.060 0.035 0.334 0.019 0.548 0.047 
 (2.80)*** (0.99) (2.32)** (1.34) (10.87)*** (1.00) 
ASTOt−1 -0.001 0.057 0.028 -0.001 0.028 0.866 
 (0.10) (3.38)*** (0.70) (0.14) (3.46)*** (15.95)*** 
       




are insignificant for the past performance of Tobin’s Q are also considered as endogenous because 
they are significantly related to the past performance of ROA and ROE. Past firm size is 
significantly related to the current levels of foreign ownership, horizontal spillovers and the 
dividend payout ratio for all three performance measures. Past performance, when measured by 
ROA and ROE, positively influence the current firm size, suggesting that “firms that have done 
well in the past will be larger today” (Wintoki et al., 2012: 23).  
Based on the results of this test, all variables are thus considered as dynamically endogenous as 
each variable is significant for at least one of the performance measures. This highlights the fact 
that it is not only the explanatory variables (foreign ownership and horizontal spillovers) that can 
be considered as endogenous, but also the control variables that are used as proxies for the firm's 





















4.3.3 Regression Results for the Strict Exogeneity and DWH Tests  
Despite the fact that all variables are found to be endogenous in section 4.3.2, a second test to 
examine exogeneity was conducted as suggested by Wooldridge (2002), Wintoki et al. (2012) and 
El-Faitouri (2014), as outlined in section 3.5.1.3. Tables 4-11, 4-12 and 4-13 show the results 
thereof for ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, respectively.  

























                                                                
  
Notes: All t-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively for the t-test. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. ROA represents the firm’s returns on assets, 
FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, HS is the percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI, LNSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the 
firm to the observation date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the 
asset turnover ratio for the firm. (t+1) is a subset of forward values of the foreign ownership characteristics and control variables. 
See chapter 3 for complete definitions of all variables.   
 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA 
FO 0.045 0.063 0.047 0.046 
 (0.84) (1.71) (0.86) (0.85) 
HS 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.24) (0.43) (0.40) (0.53) 
LNSIZE 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.011 
 (5.47)*** (5.45)*** (5.44)*** (2.81)*** 
LNAGE -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.63) 
LEV 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.010 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.17) 
DIVPAY 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.055 
 (3.67)*** (3.70)*** (3.69)*** (3.60)*** 
ASTO 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.031 
 (2.82)*** (2.82)*** (2.81)*** (2.13)** 
FOt+1 0.026  0.022 0.017 
 (0.58)  (0.48) (0.36) 
HSt+1  0.012 0.011 0.010 
  (1.51) (1.34) (1.12) 
LNSIZEt+1    0.003 
    (0.57) 
LNAGEt+1    -0.011 
    (1.17) 
LEVt+1    -0.009 
    (0.24) 
DIVPAYt+1    0.027 
    (2.38)** 
ASTOt+1    -0.010 




Table 4-12: FE Regression Results for Test of Strict Endogeneity for ROE 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE 
FO 0.166 0.181 0.171 0.164 
 (1.58) (2.83)*** (1.61) (1.57) 
HS 0.020 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (1.77) (0.33) (0.34) (0.28) 
LNSIZE -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 
 (1.31) (1.34) (1.35) (1.41) 
LNAGE 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.003 
 (1.06) (1.05) (1.04) (0.14) 
LEV 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) 
DIVPAY 0.173 0.174 0.174 0.164 
 (5.88)*** (5.90)*** (5.89)*** (5.80)*** 
ASTO 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.086 
 (3.66)*** (3.65)*** (3.64)*** (2.55)** 
FOt+1 0.025  0.012 0.008 
 (0.28)  (0.13) (0.09) 
HSt+1  0.034 0.034 0.033 
  (2.35)* (2.24)** (2.26)** 
LNSIZEt+1    0.004 
    (0.57) 
LNAGEt+1    0.010 
    (0.51) 
LEVt+1    0.012 
    (0.25) 
DIVPAYt+1    0.065 
    (2.90)** 
ASTOt+1    -0.048 
    (1.65)* 
Notes: All t-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively for the t-test. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. ROE represents the firm’s return on equity, 
FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, HS is the percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI, LNSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the 
firm to the observation date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the 
asset turnover ratio for the firm. (t+1) is a subset of forward values of the foreign ownership characteristics and control variables. 










Table 4-13: FE Regression Results for Test of Strict Endogeneity for Tobin’s Q 
 TQ TQ TQ TQ 
FO 1.633 1.468 1.526 1.776 
 (0.75) (0.50) (0.69) (0.81) 
HS -0.421 -0.080 -0.080 -0.184 
 (0.72) (0.11) (0.11) (0.25) 
LNSIZE 0.073 0.077 0.077 -0.087 
 (0.60) (0.64) (0.64) (0.85) 
LNAGE -0.720 -0.716 -0.715 0.005 
 (1.52) (1.51) (1.51) (0.01) 
LEV -2.842 -2.840 -2.839 -1.267 
 (1.64) (1.64) (1.64) (0.81) 
DIVPAY 1.405 1.394 1.394 1.165 
 (1.48) (1.47) (1.47) (1.40) 
ASTO -0.269 -0.262 -0.261 -0.725 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.79) 
FOt+1 -0.370  -0.081 -0.731 
 (0.14)  (0.03) (0.26) 
HSt+1  -0.786 -0.783 -0.911 
  (0.65) (0.62) (0.72) 
LNSIZEt+1    0.217 
    (2.10)** 
LNAGEt+1    -0.946 
    (1.53) 
LEVt+1    -2.532 
    (1.72)* 
DIVPAYt+1    1.523 
    (1.75)* 
ASTOt+1    0.813 
    (0.82) 
Notes: All t-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively for the t-test. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. TQ represents Tobin’s Q, FO represents the 
percentage of foreign ownership in firms, HS is the percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the firm to the observation 
date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for 
the firm. (t+1) is a subset of forward values of the foreign ownership characteristics and control variables. See chapter 3 for complete 
definitions of all variables.   
Table 4-12 shows that the coefficient estimates for the future values of horizontal spillovers are 
significant in all three specifications of ROE. The future values of some control variables are 
significant for certain performance measures, such as the dividend payout ratio and asset turnover 
ratio for ROE. Firm size, the leverage ratio and the dividend payout ratio are significant for Tobin’s 
Q in table 4-13, whereas only the dividend payout ratio is significant for ROA in table 4-11. The 




indicating that future realisations of these control variables are, in fact, related to current 
performance and, therefore, cannot be considered strictly exogenous (Wintoki et al., 2012). This 
corresponds with the results of the first test of endogeneity performed in the previous section.  
With respect to foreign ownership, the findings of the first test conflict with the results in table 4-
11, 4-12 and 4-13, where future values of foreign ownership did not display statistical significance 
with any firm performance measures, across any of the specifications; thus, suggesting that the 
foreign ownership variable does not adjust in response to firm performance.  
Due to the difference in results across these two endogeneity tests, the DWH test was performed 
as an additional robustness check, as stipulated in section 3.5.1.4. The results thereof, shown in 
table C-1 of appendix C, confirm the results of the reverse causality test, as it was found that all 
variables (including foreign ownership) are in fact endogenous. The DWH test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the explanatory and control variables are exogenous, thus supporting that 
endogeneity is a significant concern when using ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as performance 
indicators. Hence, the results of the DWH test reinforces that endogeneity is an issue in this study. 
This is supported by previous research of Schultz et al. (2010), Wintoki et al. (2012) and El-
Faitouri (2014), who observed endogeneity biases in firm performance-related studies.  
With support from the findings of all endogeneity tests and the justifications in section 3.5.3, the 
FEM is deemed as an unreliable and biased technique for this study. Therefore, this study 
employed the system GMM, which is “robust to dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity and 










4.4 System GMM Regression Results for the Direct Effect of Foreign Ownership  
4.4.1 The Base Model 
Table 4-14 reports the results from equation (1) of the base model that was implemented by the 
system GMM of equation (15). As discussed in section 4.3.1, two lags of performance (ROA, ROE 
and Tobin’s Q) were included in the system GMM models. 



















Notes: All z-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is 
under the null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity are under the null that instruments used for the 
equations in levels are exogenous. ROA represents the firm’s returns on assets, ROE represents the firm’s return on equity, TQ 
represents Tobin’s Q, FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
net assets, LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of the firm to the observation date, LEV 
is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for the firm. (t-
1) and (t-2) are subsets of past values of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. See chapter 3 for complete definitions of all variables.   
 
 
 ROA ROE TQ 
Performancet−1 0.328 0.447 0.457 
 (2.29)** (4.10)*** (3.06)*** 
Performancet−2 0.113 0.074 0.145 
 (1.78)* (0.84) (1.09) 
FO 0.069 0.241 2.787 
 (0.96) (2.01)** (0.97) 
LNSIZE 0.002 -0.015 0.020 
 (0.30) (2.27)** (0.09) 
LNAGE -0.010 -0.013 -0.248 
 (1.31) (1.04) (0.88) 
LEV -0.017 -0.035 -1.505 
 (0.42) (0.54) (0.90) 
DIVPAY 0.089 0.158 0.116 
 (2.23)** (1.57) (0.05) 
ASTO -0.016 -0.017 -1.299 
 (0.83) (0.43) (1.87)* 
    
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.025 0.004 0.041 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.136 0.765 0.938 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.319 0.610 0.710 




The results in table 4-14 demonstrate that foreign ownership is positively related to all three 
performance measures; however, it is only found to be statistically significant for ROE, by which 
a 1% increase in foreign ownership increases ROE by 0.22%. These findings are supported by 
Marashdeh (2014) and Khan and Nouman (2017), that are reviewed in section 2.3.1. Marashdeh 
(2014) observed a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance in Jordan 
only when firm performance was measured with ROE, whereas Khan and Nouman (2017) found 
an insignificant relationship in Pakistan when Tobin’s Q and ROA were utilised as performance 
measures. The significance of ROE, particularly, may allude to the presence of competitive 
advantage in firms with foreign ownership, which is outlined in the resource-based theory in 
section 2.2.1.2.  
Turning to the control variables, the dividend payout ratio exhibits a positive effect on ROA, 
suggesting that the higher the dividend payout ratio of JSE-listed firms, the higher the firm’s 
performance, in terms of ROA. This coincides with the expectations of the relationship between 
the dividend payout ratio and firm performance, which is outlined in section 3.3.1.3. In addition, 
Amidu (2007) also observed that the dividend payout ratio of companies listed on the Ghanaian 
Stock Exchange affected their performance, primarily when measured by ROA. Gedajlovic, 
Yoshikawa and Hashimoto (2005) and Gurbuz and Aybars (2010) obtained similar results. 
Firm size demonstrates a negative coefficient that is statistically significant for ROE. The 
occurrence of a negative relationship between firm size and performance is highlighted in previous 
studies (such as Himmelberg et al., 1999; De Miguel et al., 2003; Mishra, 2014). A potential reason 
for this is because large firms are more susceptible to agency problems and information asymmetry 
that hinder their firm performance (De Miguel et al., 2003). In line with the findings in table 4-12, 
an Indian study by Chadha and Sharma (2015) also discovered a negative relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and the asset turnover ratio.  
Table 4-14 also reports the results of the specification tests discussed in sections 3.5.3.4, 3.5.3.5 
and 3.5.3.6. The Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test yields p-values that are less than the 5% level 
of significance for all three performance measures. This results in the rejection of the null 
hypothesis for the first-order (AR (1)). The null hypothesis for the AR (2) test cannot be rejected 
for all performance measures as the resulting p-values are greater than the 10% level of 




hypothesis for AR (2) reinforce the validity of the system GMM results (Roodman, 2009). This is 
because the residuals in the first-order are correlated, whereas there is no second-order serial 
correlation, hence, the exogeneity assumption is satisfied (Phung, 2015). Concerning the Hansen 
test, the insignificant p-values in table 4-14 reveal that the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid cannot be rejected (Wintoki et al., 2012). Similarly, the difference-in-Hansen test also fails 
to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments used for the levels equation are exogenous. Thus, 





















4.4.2 The Non-Linearity (“U-shaped”) Test  
Taking into consideration the empirical evidence presented in chapter 2, it is necessary to consider 
that different quantities of foreign ownership can have different impacts on financial performance 
and thus, non-linearity tests were performed. As discussed in section 3.3.2.2, these tests include 
the quadratic regression, given by equation (2) and the SLM test. Table 4-15 displays the results 
of the quadratic regression, for all three performance measures, using the system GMM estimation 
approach.    
Table 4-15: GMM Regression Results for the Test of Non-Linearity between Foreign Ownership 



















Notes: All z-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under 
the null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity are under the null that instruments used for the 
equations in levels are exogenous. ROA represents the firm’s returns on assets, ROE represents the firm’s return on equity, TQ 
represents Tobin’s Q, FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, FO² represents the quadratic term of foreign 
ownership, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since 
the establishment of the firm to the observation date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio 
and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for the firm. (t-1) and (t-2) are subsets of past values of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
See chapter 3 for complete definitions of all variables.   
 ROA ROE TQ 
Performancet−1 0.330 0.455 0.416 
 (2.24)** (3.60)*** (2.57)** 
Performancet−2 0.112 0.051 0.158 
 (1.73)* (0.51) (1.13) 
FO 0.190 0.951 9.930 
 (0.85) (2.61)*** (1.21) 
FO² -0.201 -1.184 -12.304 
 (0.55) (1.89)* (0.97) 
LNSIZE 0.001 -0.014 0.045 
 (0.23) (2.63)*** (0.22) 
LNAGE -0.010 -0.015 -0.332 
 (1.27) (1.18) (1.09) 
LEV -0.022 -0.040 -1.309 
 (0.48) (0.63) (0.68) 
DIVPAY 0.086 0.124 0.672 
 (2.17)** (1.38) (0.36) 
ASTO -0.020 -0.025 -1.567 
 (1.11) (0.81) (1.93)* 
    
AR(1) test(p-value) 0.026 0.007 0.054 
AR(2) test(p-value) 0.138 0.905 0.968 
Hansen test(p-value) 0.249 0.436 0.599 




Similar to the results of the base model shown in table 4-14, the specification tests (i.e., the 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test, the Hansen test and the difference-in-Hansen test) in table 4-
15 indicate that the system GMM results and instruments are valid. The results also reinforce the 
non-existent relationship between foreign ownership and ROA, and Tobin’s Q.  
The linear coefficient of foreign ownership for ROE is significantly positive, whereas the quadratic 
term for foreign ownership is significantly negative; thereby indicating an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between foreign ownership and ROE. The presence of an inverse U-shaped 
relationship implies that when the level of foreign ownership increases, the ROE of JSE-listed 
firms initially improves, however, once foreign ownership rises above a certain level, it begins to 
erode the ROE of firms.  
As discussed in section 3.3.2.2, the quadratic regression alone is insufficient for detecting the 
presence of a non-linear relationship, therefore, in order to confirm non-linearity between foreign 
ownership and ROE, the SLM test was performed.  This test also determined the optimal level of 
foreign ownership for JSE-listed firms. The results are presented in table 4-16. As mentioned in 
chapter 3, firms with less than 10% of foreign ownership are excluded as they are considered 
domestic-owned firms. 
Table 4-16: U-Test Regression Results of the SLM Test  
 Dependent Variable: ROE  
Bounds FOmin FOmax 
Interval 0.1 0.979 
Slope 0.714 -1.368 
p-value 0.002 0.063 
Overall test of the presence of a U-shape 
p-value 0.063 
Extreme point  0.401 
95% Fieller interval for 
extreme point 
[0.298; 0.925] 
Notes: FOmin and FOmax represent the minimum and maximum level of foreign ownership in JSE-listed firms. The slope at 
FOmin=β + 2λ(FOmin) and the slope at FOmax= β + 2λ(FOmax). 
The results from table 4-16 confirm that the slope at the minimum level (0.714) and the maximum 
level (-1.368) are consistent with the characteristics of an inverse U-shape (i.e., positive slope 
followed by a negative slope). Based on the p-values, the slopes are significant at the 1% and 10% 
level of significance, respectively. The extreme point (0.401) and the lower and upper bounds of 




level of foreign ownership in JSE-listed firms (0.1 to 0.979). These estimates violate the condition 
for a U-shape that is captured in equation (3). Accordingly, this study fails to reject the null 
hypothesis in equation (4) of an inverse U-shaped relationship and rejects the alternative 
hypothesis in equation (5) of a U-shaped relationship as the slope at FOmin is greater than 0 (β +
2λ(FOmin) =0.714) and the slope at FOmax is less than 0 (β + 2λ(FOmax) =-1.367); thereby 
satisfying the conditions of an inverse U-shaped curve.  This confirms the results of table 4-15 and 
the expectation of a non-linear relationship, stated in section 4.2.3. The inverse U-shaped 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance is in accordance with many studies 
that are discussed in section 2.3 (such as Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010; Choi et al. 2012; Greenaway 
et al. 2014; Viet, 2013; Phung, 2015).   
The optimal level of foreign ownership in this study is represented by the extreme point of 40.1%. 
Based on this, it is deduced that the inflow of foreign ownership to JSE-listed companies initially 
improves their performance, but once the level of foreign ownership exceeds 40.1% of the 
ownership structure, the impact of foreign ownership becomes negative. This is evident in figure 
4-2 below, where ROE begins to decline once foreign ownership exceeds 40%. 
Figure 4-2: U-shaped Relationship between ROE and Foreign Ownership 
                                            




As discussed in section 2.2.1.1, foreign investors often enhance firm performance because they 
have incentives to monitor managers and force them to align their goals with shareholders. Foreign 
investors also introduce know-how, technologies and skills to the firms, which is pivotal in 
improving performance (Gurbuz and Aybars, 2010). Nonetheless, when foreign ownership 
exceeds a certain level, foreign investors have an entrenchment effect that reduces performance 
because as they can expropriate other, smaller shareholders (Phung, 2015). Consequently, the 
effect of foreign ownership on firm performance thus becomes negative (Greenaway et al., 2014). 
The recent corporate failures in South Africa, such as the case of Steinhoff and South African 
Airways (SAA) have been blamed on poor corporate governance, stemming from reporting 
irregularities and the lack of strategic monitoring. Hence, the improvement of firm performance 
through foreign ownership could be attributed to the activation of better corporate governance 
practices by foreign investors (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003; Phung, 2015). This view is supported 
by Choi et al. (2012), who stated that foreign investors can improve corporate governance by 
becoming board members, leading to the enhancement of firm performance. According to 
Kollamparambil and Jogee (2018), MNCs in South Africa have technological advantages over 
their local counterparts. These technological advantages often arise from the transfer of technical 
knowledge and leading-edge technology by foreign investors (Sazali, Haslinda, Jegak and Raduan, 
2010). Foreign firms in South Africa spend a substantial amount of money and time on training 
and skills development for local employees. In some cases, international professionals are brought 
in to train local employees (Kollamparambil and Jogee, 2018). Therefore, the increase in firm 
performance can also be attributable to the transfer of scarce and valuable resources by foreign 
investors; thereby signalling a competitive advantage over domestic firms.  
However, in developing countries, the protection of minority shareholders is usually insufficient 
(Gibson, 2003), therefore, like Turkey, China and Vietnam, the performance of South African 
firms decreases when foreign ownership becomes concentrated enough to effectively control the 
board. Choi et al. (2012), who observed an inverse U-shaped relationship in China, argued that 
concentrated foreign ownership could erode firm value when the foreign shareholders have 
controlling power to pursue private interests, such as short-term profit and high dividends, to the 





With respect to Turkey, Gurbuz and Aybars (2010) stated that the local alliances among local 
firms, their managers and their owners provide certain advantages to domestic-owned firms that 
cannot be achieved by highly concentrated foreign-owned firms; thereby highlighting the issue of 
liability of foreignness that is outlined in section 2.2.1.2. This may be applicable to South Africa 
as well since domestic owners may be more familiar with the South African environment, 
including governance structures, procedures, business practices and the legal and regulatory 
frameworks.  
Hence, the deterioration of firm performance after foreign ownership exceeds 40.1% may be 
caused by the entrenchment effect and/or the liability of foreignness. It is thus recommended that 
domestic investors should form at least 60% of the total shareholdings in order to attain optimal 
firm performance on the JSE as this prevents foreign investors from having the power to influence 
managerial decisions in ways that benefit them (Phung, 2015). The optimal level of 40.1% of 
foreign ownership is similar to previous findings by Akimova and Schwodiauer (2004) and Phung 
(2015), mentioned in section 2.3.1.2, who estimated optimal levels of foreign ownership to be 39% 
in Ukraine and 43% in Vietnam, respectively.   
The observation of no relationship between ROA and foreign ownership is supported, to an extent, 
with the results of the prior South African studies of Swart (2013) and Dube (2018). With respect 
to ROE, these results are similar to those of Dube (2018) but contrast with Swart (2013), who 
found an insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and ROE. In the case of Tobin’s Q, 
these findings are different from Dube (2018), as the author observed a positive relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and foreign ownership. Swart (2013), on the other hand, did not utilise the 
Tobin's Q as a performance measure in his study. The differences between these results may exist 
due to the inclusion of financial firms and the estimation technique used by Swart (2013), and 
Dube's (2018) disparate composition of percentage of foreign ownership in JSE-listed firms. The 
other notable differences were that both prior studies did not account for the possibility of a non-
linear relationship or the issue of endogeneity. 
The statistical insignificance of ROA and Tobin’s Q in the foreign ownership-performance nexus 
creates a level of uncertainty as to whether foreign ownership actually affects firm performance 




institutional ownership when different performance indicators (Tobin's Q, ROA, or ROE) were 
used.  
On the one hand, firms with higher ROE typically possess competitive advantages over their 
counterparts that translates into superior returns for investors (Kharatyan, Nunes and Lopes, 2016). 
Therefore, in line with the resource-based theory explained in section 2.2.1.2, the increase in ROE 
particularly, could be a result of the transfer of scarce and valuable resources by foreign investors 
(Ghebrihiweta and Motchenkovab, 2017) to JSE-listed firms. This corroborates with the 
previously discussed findings of Kollamparambil and Jogee (2018). 
On the other hand, the ROE performance measure is different from ROA and Tobin's Q as it looks 
at how effectively a firm is using shareholder’s equity. A high ROE assumes an efficient use of 
equity. Nevertheless, Jensen and Meckling (1999) argue that, even though many firms make use 
of ROE, this performance indicator is susceptible to manipulation when managers have the rights 
to make decisions over the level of investment. As a consequence, investors may be misled by the 
apparent better performance. In addition, Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1996) claim that ROE is 
a short-term performance measure and, therefore, may not be appropriate for assessing long-term 
investments.  
In light of the above, South African firms cannot rely on the ROE alone to measure performance 
(Finegan, 1991). Therefore, taking into consideration the results of all the performance indicators 
used in this study, it can be concluded that the relationship between foreign ownership and the 
performance of JSE-listed firms is gathered to be ambiguous as it varies with the use of different 









4.5 System GMM Regression Results for Horizontal Spillovers 
This section focuses on the effect of horizontal spillovers from foreign ownership on JSE-listed 
firms and aims to fulfil the final objective of the study. Table 4-17 displays results estimated from 
equation (8), using the system GMM. 


























                                              
 
                                        
 
 
                                   
 
                                              
 
All z-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is 
under the null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity are under the null that instruments used for the 
equations in levels are exogenous. ROA represents the firm’s returns on assets, ROE represents the firm’s return on equity, TQ 
represents Tobin’s Q, FO represents the percentage of foreign ownership in firms, HS is the percentage of horizontal spillovers 
from FDI, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s net assets, LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since 
the establishment of the firm to the observation date, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio 
and ASTO represents the asset turnover ratio for the firm. (t-1) and (t-2) are subsets of past values of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
See chapter 3 for complete definitions of all variables.   
 
 
 ROA ROE TQ 
Performancet−1 0.396 0.509 0.434 
 (2.48)** (4.69)** (3.19)*** 
Performancet−2 0.116 0.068 0.201 
 (1.57) (0.75) (1.64) 
FO 0.037 0.167 2.709 
 (0.60) (1.65) (0.86) 
HS -0.003 -0.001 0.520 
 (0.17) (0.03) (0.42) 
LNSIZE 0.001 -0.013 -0.175 
 (0.19) (2.20)** (0.66) 
LNAGE -0.011 -0.015 -0.166 
 (1.50) (1.21) (0.58) 
LEV -0.009 -0.018 -2.036 
 (0.24) (0.33) (1.13) 
DIVPAY 0.123 0.217 1.740 
 (2.42)** (2.08) (0.58) 
ASTO -0.011 -0.002 -0.615 
 (0.79) (0.07) (1.00) 
    
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.026 0.002 0.044 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.169 0.874 0.839 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.248 0.510 0.403 




According to the results presented in table 4-17, the coefficient for horizontal spillovers is 
statistically insignificant in the equations for all three performance measures. It is thus evident that 
the entrance of MNCs into South Africa does not affect the financial performance of other 
companies operating in the same industry. This is consistent with the results of previous research 
conducted in South Africa (such as Mebratie and Bedi, 2011; Magwiro et al., 2014) and 
internationally (such as Schoors and Tol, 2002; Fatima, 2014; Li and Luo, 2019). Similar to tables 
4-14 and 4-15, the specification tests (i.e., Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test, the Hansen test and 
the difference-in-Hansen test) verify that the system GMM results and instruments are reliable.  
As explained in section 3.4.1.2, horizontal spillovers are measured through the channel of 
competition where the presence of foreign-owned firms indirectly increases the performance of 
domestic firms in the same industry. This is because the increased competition created by the 
entrance of foreign firms, in the same industry, force local companies to enhance their production 
processes by upgrading technology and imitating the innovative processes of MNCs (Wang and 
Blomström, 1992). Therefore, the absence of horizontal spillovers in this study implies that foreign 
competition does not have any effect on the productivity or sales of local firms, thereby not 
impacting firm performance.  
In order to realize the benefits from spillovers, firms require an adequate level of absorptive 
capacity, as acknowledged in section 2.2.2.3. Domestic firms in South Africa are often subjected 
to weak human capital. Furthermore, Mabena (2012) argued that South African local firms are 
weaker than MNCs with respect to technology. Schools and tertiary institutions in South Africa 
do not thoroughly prepare their students for the use of technology in the workplace.  
The lack of preparation for the use of technology prevents firms from absorbing horizontal 
spillovers because local workers do not have the knowledge and capabilities required for using  
modern technologies as a means to imitate the processes, products and innovations of foreign firms 
(Wang and Blomström, 1992). This is supported by Mondal and Pant (2010), who claimed that 
industries dominated by low technology intensive firms lack the ability to absorb horizontal 
spillovers from foreign competition.   
Besides the lack of initial technological knowledge, local workers generally have low levels of 
education and skills (Mabena, 2012; Mateus, Allen-Ile and Iwu, 2014). As discussed in section 




through training and learning by doing. South Africa’s weakness in this area could be a further 
consequence that prohibits local workers from imitating the processes of foreign firms due to their 
lack of skills. Hence, firms may not experience any effects of horizontal spillovers due to their 
weak absorptive capacity. An additional notable reason for the nonexistence of horizontal 
spillovers in South Africa may also be attributed to the fact that MNCs have a strong incentive to 
prevent their firm-specific knowledge from leaking to domestic competitors (Li and Luo, 2019), 
as discussed in section 2.2.2.1.  
4.6 Strengths of Instruments Regression Results 
Table 4-18 depicts the results of the first-stage regression to assess the strength of the instruments 
used in the system GMM estimates, as outlined in section 3.5.3.7. 
Table 4-18: First-Stage Regression for System GMM Estimates 
Panel A: Dependent variable (X) is in levels 
 F-statistic R2 
FO 1.981*** 0.1968 
HS 19.99*** 0.2947 
LNSIZE 28.943*** 0.3675 
LEV 64.487*** 0.2747 
DIVPAY 1.393*** 0.2383 
ASTO 1.981 0.1968 
Panel B: Dependent variable (∆X) is in first differences 
 F-statistic R2 
∆FO 2.725** 0.019 
∆HS 14.518*** 0.1694 
∆LNSIZE 82.307*** 0.1412 
∆LEV 10.12*** 0.2102 
∆DIVPAY 1.250 0.0156 
∆ASTO 92.581*** 0.1412 
This table reports the F-statistics and R² of OLS first-stage regressions of levels and first-differenced variables on lagged differences 
and lagged levels, respectively. All F-statistics in parenthesis are based on robust, standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Items in boldface are significant at the 10% level or higher. FO represents the 
percentage of foreign ownership in firms, HS is the percentage of horizontal spillovers from FDI, LNSIZE is the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s net assets, LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm, DIVPAY is the dividend payout ratio and ASTO represents the asset 
turnover ratio for the firm.  For the levels variables(X), the dependent variables are: ∆FOt−2, ∆HSt−2, ∆LNSIZEt−2, 
∆LEVt−2, ∆DIVPAYt−2 and ∆ASTOt−2. For the first-differenced variables (∆X), the dependent variables are FOt−3, HSt−3, 
LNSIZEt−3, LEVt−3, DIVPAYt−3 and ASTOt−3. See chapter 3 for complete definitions of all variables.   
Table 4-18 reveals that most of the instruments have significant F-statistics, with exception to the 
asset turnover ratio in levels and the dividend payout ratio in first differences; thereby indicating 
the rejection of the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. This suggests that the instrument 




Wintoki et al., 2012). With only five exceptions, the F-statistics are all greater than 10, which is 
the “rule of thumb” critical value suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) for assessing instrument 
strength. Overall, the results from the tests for the strength of the instruments support that weak 
instruments do not drive the results of the system GMM estimates. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the results of the procedures described in chapter 3 for the estimation of the various 
parameters were discussed. The endogeneity tests revealed that the endogeneity issue was present 
in this study. The results of the system GMM found an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
foreign ownership and ROE and no significant relationship between horizontal spillovers and firm 
performance. Lastly, all specification tests of the system GMM confirmed the validity of results. 
The next chapter, concludes the study, provides a brief overview of the objectives of the research, 
the relevant findings, and discusses the implications of the results and provides recommendations 
















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Review of Research Objectives  
FDI has been viewed as an essential stimulus for productivity, economic growth and general 
welfare in developing countries. For countries like South Africa, with a history of political 
instability, fluctuating economic performance and low domestic savings; the inflow of FDI is 
required to meet the countries objectives of job creation and inclusive growth. The South African 
government has acknowledged the importance of FDI and made several efforts to attract more 
foreign investors. By the end of 2015, FDI was the largest source of foreign ownership in JSE-
listed companies. The effects of foreign ownership on domestic firms can be divided into two 
categories: direct and indirect effects. Direct effects to MNCs occur through access to know-how, 
technology, better managerial practices, production processes and the enhancement of skills of 
domestic labourers. Nevertheless, direct effects can also materialise through negative effects such 
as entrenchment and liability of foreignness. Indirect effects occur through spillovers (horizontal 
or vertical), where the benefits and drawbacks of foreign ownership are experienced by domestic 
firms that were not recipients of FDI.  
As discussed in section 1.2, a considerable amount of research has been undertaken on the 
determinants and effects of FDI at a macroeconomic level. Furthermore, the studies pertaining to 
the direct and indirect effects of FDI have mainly been pursued individually. Consequently, the 
primary objective underlying this study was to ascertain the direct and indirect horizontal effects 
of foreign ownership on the financial performance of firms listed on the JSE. In analysing this 
topic, the secondary objectives were considered as follows:  
• To explore if endogeneity exists between foreign ownership and firm performance.  
• To establish if the direct relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance is 
either linear or non-linear (with the non-linear relationship being either U- or inverse U-
shaped). 
• If the direct relationship is non-linear, to determine the optimal level of foreign ownership. 





The results of the secondary objectives were discussed first as they formed the basis of the primary 
objective. The next sections outline the main results obtained, which aim to address each of the 
research objectives outlined above. 
5.2 Summary of Study Findings  
5.2.1 The Issue of Endogeneity  
To determine the most suitable method to estimate the relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performance, the issue of endogeneity was investigated. Despite some conflicting results 
regarding foreign ownership, the tests confirmed that all variables were endogenous. With respect 
to foreign ownership and firm performance, this indicates that not only does foreign ownership 
impact firm performance, but that firm performance also impacts foreign ownership. To account 
for endogeneity, this study implemented the system GMM.  
5.2.2 Linear Versus Non-Linear Relationship Between Foreign Ownership and Firm Performance  
The results produced were mixed as a non-linear relationship was observed when firm performance 
was measured with ROE, however, when ROA and Tobin's Q were used as performance measures; 
the relationship proved to be statistically insignificant. The non-linear relationship between foreign 
ownership and ROE was that of an inverse U-shape where the linear coefficient of foreign 
ownership was significantly positive, and the quadratic term of foreign ownership was 
significantly negative. The SLM test confirmed that U-shape and revealed that the optimal level 
of foreign ownership based on ROE was 40.1%. From this finding, it can therefore be seen that 
the increase in the percentage of foreign ownership is met with an initial increase in the ROE of 
JSE-listed firms, however, when the level of foreign ownership surpasses 40.1%, the ROE begins 
to decrease. The initial increase in ROE was explained by the reduction in agency problems, 
introduction of know-how, skills and technology to the firms, while the subsequent decrease was 
ascribed to the entrenchment effect and the liability of foreignness. Therefore, it is suggested that 
domestic shareholders should form at minimum 60% of the ownership structure to achieve optimal 
firm performance.  
Based on the findings that the two other performance measures (ROA and Tobin's Q) shared an 
insignificant relationship with foreign ownership, there was a certain degree of uncertainty 




performance measures generating difference results is a common occurrence in prior studies. The 
three performance measures in this study differ in terms of their implications. The statistical 
significance of ROE was attributed to competitive advantages attained by JSE-listed firms with 
foreign ownership, which resulted in superior returns to shareholders. Notwithstanding this, the 
reliability of ROE was disputed as it is vulnerable to manipulation by managers. South African 
firms cannot rely on ROE alone to measure performance. Therefore, it was concluded that the 
relationship between foreign ownership and the performance of JSE-listed firms was ambiguous 
as it varied with different performance indicators. 
5.2.3 Horizontal Spillovers  
To determine the indirect relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance, 
horizontal spillovers were estimated. The results of this analysis revealed that there were no 
horizontal spillovers from foreign firms to domestic firms listed on the JSE in the same industry. 
Since the horizontal spillover variable was proxied through the channel of competition, its absence 
indicated that foreign competition had no influence on the performance of local firms.  
The insignificance of horizontal spillovers was attributed mainly to the weak absorptive capacity 
within the South African environment, specifically in terms of poor human capital and the lack of 
initial technological knowledge. The other notable reason for the absence of horizontal spillovers 
was explained by the reluctance of foreign subsidiaries in sharing technology and knowledge with 
their local competitors.  
5.3 Policy Implications  
The results of the study give rise to several recommendations for government policy and South 
African firms, which are discussed below: 
• As mentioned in chapter 1, the existing policy on FDI in South Africa does not place 
restrictions on foreign ownership in South African firms. However, the findings of an 
inverse-U shaped relationship, with an optimal level of 40.1% of foreign ownership 
indicates the need for a policy that limits the level of foreign ownership in a listed firm. 
• In an emerging market like South Africa, a key policy priority should be the 
implementation of a corporate governance framework that secures the benefits of large 




expense of minority shareholders and firm performance. In addition, the JSE can encourage 
transparency among shareholders by enforcing mandatory disclosure requirements, to help 
ensure that the investment environment encourages all types of investors (large and small) 
feel safe to participate in the stock market. 
• Taking into consideration the non-existence of horizontal spillovers attributed to the lack 
of absorptive capacity of the local workforce, the government should seek to formulate 
policies focused on human capital accumulation that is targeted on building the absorptive 
capacity of local workers. Policies should focus on firm learning and innovation in order 
to reduce the technical and managerial skills gap with foreign-owned firms.  
• Based on the occurrence of the liability of foreignness, it is evident that foreign firms 
experience certain disadvantages from venturing abroad. Thus, the government can 
establish incentives that help MNCs reduce their liability of foreignness in exchange for 
their engagement with local firms. This may facilitate local firms learning from foreign 
firms through demonstrations of their processes, products and technologies. Policymakers 
can further support networking between foreign and local firms by creating collaborative 
spaces and programmes. Given that the access to technology from MNCs is a significant 
source of spillovers, these incentives can also be provided for the transfer and licensing of 
technology from foreign firms. Incentives for licensing and transfer of technology have 
proven to be effective in promoting innovation in many developing countries (Farole and 
Winkler, 2014).   
5.4 Opportunities for Further Research 
This study, in addressing the question of the direct and indirect spillover effects of foreign 
ownership in South Africa, has contributed to the knowledge and understanding of the estimation 
of FDI effects at firm-level. Nevertheless, numerous opportunities for further research that exceed 
the scope of this study arise. The details of these opportunities are outlined below: 
• Although this study only estimates horizontal spillovers, it is acknowledged that vertical 
spillovers may still exist.  Markusen and Venables (1999) and Javorcik (2004) pointed out 
that if FDI were to generate spillovers, they are more likely to occur through vertical 




technology diffusion to upstream industries. Hence, future research can account for the 
estimation of vertical spillovers.  
• The origin of foreign ownership is an important subject for future research. As per 
Dunning's (2000) eclectic paradigm, the relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
performance may vary depending on the source country of the foreign capital. By 
accounting for the origin of foreign ownership, it is possible to reveal whether the 
characteristics of foreign investors contribute to the differences in firm performance. This 
could have direct policy implications regarding the geographical distance of foreign 
investors in the South African context in particular but also in emerging markets in general. 
• Alternative proxies for horizontal spillovers could be used. Aside from the competition 
channel, horizontal spillovers can be proxied through imitation, skill, employment, exports, 
and wages (Mondal and Pant, 2018). The use of different horizontal spillover proxies may 
exhibit different effects on firm performance, implying that more in-depth research into the 
channels of horizontal spillovers in firms will shed more light on the role of foreign 
shareholders in the industrial context.  
• As highlighted in sections 2.2.2.3 and 4.6, absorptive capacity is an important determinant 
of FDI spillovers.  The measurement of absorptive capacity in future research will provide 
insight on the ability of domestic firms to identify, assimilate and exploit the benefits 
spilled over by FDI. It will also serve as an inference behind the results of FDI spillovers.  
• The current research was conducted in a single country (South Africa). Although South 
Africa shares some typical characteristics with other African countries, their financial 
system is constantly praised as the most sophisticated from all African countries (Wyk, 
Botha and Goodspeed, 2018).  Therefore, the applicability of such results to other African 
countries may be questionable. Thus, it is recommended that future research incorporate 








The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the direct and indirect horizontal effects of 
foreign ownership on the performance of firms listed on the JSE. The analysis revealed that the 
direct effects were ambiguous as they depended on the performance indicators. ROA and Tobin’s 
Q were not impacted by foreign ownership whereas ROE shared a non-linear relationship with 
foreign ownership, characterised by an inverse U-shape. The significance of ROE may have been 
due to the competitive advantage in MNCs. The SLM test produced an optimal level of 40.1% of 
foreign ownership; thereby suggesting that foreign ownership greater than this level will 
deteriorate firm performance on the JSE. With respect to the indirect effects, there was no evidence 
found of horizontal spillovers. This is attributed to the inability of local workers in realising the 
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Figure A-1: Ownership of shares listed on the JSE at the end of 2015 
 
(Source: JSE, 2015; South African Revenue Bank, 2015) 
 
Appendix B 
Table B-1: JSE Securities Exchange list of non-financial firms 
 
Long Name  ICB Industry Long 
Name 
1 1TIME HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
2 ACCENTUATE LTD Industrials 
3 ADAPTIT HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
4 ADCOCK INGRAM HOLDINGS LTD Health Care 
5 ADCORP HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
6 ADVANCED HEALTH LTD Health Care 
7 ADVTECH LTD Consumer Services 
8 AECI LTD Basic Materials 
9 AFRICA CELLULAR TOWERS LTD Basic Materials 
10 AFRICAN MEDIA ENTERTAINMENT Consumer Services 
11 AFRICAN OXYGEN LTD Basic Materials 

















Other SA investors SA investment management
SA collective investment schemes SA long-term insurance




13 AFRIMAT LTD Industrials 
14 AFROCENTRIC INVESTMENT CORPO Health Care 
15 ALARIS HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
16 ALERT STEEL HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
17 ALLIANCE MINING CORP LTD Basic Materials 
18 ALLIED ELECTRONICS COR-A SHR Industrials 
19 ALLIED TECHNOLOGIES LTD Basic Materials 
20 ALVIVA HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
21 AMALGAMATED ELECTRONIC CORP Industrials 
22 ANGLO AMERICAN PLATINUM LTD Basic Materials 
23 ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD Basic Materials 
24 ARB HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
25 ARCELORMITTAL SOUTH AFRICA Basic Materials 
26 ARGENT INDUSTRIAL LTD Industrials 
27 ASCENDIS HEALTH LTD Health Care 
28 ASPEN PHARMACARE HOLDINGS LT Health Care 
29 ASSORE LTD Basic Materials 
30 ASTRAL FOODS LTD Consumer Goods 
31 ASTRAPAK LTD-UTS Basic Materials 
32 AVENG LTD Industrials 
33 AVI LTD Consumer Goods 
34 AWETHU BREWERIES LTD Consumer Goods 
35 B&W INSTRUMENTATION AND ELEC Industrials 
36 BARLOWORLD LTD Industrials 
37 BASIL READ HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
38 BAUBA RESOURCES LTD Basic Materials 
39 BEIGE HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Goods 
40 BELL EQUIPMENT LTD Industrials 
41 BID CORP LTD Consumer Services 
42 BIDVEST GROUP LTD Industrials 
43 BIOSCIENCE BRANDS LTD Health Care 
44 BLUE LABEL TELECOMS LTD Telecommunications 
45 BOWLER METCALF LIMITED Industrials 
46 BRIKOR LTD Industrials 
47 BSI STEEL LTD Basic Materials 
48 BUILDMAX LTD Basic Materials 
49 BUSINESS CONNEXION GROUP Technology 
50 CARGO CARRIERS LTD Industrials 
51 CARTRACK HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
52 CASHBUILD LTD Consumer Services 
53 CAXTON AND CTP PUBLISHERS AN Consumer Services 
54 CENTRAL RAND GOLD LTD Basic Materials 




56 CHROMETCO LTD Basic Materials 
57 CIPLA MEDPRO SOUTH AFRICA LT Health Care 
58 CITY LODGE HOTELS LTD Consumer Services 
59 CLICKS GROUP LTD Consumer Services 
60 CLOVER INDUSTRIES LTD Consumer Goods 
61 COGNITION HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
62 COMAIR LTD Consumer Services 
63 COMBINED MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
64 COMMAND HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
65 COMPU-CLEARING OUTSOURCING Technology 
66 CONSOLIDATED INFRASTRUCTURE Industrials 
67 CONTROL INSTRUMENTS GROUP PT Industrials 
68 COUNTRY BIRD HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Goods 
69 CROOKES BROTHERS LTD Consumer Goods 
70 CSG HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
71 CULLINAN HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
72 CURRO HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
73 DATACENTRIX HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
74 DATATEC LTD Technology 
75 DIGICORE HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
76 DIS-CHEM PHARMACIES PTY LTD Consumer Services 
77 DISTRIBUTION & WAREHOUSING Industrials 
78 DON GROUP LIMITED Consumer Services 
79 DORBYL LTD Consumer Services 
80 DRDGOLD LTD Basic Materials 
81 E MEDIA HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
82 EFORA ENERGY LTD Oil and Gas 
83 ELB GROUP LTD Industrials 
84 ELLIES HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
85 ENX GROUP LTD Industrials 
86 EOH HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
87 ESOR LTD Industrials 
88 ETION LTD Industrials 
89 EVRAZ HIGHVELD STEEL & VANAD Basic Materials 
90 EXTRACT GROUP LTD Industrials 
91 EXXARO RESOURCES LTD Basic Materials 
92 FAMOUS BRANDS LTD Consumer Services 
93 FARITEC HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
94 GIJIMA GROUP LTD Telecommunications 
95 GOLD BRANDS INVESTMENTS LTD Consumer Services 
96 GOLD FIELDS LTD Basic Materials 
97 GOLIATH GOLD MINING LTD Basic Materials 




99 GRINDROD LTD Industrials 
100 GRINDROD SHIPPING HOLDINGS L Industrials 
101 GROUP FIVE LTD Industrials 
102 HARDWARE WAREHOUSE LTD Basic Materials 
103 HARMONY GOLD MINING CO LTD Basic Materials 
104 HOLDSPORT LTD Consumer Goods 
105 HOWDEN AFRICA HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
106 HUDACO INDUSTRIES LTD Industrials 
107 HUGE GROUP LTD Telecommunications 
108 HULAMIN LTD Basic Materials 
109 IFA HOTELS & RESORTS LTD Consumer Services 
110 ILIAD AFRICA LTD Consumer Goods 
111 ILLOVO SUGAR PTY LTD Consumer Goods 
112 IMBALIE BEAUTY LTD Consumer Goods 
113 IMPALA PLATINUM HOLDINGS LTD Basic Materials 
114 IMPERIAL LOGISTICS LTD Industrials 
115 INFRASORS HOLDINGS LTD Basic Materials 
116 INSIMBI INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS Basic Materials 
117 INTERWASTE HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
118 INVICTA HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
119 ITALTILE LTD Consumer Services 
120 JASCO ELECTRONICS HOLDINGS Technology 
121 JD GROUP LTD Consumer Goods 
122 KAAP AGRI LTD Consumer Services 
123 KAGISO MEDIA LTD Telecommunications 
124 KAP INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
125 KAYDAV GROUP LTD Industrials 
126 KEATON ENERGY HOLDINGS LTD Oil and Gas 
127 KELLY GROUP SA PTY LTD Consumer Services 
128 KUMBA IRON ORE LTD Basic Materials 
129 LEWIS GROUP LTD Consumer Services 
130 LIFE HEALTHCARE GROUP HOLDIN Health Care 
131 LITHA HEALTHCARE GROUP LTD Health Care 
132 MASONITE AFRICA LTD Consumer Goods 
133 MASSMART HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
134 MASTER DRILLING GROUP LTD Industrials 
135 MASTER PLASTICS LTD Industrials 
136 MAZOR GROUP LTD Industrials 
137 MEDICLINIC INTERNATIONAL RF Health Care 
138 MERAFE RESOURCES LTD Basic Materials 
139 METMAR LTD Basic Materials 
140 MIDDLE EAST DIAMOND RESOURCE Basic Materials 




142 MONDI LTD Basic Materials 
143 MONEYWEB HOLDINGS LTD Telecommunications 
144 MONTAUK ENERGY HOLDINGS LTD Oil and Gas 
145 MPACT LTD Industrials 
146 MR PRICE GROUP LTD Consumer Services 
147 MTN GROUP LTD Telecommunications 
148 MURRAY & ROBERTS HOLDINGS Industrials 
149 MUSTEK LTD Technology 
150 NAMPAK LTD Industrials 
151 NASPERS LTD-N SHS Telecommunications 
152 NETCARE LTD Health Care 
153 NETCARE LTD Basic Materials 
154 NICTUS LTD Consumer Services 
155 NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD Basic Materials 
156 NOVUS HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
157 NU-WORLD HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Goods 
158 NUTRITIONAL HOLDINGS LTD Health Care 
159 OAKBAY RESOURCES AND ENERGY Oil and Gas 
160 OCEANA GROUP LTD Consumer Goods 
161 OMNIA HOLDINGS LTD Basic Materials 
162 ONELOGIX GROUP LTD Industrials 
163 OPTIMUM COAL HOLDINGS PTY LT Basic Materials 
164 PALABORA MINING CO LTD Basic Materials 
165 PAMODZI GOLD LTD Basic Materials 
166 PEMBURY LIFESTYLE GROUP LTD Consumer Services 
167 PETMIN LTD Oil and Gas 
168 PHUMELELA GAMING & LEISURE Consumer Services 
169 PICK N PAY STORES LTD Consumer Services 
170 PICK'N PAY HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
171 PINNACLE POINT GROUP LTD Consumer Services 
172 PIONEER FOODS GROUP LTD Consumer Goods 
173 PLATFIELDS LTD Basic Materials 
174 PPC LTD Industrials 
175 PREMIER FISHING AND BRANDS L Consumer Goods 
176 PROTECH KHUTHELE HOLD LTD Industrials 
177 PSV HOLDINGS Industrials 
178 QUANTUM FOODS HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Goods 
179 QUEENSGATE HOTEL AND LEISURE Consumer Services 
180 RACEC GROUP LTD Industrials 
181 RANDGOLD & EXPLORATION CO Basic Materials 
182 RARE HOLDINGS LTD Basic Materials 
183 RAUBEX GROUP LTD Industrials 




185 RENERGEN LTD Oil and Gas 
186 REUNERT LTD Industrials 
187 RHODES FOOD GROUP PTY LTD Consumer Goods 
188 ROLFES HOLDINGS LTD Basic Materials 
189 ROYAL BAFOKENG PLATINUM LTD Basic Materials 
190 SANTOVA LTD Industrials 
191 SANYATI HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
192 SAPPI LIMITED Basic Materials 
193 SASOL LTD Basic Materials 
194 SEA HARVEST GROUP LTD Consumer Goods 
195 SEA KAY HOLDING LTD Industrials 
196 SECUREDATA HOLDINGS LTD Technology 
197 SEPHAKU HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
198 SHERBOURNE CAPITAL LTD Industrials 
199 SHOPRITE HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
200 SIBANYE GOLD LTD Basic Materials 
201 SIMMER & JACK MINES PTY LTD Basic Materials 
202 SOUTH AFRICAN COAL MINING HO Oil and Gas 
203 SOUTH OCEAN HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
204 SOUTHERN ELECTRICITY CO LTD Oil and Gas 
205 SOVEREIGN FOOD INVESTMENTS Consumer Services 
206 SPANJAARD LTD Basic Materials 
207 SPAR GROUP LIMITED Consumer Services 
208 SPUR CORP LTD Consumer Services 
209 STEFANUTTI STOCKS HOLDINGS Industrials 
210 STELLA VISTA TECHNOLOGIES Technology 
211 SUN INTERNATIONAL LTD Consumer Services 
212 SUPER GROUP LTD Industrials 
213 TASTE HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
214 TELEMASTERS HOLDINGS LTD Telecommunications 
215 TELKOM SA SOC LTD Telecommunications 
216 THABEX LTD Basic Materials 
217 THARISA PLC Basic Materials 
218 THE FOSCHINI GROUP LTD Consumer Services 
219 TIGER BRANDS LTD Consumer Goods 
220 TONGAAT HULETT LTD Consumer Goods 
221 TORRE HOLDINGS PTY LTD Industrials 
222 TORRE INDUSTRIES LTD Industrials 
223 TOTAL CLIENT SERVICES LTD Technology 
224 TRANS HEX GROUP LTD Basic Materials 
225 TRANSPACO LTD Industrials 
226 TRELLIDOR HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 




228 TRUWORTHS INTERNATIONAL LTD Consumer Services 
229 TSOGO SUN GAMING LTD Consumer Services 
230 UBUBELE HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Goods 
231 UNION ATLANTIC MINERALS LTD Basic Materials 
232 VALUE GROUP LTD Industrials 
233 VERIMARK HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
234 VILLAGE MAIN REEF LTD Basic Materials 
235 VODACOM GROUP LTD Telecommunications 
236 W G WEARNE LTD Industrials 
237 WESCOAL HOLDINGS LTD Basic Materials 
238 WESIZWE PLATINUM LTD Basic Materials 
239 WILLIAM TELL HOLDING Basic Materials 
240 WILSON BAYLY HOLMES-OVCON Industrials 
241 WINHOLD LTD Basic Materials 
242 WITWATERSRAND CONSOLIDATED G Basic Materials 
243 WOOLWORTHS HOLDINGS LTD Consumer Services 
244 WORKFORCE HOLDINGS LTD Industrials 
245 YORK TIMBER HOLDINGS LTD Basic Materials 
246 ZAPTRONIX LTD Industrials 
247 ZCI LTD Basic Materials 
 
Table B-2: Structure of Unbalanced Panel 
Year Number of 
companies 
Percent Cumulative 
2012 217 16.44 16.44 
2013 211 15.98 32.42 
2014 203 15.38 47.80 
2015 189 14.32 62.12 
2016 178 13.48 75.61 
2017 163 12.35 87.95 
2018 159 12.05 100 











Table B-3: Number of companies selected from each industry 




Basic materials 60 323 
Consumer goods 24 117 
Consumer services 45 241 
Health Care 14 65 
Industrials 70 410 
Oil and gas 8 31 
Technology 16 75 
Telecommunications 10 58 
 247 1320 
 
Appendix C 
Table C-1: Regression Results of DWH Test 
 ROA ROE TQ 
DWH Test Statistic 31.667*** 40.415*** 14.031** 
Degrees of Freedom 6 6 6 
The test is based on the levels of firm performance on the foreign ownership, horizontal spillovers and control variables. The 
instruments are the lags of the differenced firm performance, foreign ownership, horizontal spillovers and control variables. Lags 
3 of the differenced foreign ownership and horizontal spillover variables and differenced control variables and lags 1 of the 
differenced firm performance measures are employed as instruments. *, ** and *** indicate significance and the rejection of 𝐻0 at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution. Year, industry dummies and firm age 















Appendix D: Ethical Clearance  
 
 
